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Abstract
Broadly defined, what factors explain changes in party competition in developing
democracies? The dominant theoretical paradigm used to explain changes in party
competition in established democracies does not offer much leverage in emerging
ones. The literature argues that linkages between voting blocs and parties erode
and cleavages shift, allowing for new voter blocs or even new parties. However, if
social groups, parties, and party systems are different in emerging democracies than in
established ones, does this mean the dynamics of party competition are also different?
Also, what does is the role of voters in these systems? My dissertation outlines
a theory for how changes in competition occur. Over time, voters form partisan
attachments to parties based upon what parties say and do. Using extensive fieldwork
my dissertation maps the broad contours of clientelism in Malaysia. I demonstrate
that clientelism, as part of the party brand, has been a significant part of the electoral
strategy for Malaysia’s longstanding dominant coalition. Nonetheless, in recent years
programmatic platforms of opposition parties have become more popular, culminating
in a substantial decline of Malaysia’s longstanding ruling coalition in the 2018 elections.
This finding challenges much of the existing literature, which treats Malaysia as a case
where ethnic political parties are the driving force behind electoral politics. However,
in failing to account for clientelism and the way it is changing, this literature misses a
major factor driving party competition. This has broad implications for democracy in
Malaysia.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Seymour Lipset (1963, 220) made the observation that “in every modern democracy
conflict among different groups is expressed through political parties.” Formally
speaking, “what might be seen as a fairly simple and straightforward process, the
translation of social conflict into political and party alternatives, turns out to be quite
fraught and complex” (Mair 2006b, 372). More on this point, political parties exist
because divisive interests in society also exist (Neumann 1956). Which subsequently
makes for a messy political space, with consistent fluctuations between stability and
instability within the party system. While the dynamic nature of these fluctuations has
occupied the minds of political scientists for decades, and likewise, is the focal point
of this paper; the function of party competition – in both old and new democracies –
remain unanswered. This dissertation will try to address these questions.
Imagine a situation where a voter faces the following choices; they can support the
incumbent party and receive payments in the form of employment, food, subsidized
housing, or additional income. Or they could support the opposition, and receive none
of these benefits. Unless a voter does not need such benefits, and is indifferent to what
the party is offering; their rational action is to support the incumbent party, even if
they must do so reluctantly. If enough voters face similar situations, the incumbent
party is likely to win the election.
Mexico was ruled by the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) for seventy-one

1

years, and these types of clientelistic relationships were a significant aspect of their rule
(Magaloni 2006). Such exchanges were based, first, upon a monopoly over political and
financial resources, and second, on the ability of the PRI to screen supporters from
opponents, and subsequently form patron-client relationships with these supporters.
If the supporters were to defect, they would be excluded from the stream of benefits
dictated by the party.
The PRI was able to identify voters at an individual level, screen loyal supporters
from opponents, and invest in those voters that were most likely to support them. To
do so, they controlled a well-established organizational network of party brokers to
target and transfer goods to constituents. They employed everyone from party bosses,
and labor unions, to schoolteachers. The transfers of private goods from the party
to loyal voters was substantial in both quantity and diversity of goods. The network
was used to transfer everything from cash payments, and food subsidies, to land and
water rights (Camp 1999).
Indeed, the PRI did not coerce voters into supporting the incumbent party. This
was unnecessary. In rural areas often times there did not exist a choice between
parties. The PRI was the only party on the ballot, and certainly poor voters’ ’sincere’
choice was the PRI, even if this choice was constrained (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros &
Estévez 2007). The party could buy votes, and subsequently use their dense network
of party organizations to monitor the behavior of its clients in rural areas. Even in
the face of minor opposition, the PRI would simply threaten to suspend or revoke
transfers. This would sufficiently deter voters from supporting the opposition.
However, urban areas were a different matter. Beginning in the 1950s, political
opposition to the PRI had an important role in larger and wealthier localities. Mexico
City for example, was the earliest center for political opposition (Ames 1970, Klesner
1994, Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros & Estévez 2007). The PRI enjoyed a significant amount
2

of support in Mexico City from working-class constituents, particularly those affiliated
with party and labor unions. Although even unskilled labor, for example taxi cab
drivers and coffee vendors supported the PRI. To these groups, the PRI offered
everything from property titles, and food and housing subsidies, to work opportunities
(Joseph & Henderson 2002).
The debt crisis in 1982 forced the PRI to institute a number of severe austerity
programs, no matter the political cost. Soon after, they started losing support from
working-class voters in Mexico City. Even organized labor, who was up until that point
was an unconditional supporter of the party, started shifting towards the opposition.
By the 1988 presidential elections, both working-class and middle-class supporters
defected to the opposition in Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the National Democratic
Front. Even though the political opposition lost the election, this was the beginning
of the end to the PRI’s rule.
The PRI came in thinking they had a brilliant rescue plan. They make the
argument that the classic system of clientelistic networks, brokers, and intermediaries,
etc all worked well to shore up regime support. But clientelism is inherently inefficient
and cumbersome, and entirely too costly for the current climate of austerity. They
had to find a way to gain the same support for less money. The party’s neoliberal
agenda, with its slim state, clashed with the traditionally expensive mechanisms of
clientelism. The party hoped that more efficient social programs would deliver the
same degree of loyalty at much lower cost.
For awhile it did, as long as they could sell the "first worldization’ narrative to
the population, as the middle-class wanted a quality of life similar to that of the
developed world. But gradually the reduction of the state, privatization, withdrawal
of the parastatals, all of that gradually chipped away at regime support. Because the
party loyalists were no longer receiving benefits from the party, the network collapsed,
3

and many of the party brokers became dissidents or left the party. Eventually the PRI
lost support of both working-class and middle-class voters, first in Mexico City, and
later in rural areas. Mexico soon shifted from a dominant-party system to a legitimate
multi-party system.
What factors explain changes in party competition in developing democracies?1
The dominant theoretical paradigm used to explain changes in party competition in
established democracies does not offer much leverage in emerging ones. If social groups,
parties, and party systems are different in emerging democracies than in established
ones, does this mean the dynamics of party competition is also different? Also, what
does this mean for voters in these systems? Answers to such questions have serious
implications for the quality of democratic governance. In answering this question,
much of the relevant literature traditionally concerns itself with the Lipset-Rokkan
(1967) theory of social cleavages.2

1.1

Existing Explanations

Shifts in voter preferences and subsequent party identification occur within the
electorate, because of a disjuncture between the party-in-the-electorate and the partyin-government. This disjuncture is created through the development of divisive
1

I use the phrases “developing democracy” “new democracy” “emerging democracy” or “industrializing
democracy” interchangeably. By this I mean states where democracy is present, but not completely
established. The definition I use is similar to that of Levitsky and Way, (2010, 5) where semidemocratic systems are defined as “regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are
widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state
places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive, in
that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not
democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus
real but unfair.” There is likely a necessary economic dimension to this, to exclude wealthy mature
democracies, for example the United States or Western Europe.

2

Important to note, Lipset and Rokkan are discussing changes in the party system itself. As Mair
(1997) argues, changes in competition define the very nature of the party system. Thus, in my mind,
there is little difference between the two.
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and salient issues within society; for example slavery during 19th century American
politics, nationalism immediately before the 1918 Irish elections, or the recent Scottish
independence movement in the United Kingdom. Issues that redefine conflict in society
– changing both linkages between social groups and parties – as well as existing and
stable cleavage structures. The role of both the formation of cleavages and their
restructuring is essential to the study of political parties.
Cleavage structures, initially defined by (Lipset & Rokkan 1967) developed out of
complex historical processes stemming from two separate – national and industrial
– revolutions.3 These resulting cleavages “produced stable patterns of group-based
political conflict, expressed through modern party systems” (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta
& Manza 2006, 89). Once established, they provide a durable ‘frozen’ foundation
for political conflict through electoral behavior (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, Rose 1974,
Bartolini & Mair 1990, Brooks, Nieuwbeerta & Manza 2006, 50). For example, both
Lipset & Rokkan (1967, 50) and Deschouwer (2001, 205) assert, “the party systems of
the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the
1920s.” Cleavages then ‘unfreeze’ within the electorate; creating shifts in voter blocs
based upon formation of new connections between groups and parties, subsequently
party system change occurs. What then, makes up a cleavage?
Cleavages are defined by a social reality. Within this reality, they have three
essential and defining characteristics (Bartolini & Mair 1990, Bartolini 2000, Bartolini
2005a, Mair 2006b, Deegan-Krause 2006, Deegan-Krause 2007). 1) A social division
that distinguishes one group from another on the basis of critical social-structural
characteristic, for example class, religion, or ethnicity. 2) There must be an established
collective identity. Whatever group the cleavage is centered upon, must be aware of
3

They can originally be separated into four distinct categories, center-periphery; state-church;
owner-worker; and land-industry.
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its collective interest. For example, women, Catholics, or factory workers must be
aware of their shared identity. Finally, 3) there must be an organization that is rooted
within the cleavage. Whether it is a political party, labor union, or church, there must
be some representative body attached to that reality.
The durability of cleavages in society is important to note here. They are deep
structural divides that persist over a significant period of time. Why is this so? As Mair
(2006b) argues, first and foremost, the interests and groups involved remain significant.
Second, because alternatives to the existing identities are only to be mobilized with
sufficiently large blocs of voters, “and this ended with universal suffrage” (374). Third,
the electoral rules that make up the existing system tend to favor the existing parties,
and cleavages that created those parties. Fourth, because the parties that are attached
to these cleavages, want to remain in power, therefore they control sources of political
conflict. However, this is not to say that existing cleavages do not decline. In fact,
when cleavages based upon historical antagonisms within society eventually erode, and
new linkages are formed, they do so in an eruptive process. Indeed, if party system
change is to be understood, this erosion of existing cleavages in society is critical.
As others (Stanley & Nieme 1993, Manza & Brooks 1999, Heath, Jowell & Curtice
2001) have noted, the magnitude and saliency of cleavage structures, whether they are
economic, political, or cultural, changes both between countries and within them over
time. (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 6) note this themselves when they state the following:
There is a hierarchy of cleavage bases in each system and these orders of
political primacy not only vary among polities, but also tend to undergo
changes over time. Such differences and changes in the political weight of
socio-cultural cleavages set fundamental problems for comparative research.
While old linkages between social groups and parties may decline, new and salient
issues lead to the formation of new linkages. Certainly it seems tautological, that as
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older cleavages decline, newer ones take their place. It is nonetheless necessary to
our discussion. Generally speaking, these shifts occur in one of two ways, either the
partisan alignments of particular groups changes or the relative sizes of groups change
(Brooks, Nieuwbeerta & Manza 2006). Martin (2000, 422 - 427) and Bornschier (2009,
5) both give more detailed explanations.
(1) The most fundamental forces of politics lie in the long-term evolution of social
structure, the primary focus of cleavage-theory. Here, the focus is on those critical
junctures, such as the national and industrial revolutions, which heavily influenced
political development in a path- dependent function. Following Allardt (1968) and
Kriesi (1999), it can be argued that the educational revolution of the 1960s and
1970s has constituted a further critical juncture. Furthermore, it has been claimed
that the processes of globalization and Europeanization that have intensified since
the 1980s and 1990s also constitute a critical juncture shaping party systems (Kriesi
et al. 2006, Kriesi et al. 2008). In an inverse reading of the preconditions of cleavage
formation outlined earlier on, Bartolini (2005b) has argued that the lowering of national boundaries in Europe does not necessarily lead to a new line of opposition, but
to a de-structuring of the functional cleavages at the national level.
(2) These developments do not translate directly into new antagonisms within the
party system due to the force of existing alignments and the freezing of party systems
along historical divides (Clark, Lipset & Rempel 1993). The established parties will
seek to avert the entry of new parties by responding to new potentials within the
electorate, within the limits set by their historical position. The adaptation of the
existing structure of conflicts to new political potentials is the central focus of the
theory of political realignments, which is situated at an intermediate level of analysis.
The weakening of prevailing alignments and the emergence of conflicts cutting across a
prevailing cleavage makes electoral coalitions, united by virtue of this cleavage, break
7

apart and opens the way for the establishment of new links between social groups and
political parties.
(3) The least abstract level of analysis focuses on everyday politics. Here, cyclical
issues of minor importance, corruption scandals and the popularity or unpopularity
of politicians and governments affect the results of elections. Even if such issues
dominate everyday politics, these events rarely affect the two higher levels of political
development. In order for voters to become available to the mobilization efforts of
new actors, the links between social groups and parties on which the established
structure of conflict is based must have weakened (Bornschier 2009, 6). This raises
important questions as to the continuing relevance of cleavage structures within party
system change. While the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage framework has been the dominant
paradigm for changes in the party system, it is not universally accepted.
There have been numerous people who have argued that cleavage structures
have declined, and social position no longer determines political alignment. More
specifically, voters are making decisions within the electorate, independent of their
identity (Dogan 1995, Dalton 1996, Pakulski & Waters 1996). Although numerous
scholars likewise argue that the decline of cleavage structures is considerably overrated, particularly class, (Weakliem & Heath 1994, Weakliem & Heath 1999, Evans &
Whitefield 1999, Goldthorpe 2001) religion, (Manza & Brooks 1999, Knutsen 2004,
Thomassen 2005, Lachat 2007) and gender (Huber & Stephens 2000). This body
of work uses more contemporary theoretical understandings of class, gender, and
ethnicity, and suggests that electoral patterns are consistent with typical cleavages.
That said there is one significant issue with the Lipset-Rokkan model that must be
taken into consideration.
While their influential work has been extended and developed to consider contemporary party systems. They argue that salient cleavages in society create linkages
8

between voters and parties, forming a stable party system. Eventually, the linkages
between voting blocs and parties erode and cleavages shift, allowing for new voter
blocs or even new parties. The formation of such cleavages is critical to the stable
function of party systems. However, the application thus far has largely only examined
Western European democracies. What does this mean for the study of less advanced
democracies?
The work thus far has predominantly been used to study party systems in Western
European polities, particularly Nordic party systems. As Van Biezen & Caramani
(2007, 7 - 8) argue, “The concept of cleavage is the product of a very specific transformation that took place in Western Europe exclusively.” Party systems in much of
Latin America and Africa are products of colonial legacies, which have long-lasting
differences from those found in Western Europe. Similarly, in much of the world, the
addition of universal suffrage did not coincide with the development of a working class
as it did in Europe.
Salient cleavages in new democracies have substantially different historical developments than those of Western Europe. For example, colonialism had a profound impact
on society formation in nascent democracies. The roles of ethnicity, religion, and class
also have different historical evolutions. In part due to significant urbanization, social
class is extremely important throughout much of Latin America. Furthermore, in
most Latin American polities, the Roman Catholic Church played a dominant role in
cleavage structures’ development (Scarritt 2006).
The opposite is true of African politics, where parties are defined, less by class and
religion, and more by ethnicity (Manning 2005). In addition to a dissimilar evolution
of cleavages, both parties and party systems in new democracies should be considered
empirically different from Western European democracies. If cleavage structures,
parties, and party systems are different in developing democracies, it seems intuitive
9

that party competition will also be different.
This brings up important questions of representation. Given that shifts in party
competition is different in consolidating democracies, what does this mean for relationships between voters and parties? This is a difficult question to answer. Certainly
cleavages exist, and do matter in developing democracies. However, it is important to
point out that clientelism “is a pervasive feature of parties in the developing world. . . ”
(Randall 2006, 15). Taking this one step further, Pattioni (speaking in a European
framework) argues that clientelism is incompatible with contemporary understandings
of representation (Piattoni 2001). Because of this, the role of clientelism in consolidating democracies is important to consider.
Take Southeast Asia for example. Social cleavages absolutely exist, and certainly
shape identity that forms political behavior. Ethnicity is a critical factor in identity
in Southeast Asia. For example, Indonesia alone has 300 distinct ethnic groups.
The Philippines has over 175. In fact, ethnic politics is typically the driver behind
elections in Malaysia. Class and labor divisions between urban Manila and rural
parts of the Philippines are important aspects of partisan attitudes. Nonetheless,
parties in Southeast Asia are considered less programmatic and more clientelistic and
personalistic. This suggests that Lipset and Rokkan’s work may have less to say about
newer party systems than old ones. It also makes clientelism and the role it plays in
competition between parties important. Keeping this in mind, I offer an alternative.

1.2

A Brief Overview of the Theory

Similar to social cleavages, clientelism acts as a mechanism for changes in the party
system. As wealth increases, a growing middle-class is more difficult to mobilize using
clientelistic practices. For example, instead of money or food, they may want better
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healthcare, university scholarships for their children, or no clientelism at all. Moreover,
because clientelism is inefficient and parties have limited resources, it is difficult for
the party to successfully mobilize both the lower and middle classes simultaneously.
Changes in competition occur in this manner, when relationships between the voter
and the party breaks down and voters support an opposition party. So why does the
breakdown between parties and voters occur in the first place?
Political attachments are similar to social group attachments. Political parties
develop party brands, (or platforms) and voters attach themselves to them based upon
how closely they fit with one party relative to another. It is a matter of comparative fit
with the brand itself. When the brand strengthens or weakens, the attachment of the
voter strengthens or weakens along with it. If a party brand is strong, partisan voters
are more likely to overlook issues with the party, for example bad performance or
some kind of social strife. However, if the party brand is weak, attachment will also be
weak, and voters are going to be less forgiving. Party competition changes, therefore,
when two conditions are met: 1) the party’s brand weakens, partisan attachment
along with it, and 2) some kind of social issue (e.g. bad performance on the part of
the party, an economic decline, or political scandal) occurs. How does clientelism fit
within this framework?
Given that clientelism is a dominant strategy for mobilizing voters, a strong
assumption can be made for clientelism acting as a party brand. When a party decides
to opt out of patron-client relationships and shift to a programmatic platform, or
voters do not identify as clients, or the party sends mixed signals, the party brand
weakens or dilutes. As the brand becomes more ambiguous, the weaker the partisan
attachment is, and the less competitive the party eventually becomes. These votes,
however, do not disappear. The voter decides their political identity fits better with a
different party brand, for example, one that is more or less clientelistic.
11

1.3

The Nature of Clientelism

The literature on clientelism can be broken into three general approaches (Roniger
2004, Hicken 2011). The first approach, was largely descriptive in nature. It focused
on conceptualizations of clientelism, using singular case studies (Gellner, Waterbury
& Silverman 1977, Land 1977, Schmidt, Guasti, Landé & Scott 1977, Eisenstadt &
Lemarchand 1981). Much of this work argued unsuccessfully that clientelism would
decline once countries develop both economically and democratically. They failed to
understand the evolving dynamics of patron-client relationships. Scholars mistakenly
viewed the relationship between clientelism and development as deterministic.
The second phase of the literature focused on the shifting circumstances, along with
ambiguous relationships between voters and patrons. This work focused on clientelism
as a type of social and political exchange. A specific political strategy for parties to
obtain power (Chubb 1982, Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984, Kettering 1986, Reynolds
1988, Roniger 2004, Hicken 2011). It examined clientelism across different types of
political systems and cultures, both historically and contemporarily. Important to
note, this literature shifted from looking at clientelism as a dyadic relationship, to
clientelism existing in a dense organizational network attached to a political institution,
for example a party or labor union (Clapham 1982, Mavrogordatos 1983). This second
phase is likewise notable for shifting from modernization/development theories of
clientelism, to those emphasizing political institutions as key explanatory variables
(Hicken 2011).
Stemming from this rich strand of research, contemporary scholarship investigating clientelism looks to develop generalizable theories that explain the dynamics
of clientelistic relationships. This newest phase of research attempts to develop an
understanding of the causal mechanisms that influence the evolution of relationships
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between voters and party machines (Nichter 2008, Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno &
Brusco 2013, Hicken, Leider, Ravanilla & Yang 2014, Szwarcberg 2015). This new
research particularly looks to understand what type of voter a party will target most often they are the poorest of voters - and how this relationship exists (and even
flourishes) in a semi-democratic system.
Certainly “the most common association drawn in the clientelism literature
is between the level of economic development and the prevalence of clientelism”
(Hicken 2011, 299). While the connection between economic development and clientelism is fairly well established, (Wantchekon 2003, Keefer 2006, Calvo & Murillo 2004,
Remmer 2007) yet the causal mechanisms at work have yet to be agreed upon.4 The
literature can be divided into two separate perspectives. The first group emphasizes
the effect of development on the clients’ value of a clientelistic relationship, versus
programmatic alternatives. The second group emphasizes the effect of development
on the patrons’ capacity to provide clientelist benefits (Hicken 2011, 299).

1.4

Clientelism and Economic Development

Development can effect a voter’s opinion of the value of a patron-clientelist relationship
in several ways. As income increases, the marginal return on a payment for one’s vote
decreases.5 As income increases, voter preferences concerning the type of benefit also
changes (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Voters become concerned with tax rates and
interest rates. Subsequently, the opportunity costs for supporting a party that only
supplies a clientelist benefit increases, relative to the party that offers a broader range
4

For opposing views to this argument, see Schaffer (2004).

5

This is why patrons target poor voters, they get a better return for their dollar (Dixit & Londregan
1996, Calvo & Murillo 2004). In addition, poor voters are more risk averse than their wealthier
counterparts, and thus, the benefits of clientelism are more appealing.
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of collective goods and services. Wealthier voters have longer time horizons, and are
willing to support a party based on the promise of a future policy benefit, opposed to
an immediate concrete economic benefit.6
Development influences a patrons’ ability to provide clientelist benefits in a number
of ways. As income increases, the cost of clientelism also increases, and the benefits
decline. This ultimately makes more programmatic mobilization strategies more
appealing. First, development allows for greater voter mobility (Nielson & Shugart
1999, Bloom, Craig & Malaney 2001, Kitschelt 2000). As voter mobility increases,
clientelist networks become difficult to develop, monitor, and use to transfer payments.
Second as incomes rise, resources become difficult or expensive to obtain. If a party
has unlimited access to resources, they can easily keep up with economic growth in
the population. However due to the realities of politics, this is often not the case,
and politicians often find clientelism to be less useful over time. Finally, there are
defined social costs to clientelism. As incomes increase, the negative externalities to
clientelism manifest themselves more clearly. For example, as the middle-class develops,
the discontent with perceived corruption also increases (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007,
Singer 2009). This might compel parties to switch to both a more cost effective, and
socially acceptable method of voter mobilization.
While there has been a wealth of recent academic work on the topic of clientelism,
there are several questions that remain. At what point does clientelism end and
programmatic parties emerge? When clientelism declines, what effect does this
have on the fundamental institutions in democratic government? Likewise, greater
investigation into the mechanism that connects economic growth and clientelism
is required. Finally, what does this mean for party competition? Contemporary
6

Lyne (2007) argues that even middle-class voters should prefer immediate benefits through clientelism
opposed to collective goods in the future.
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scholarship involving clientelism has failed to link changes in clientelistic relationships
between parties and voters, to critical institutions in democratic systems (e.g. party
systems). Yet these questions lack sufficient answers. This project will illuminate
answers to these questions, further bridging the divide between comparative politics
literature on clientelism and that of literature on competitive political parties.
Social science literature argues that clientelism is the opposite of what is typically
considered good governance. It sacrifices long-term legitimate democratic institutions
for unequal relationships between citizens and representatives. These relationships
undermine voter autonomy and participation, creating classes of citizens based on
the monetary value of their votes (Stokes et al. 2013). This lack of equality in the
democratic process deprives citizens of effective participation in the collective decisionmaking process. Because of this, voters look at electoral processes with suspicion, and
as a result, the quality of party competition within the democracy in question is likely
to suffer immensely.

1.5

Clientelism and Party Competition

Some scholars argue that electoral institutions can, at times, encourage patron-client
relationships (Hicken 2007, Kitschelt 2000). However, most scholars also argue that
electoral competition acts as a check against clientelistic activity (Geddes 1991, Hicken
2011). For example, an increase in competition between political parties forces
representatives to “professionalize the bureaucracy“ (Hicken 2011, 297).7 Meanwhile,
Keefer (2006, 2007) argues that once a programmatic party takes office, this compels
other parties to opt out of clientelism. This suggests that party competition reduces
clientelism, presumably by either a) raising relative the costs of clientelism or b)
7

See also (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007)
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increasing the risk of clientelism strategies.8
Nonetheless, there are some important contributions to the literature that suggest
otherwise (Kopeckỳ 2011, Gottlieb & Kosec 2017). For example, Epstein (2009) argues
that while parties use clientelism to mobilize voters, clientelism also stifles both party
development and competition, wherein parties use clientelism to hold an undemocratic
monopoly at local levels of government. Moreover, some scholars argue that robust
party competition acts as a double edged sword. For example Levitsky (Levitsky 2007)
argues that competition creates opportunity for labor-based parties in Latin America
to transform themselves into clientelistic parties. Meanwhile in Ghana, Lindberg &
Morrison (2008) argues that a more competitive election results in greater percentage
of reported clientelism. Thus, if clientelism is already used to mobilize voters, it seems
intuitive that clientelistic political parties facing increasing competition from other
parties might attempt to simply further rely on what has worked for them in the past.
Who then do clientelistic parties target in the face of increasing political competition,
and more importantly, is this effective?
Generally speaking, the empirical evidence for whether parties target core or swing
voters with clientelistic appeals is mixed. A variety of studies have found that clientelist
parties target marginal or swing voters (Schady 2000, Stokes 2005, Magaloni 2006).
But others find that parties consistently direct benefits to their core supporters
(Hiskey 1999, Dunning & Stokes 2010). Obviously parties use both strategies to
mobilize voters, although, the combination of the two is less clear. Regardless of
8

Competitiveness is defined and operationalized in a number of ways in the literature—including
party-system fragmentation, electoral volatility, margin of victory, and party turnover in government.
Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007, 28) boil down the indicators of party-system competitiveness to the
following: “when citizens and politicians have strong incentives to try hard and win supporters at
the for one or the other partisan camp.” Under these circumstances, two conditions must be met:
(a) elections are close between identifiable and distinct rival party blocs, and (b) the number of
uncommitted (swing) voters is large enough to potentially tip the outcome of the elections toward
one party bloc or the other (Kitschelt Wilkinson 2007, 28).
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whether the response to political competition and electoral uncertainty is the attempt
to mobilize core supporters or swing voters, it is clear that when facing this competition,
parties cannot rely on loyal supporters alone to maintain or extend power.
The exact mix of clientelistic or programmatic strategies that politicians use to
mobilize such voters depends on two factors: the appeal to swing voters, and the level
of political development. The more party competition forces politicians to appeal
to indifferent voters outside of their support base, the more costly it become to use
clientelism (Hicken 2011, 298). The necessary payment to sway an indifferent voter
is likely to be higher than what is needed to mobilize loyal supporters. Moreover,
the risk that marginal voters will fail to uphold their end of the clientelist bargain is
also considerably higher. Therefore, when using clientelist strategies, the return on a
party’s investment is far lower when swing voters need to be targeted, the incentive to
pursue programmatic strategies should increase with the need to appeal to indifferent
voters (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007).
There has been some evidence to support the assumption that parties act differently
when in office. For example, Desposato (2007) argues that at least at the subnational level in Brazil, clientelist parties will behave differently in the legislature
than programmatic parties. Indeed, a critical factor in whether political parties favor
a clientelist redistribution of goods or a programmatic one, is a matter of access
to resources. As Schaffer (2007) argues, for those parties that have been excluded
from power (“externally mobilized parties” using Schaffer’s terminology) the use of
clientelist strategies is simply not a viable option. They do not have the resources, and
subsequently rely upon a programmatic platform. Once these parties gain power, the
use of clientelism declines and party competition proceeds along programmatic means
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(Piattoni 2001).9 As a starting point, this project uses Schaffer’s (2007) assumptions
to test causal relationships between clientelism, economic inequality, and political
competition in the developing world. However, measuring clientelism can be quite
difficult.

1.6

Measuring Clientelism

Clientelism is difficult to measure, especially over time in a cross-national comparison.
In the past scholars have attempted to use a proxy to measure the influence of party
competition on clientelism. The problem with this lies in the informal nature of
clientelism. Clientelism is a personal relationship between two actors, based upon
a collection of unwritten rules. Therefore, some aspects may be observable, but
clientelism in the aggregate is not. Proxies are variables that substitute variables
which cannot be easily or directly measured, may not be valid or reliable, or simply
not measured. Clientelism is such a variable.
The first example of the use of a proxy for clientelism is Philip Manow (2002, 2006)
constructed an index to measure clientelism in 23 Western Democracies. Certainly,
including aspects of questions like “the misuse of public power for private benefits” or
“improper practices in the public sphere” are very near to patronage. However, there
are significant methodological problems, primarily in that he uses corruption as a key
aspect of the measurement. Substituting an informal and difficult to observe variable
with another informal and difficult to observe variable is more than likely going to
yield inaccurate and untrustworthy results.
Keefer (2007) argues that young democracies are going to be less credible and focus
on rent-seeking instead of the provision of public goods. In order to grasp clientelism,
9

Response to Schaffer’s theory is mixed. His theory cannot account of the decline of clientelism in
the United States or United Kingdom. For a more in-depth critique, see (Keefer 2006).
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he creates a measure based upon several proxies: a) corruption, measured by the
corruption indicator by Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide, a
professional business information provider for international investment; b) rule of law,
measured by Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide, too; c) the
quality of bureaucracy, also measured by Political Risk Service’s International Country
Risk Guide; d) gross secondary school enrollment, with data from World Development
Indicators, taken as an indicator for providing public goods; e) the market share of
government newspapers, according to a special dataset; f) the government wage bill
as a fraction of GDP; and finally g) public investment, the two latter according to
governmental statistics. While this is sophisticated, there are several problems with
it. Certainly bureaucracy plays a role in the pervasiveness of clientelism, however as
Muno (2010) points out, what does either weak rule of law or school enrollments have
to do with clientelism? In sum, as de Sousa (2008) states, Keefer’s “exercise raises
more questions than answers"
There have been other attempts to create proxies for clientelism (Gordin 2002,
Grzymala-Busse 2003, O’Dwyer 2004, Indridason 2006, Arriola 2009). However, these
all share the same problems. It is the general problem of proxy measures. Even if a
measure such as corruption is not used, which is in no way easier to measure than
clientelism, proxies all share the same problem with the respect to validity. They
often times have very little to do with clientelism. Measurements of clientelism that
do exist are either incomplete with significant amounts of missing data, or insufficient
across time and space. This is with the exception of the V-Dem project.
The Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem) uses country-year point estimates,
aggregated from multiple codings submitted by country experts taking into account
disagreement and measurement error. This is coded using an ordinal scale, and then
converted into an interval variable through a measurement model. The measurement
19

fits not only the the conceptual definition of vote buying, referring to the distribution
of money or gifts to individuals in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or
whom to vote for, but also offers a far stronger measure than a proxy would. It is a
direct measure of vote buying instead of an approximation or substitute. Moreover, it
also covers a period of time (1946 to 2016) sufficient for changes in party competition
to occur. Below, in Figure 1.1, you see the mean of their vote buying measurement
from 1974 to 2018 compared to the primary case for this dissertation, Malaysia.

Figure 1.1: Mean of V-Dem Vote Buying Measurement Compared to Malaysia
However, there are problems with this. You can see that vote buying in Malaysia
drops for much of the 1990s and spikes again in the early 2000s. There are a number
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of arguments someone could make here. That clientelism declined when the Malaysian
economy took off, rising again when the economy slowed down in the 2000s. Or that
the BN had significant electoral success, throughout the 1990s and only returned to
using clientelism and vote buying when they started to lose. One can see that vote
buying in Malaysia is less than the mean for the entire dataset, so one might conclude
that vote buying is less than a problem than other countries. Yet, this still fails to
show how vote buying and clientelism are used as a mobilization strategy. It tells you
nothing about how this relationship works between parties and voters, and its impact
when things change. Only when you add context to the data can you understand the
dynamics of clientelism.

1.7

An Outline of This Project

To test the implications of the theory, I use data collected over a twelve month
period, primarily in Malaysia. I use a survey to investigate the role that vote
buying, as an aspect of clientelism, plays in voter behavior. Finally, I delve into
the relationship between voters that are also recipients of a cash transfer program,
and party competition. While there are limitations particularly the reliance upon
cross-sectional data, this project allows for significant insight into the behavior of poor,
rural Malaysian voters. Indeed, the behavior of Malaysian voters, and the dynamics
of pluralism in Malaysia is the crux of the project. Why is Malaysia important?
Until very recently, Malaysia had a uniquely different party system than other
countries, even in Southeast Asia. On the surface you had a dominant party system
where the ruling coalition had been in power for six decades. Beneath that exists a
system where voting is centered around ethnicity. At this level you see legitimate
competition between political parties over ethnic voting blocs. There is legitimate
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party competition between UMNO, and PAS, as they vie for the Malay voting bloc.
Or between the MCA and DAP for the Chinese vote in states like Penang. This
puts Malaysia in a position to illuminate important questions surrounding party
competition.
Like many countries in Southeast Asia, and the developing world, colonialism
has shaped the political culture in Malaysia. The colonially constructed society in
Malaysia and its pronounced emphasis on social divisions is a result of successful
British manipulation and exploitation of ethnic, class, and religious cleavage structures.
Much like British colonialism in East Africa (Mamdani 1996) and India (Cohn 1996)
they used indirect rule and “divide and conquer” policies to categorize, bound, and
control the vast social world in Malaya. For example the 1871 census, the vernacular
education policy, the Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 all transformed ethnic and
religious divisions in Malaysia into official categories, ultimately defining Malaysian
citizenship today.
UMNO and the Barisan Nasional, acting as the post-independence incumbent
party, used these ethnic and religious categories to maintain and extend power. They
relied upon a party brand of developmentalism combined with Malay nationalism,
patron-clientelism, gerrymandering, and malaportionment to not only maximize votes,
but to rule Malaysia with near impunity from independence in the late 1950s to their
significant electoral losses in 2018. The centerpiece of this party brand is the National
Economic Policy (NEP, 1971 – 1990) and its successor, the National Development
Plan (NDP, 1991 – 2000). Both policies have had a clear economic, political, and
social impact on Malaysia (Strauch 1981, Shamsul 1997, Loh 2001).
Throughout the 1970s Mahathir championed the idea that Malay entrepreneurship
was the cornerstone of modernization, and offered the solution to Malay poverty
and backwardness (Shamsul 2001). Within the framework on the NEP, UMNO
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implemented for a number of economic policies that quickly accelerated the pathway
to modernization for Malaysia, transforming it from an agrarian economy, to an
industrialized one. One might say the Malaysian car, the Proton Saga, became a
symbol of this transformation. With this Malaysia saw unprecedented economic
growth, including the construction of the Petronas Twin Towers, the Kuala Lumpur
International Airport, both Putrajaya and Cyberjaya projects, completion of the
North-South highway, and launching of the MAESAT satellite.10 However, there were
other consequences as well, and I argue that because of these consequences, Malaysian
political culture is changing.
The NEP was largely a result of economic inequality between Malay and Chinese
populations, culminating in the 1969 electoral riots. It was designed to lift Malays
out of poverty.11 However, the NEP also resulted in the development of a significant
urban, Malay middle-class.12 From 1970 to 1990, the Bumiputra participation in
the professions and private sector increased. For example, the Bumiputra share of
accountants doubled from 7% to 14%, engineers from 7 to 35 percent, doctors from 4%
10

Development has been a part of Malaysian politics since the colonial era. From 1950 to 1955
the British created the Daft Development Plan, to contribute to post-World War II Malaysian
reconstruction. Since then development planning in addition to five-year plans have been a staple of
Malaysian economic programs, with eleven of them in all. The creation of these plans has become
an important platform for bargaining over resources between ethnic groups.

11

Subsequently there are significant affirmative action policies hardwired into the plan. For example,
Bumiputra quotas in ownership of public company stock, and housing being sold exclusively to
Bumiputras. This results in criticism that the NEP is race-based and not deprivation-based. That
instead of addressing income inequality, the NEP results in an institutionalized system of handouts
for Malays

12

Nonetheless, there is a growing faction that argues the race-based policies of the NEP should be
abolished. Former Prime Minister Badawi, in a speech given to the 2004 UMNO General Assembly
stated, “Let’s not use the crutches for support all the time, the knee will become weak.” The
response was not entirely positive, as Badruddin Amiruldin responded by arguing, “no other race
has the right to question our privileges, our religion and our leader" (Bolton 13 October 2007).
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to 28%, and architects from 4% to 24% (Funston 2001).13 . This new group of urban,
middle-class voters hold differing perspectives than their rural brethren.14 Growth
of this middle-class legitimizes a “new Malay" identity that shifts from the kampung
(village) to thebandaraya (metropolis) (Shamsul 1996b, Shamsul 1996a, Shamsul 2001).
With this new identity comes a differing perspective on politics as well, bringing a
new dimension to the communal politics that has traditionally ruled Malaysia. For
example, in a 2008 poll implemented by the Merdeka Center, 65% of Malays agree
with the statement that the Barisan Nasional’s “race-based affirmative action policy is
obsolete and must be replaced with a merit-based policy”, compared with 83 percent
of Chinese and 89 percent of Indian respondents. Certainly, the urban middle-class is
typically the driving force behind reform, with much of this spurred by civil society.15
Malaysia is no exception in this regard, and a diverse set of interest groups developed
in the 1970s, advocating for human rights, indigenous rights, and the environment.16
Beginning in the 1990s Anwar Ibrahim promoted the concept of masyarakat madani
(civil society) rooted in keadilan sosial (social justice). He argued that Islam and
13

Even still, as of 2007, Chinese Malaysians dominate the professions of accountants, architects and
engineers while Indian Malaysians dominate the professions of veterinarians, doctors, lawyers and
dentists well exceeding their respective population ratios compared to Bumiputra (Aziz 2012).
Likewise, the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia are not considered Bumiputra under the Federal
Constitution despite their indigenous status, and remain marginalized and considerably worse off.
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According to the Malaysian Department of Statistics, the mean household income for the middleclass in Malaysia is 5,662 Ringgit. This of course has a different meaning for urban versus rural
households. For example, a family of four in the Klang Valley with a mean household income of
RM5,662 would likely be considered urban poor, or at least trend that way.
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To elaborate on this further, middle and business classes in Southeast Asia often emerge under
conditions that foster dependence upon the state for resources. This results in civil societies in
Southeast Asia are remarkably weaker than those in established democracies (Luebbert 1991, Eley
2002). Thus, social foundations for democracy in Southeast Asia are much different, generally
lacking mass organizational support. A void that has largely been filled with middle-class led
NGOs against the backdrop of close state-business relations where the poor are uninterested or
disorganized, and authoritarian leaders have been replaced by elites (Rodan & Hughes 2014).
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In fact, Ng, Rangel, Viathilingam, and Pillay (2015) argue that urbanization is the impetus for
changes in competition during the 2013 election.
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social justice were not incompatible. This message spread through Malaysian civil
society, taking a firm hold within the urban middle-class. Instead of cronyism and
money politics, these voters advocated for transparent government and space for
political expression. Meanwhile the Barisan Nasional started to fragment, and instead
of adjusting their party brand to align with the views of middle-class Malays in Kuala
Lumpur and Ipoh, they doubled-down on their existing one, poor voters. While the
BN held onto power throughout the early 2000s in part due to gerrymandering and
malaportionment, this brand eventually failed not just with the urban middle-class,
but voters in rural areas too. Coupled with a successive number of political scandals,
the political fortunes of the BN and more importantly, UMNO, declined during the
2018 elections.
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Chapter 2
Competitive Party Systems: A Theory of
Partisan Attachment in Southeast Asia
2.1

Introduction

Competitive political parties is an essential facet of democracy, and has been a significant aspect of Comparative Politics as a subfield. Nonetheless, the nature of party
competition has been one of the more puzzling features of democratic states after the
Third Wave of democratization. For example, between 1978 and 2007, twenty-five
percent of Latin America’s established political parties have become uncompetitive for
national office. With an average vote share of six percent, parties that once dominated
electoral politics in Latin America, have lost considerable seats to both new parties
and longstanding competitors alike (Lupu 2016). Furthermore, this trend holds in
other regions of the world as well
How might we explain these dramatic shifts in party competition?1 The classical
explanation rests upon Lipset and Rokkan theory of cleavage-based party politics
(Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Lipset and Rokkan in their classic text argue, that salient
divisions in society, create linkages between voters and parties. While these divisions
allow for the formation of a stable party system, eventually the linkages between voting
1

Such changes can often destabilize the party system, leading to significant fragmentation (Roberts
2014). While rare, it is also possible to see complete systemic breakdown (Morgan 2011, Seawright
2012).
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blocs and parties erode, allowing for the formation of new cleavage structures, voter
blocs, or even new parties, creating a new foundation for party competition. However,
cleavage theory has largely only been examined in a framework of Western European
democracies. Indeed, the foundational aspects of the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm are
based upon long-standing historical developments in established democracies.2
While this interaction forms the underlying basis for party competition in mature
democracies, “this same sequence of history does not apply to developing democracies”
(Selway 2011, 11). When developing countries gained independence from colonial
administrators during the post World War II era, the formation of political parties
along with a national identity was much more difficult than that of Western Europe.
In many cases, there was a lack of a national culture, forcing political elites to develop
linkages with diverse ethnic groups within newly defined borders.3 Consequently, there
is a gap in the literature.
Party systems in developing democracies should be considered far less stable
than party systems in established democracies (Kreuzer & Pettai 2003, Mozaffar &
Galaich 2003, Roberts & Wibbels 1999, Tavits 2005). Parties are weaker, and less connected to voters (Dalton & Weldon 2007, Mainwaring & Zoco 2007, Manning 2005).4
Both the existing parties and the system itself are, at times, considerably less insti2

There are other explanations as well: corruption scandals, bad performance of incumbent parties,
economic decline (Kenney 2004, Coppedge 2005). However, these too offer little leverage, incumbent
parties that have long held a significant electoral advantage have survived significant economic crises.
For instance Alan Garcia’s economic policies led to the worst hyperinflation in Peru’s history, yet
his party (ARPA) won twenty-five percent of the vote in the following election (Lupu 2016). At the
same time, dominant parties that have lost power due to corruption scandals have come back to
win electors soon after, for instance the LDP in Japan.

3

There is of course, some debate here. Tavits and Letki (2013) argues that as economic inequality
increases, socio-economic cleavages deepen and become more salient. They argue that because of
this, parties on the left have an incentive to shift voters away from interests to values, thereby
increasing party competition.

4

As Barnes et al (1985) notes, these issues resolve themselves as voters gain more experience with
political parties.
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tutionalized, and are much more prone to collapse than those systems with greater
degrees of institutionalization (Dix 1992, Kuenzi & Lampbright 2001, Mainwaring &
Scully 1995, Riedl 2008, Stockton 2001). What does this mean for the study of party
systems in developing democracies?
This characterization is defined by party systems in developing democracies lacking
the consecutive elections needed to develop strong inter-party competition. Furthermore, as Mainwaring & Zoco (2007) have shown the development of this competition
is not automatic. This is not to say that we should reject cleavage theory outright,
only that we must be careful in taking into account characteristics inherent to political
parties in new democracies. More to this point, the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm does not
fit seamlessly into a study of party systems and party competition in the developing
world. As it does not adequately take into account the changing political attitudes of
voters as part of these social divides.
I offer a competing explanation for changes in the competitiveness of a party
system in emerging democracies. This alternative explanation is based upon Noam
Lupu’s (2009, 2016) theory of party branding and party breakdown.5 The theory
is relatively simple. Over time, voters form partisan attachments to parties based
upon what parties say and do.6 Attachments that are group identities, akin to the
5

Lupu applies this narrowly to Latin America, while I extend it further to Southeast Asia. Regional
emphasis aside, this work departs from Lupu in two significant ways. 1) It shifts the emphasis to
overall party competition instead of individual party breakdown. Lupu argues that sudden shifts
in partisanship result in otherwise established parties suddenly becoming less competitive. This
opens the door to party system fragmentation. I argue that these voters do not disappear from
the electorate, they find new parties to support, subsequently increasing competition. 2) I use
clientelism as the party brand. Lupu argues that clientelism is not relevant to the party brand. That
voters who sell votes still form partisan attachments to parties that are not based upon existing
patron-client relationships. I disagree, and argue that a present patron-client relationship is part
of the attachment. I further argue that such relationships are important up until a point where
something else becomes more salient, i.e. government transparency.

6

I use the term partisan loosely, to describe someone who supports a party, making no distinction
between clientelistic and ideological support. The assumption is that partisanship reflects a voter’s

28

attachments people form to social groups. These attachments are largely based upon
perceptions of both their own political identity and to what extent the party represents
this identity, relative to other parties (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2004). The party
forms a party platform around dimensions of this identity. This platform – or what a
party stands for and what they use to connect to the voter – is the party brand.7 The
more ambiguous the party brand, the weaker the partisan attachment is and the less
competitive the party eventually becomes.8
Important to note, “the degree of identification also depends on comparative fit.”
(Lupu 2016, 7). How closely a voter fits with one party versus another. This implies
that parties can have a significant effect upon mass partisanship. Indeed, this is not
dissimilar from Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal work. However, where Lipset
and Rokkan show little interest in the strategic interaction of parties and voters, this
theory emphasizes strategic shifts in partisan alignment as it relates to perceptions
of the party over time. As the party brand becomes stronger or weaker, partisan
attachment becomes stronger or weaker along with it. If a party brand is strong,
partisan voters are more likely to overlook issues with the party, for example bad
performance. However, if the party brand is weak, voters are going to be less forgiving.
Party competition increases, therefore, when two conditions are met: 1) the party’s
social and political identity, relative to the party, and even a party hardliner has a non-zero
probability of switching parties. Whether they shift because of ideological or clientelistic reasons is
irrelevant.
7

This is similar to a consumer brand.

8

Once again, new democracies typically have high electoral volatility and weak partisanship (Freire
2006). It is therefore important to note the limitations of the theory. It is a theory of party
competition in new democracies. It outlines a process of partisan attachment and reattachment. It
does not address electoral volatility, where voters switch from party A to party B, and then back
to party A. It does not outline a process for stable party competition, and in fact, mass partisan
realignment will likely destabilize the party system. Finally, it is possible where an increase in party
competition will lead to a fragmented party system, in which there is no clear legislative majority.
However, this is true of any substantial increase in competition and in this case, fragmentation is
not the expected outcome.
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brand weakens, partisan attachment along with it, and 2) bad performance occurs.
To illustrate this further, I use clientelism as a party brand.
Clientelism helped numerous parties maintain their local bases of support over
decades. In fact, patronage has become the defining feature – or the party brand – of
many political parties in the developing world. Along with this, there are millions of
voters who identify as clients. However, when the party brand becomes diluted, in this
case, there are several possibilities. On the supply side, perhaps parties are unable to
offer resources, or some party members decide not to offer clientelistic benefits, then
partisan attachment weakens. On the demand side, if voters suddenly do not identify
as clients, or if they do identify as clients, perhaps they switch to a more clientelistic
party, partisan attachment also weakens. This coupled with bad performance, for
example a corruption scandal, or inefficient economic policies, you see an increase
in party competition. This chapter will proceed in the following manner. I will first
discuss social cleavages and why Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) explanation does not fit
with the realities of party competition. I will then illustrate the foundations of the
theory, applying it to Malaysia.

2.2

Social Cleavages in New Democracies

One finds by examining political history that competitive elections disrupt periods of
stability in party identification and power. An important aspect of increasing party
system competition is signified by a dramatic shift in political identification. The shift
in voter preferences from one party to another. These ideological realignments have
a long-term effect, generally, although not always, lasting several electoral cycles.9
9

Key (1955, 16) defines such periods differently as, ‘a concept of critical elections has been developed
to cover a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between
parties.’
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This usually happens when electorate votes impact parties and subsequently party
systems.10
Voters create party system change by identifying with new parties based upon
responses to existing, clearly defined socio-economic or socio-political issues. For
example, it can be due to a poor economic performance over a short period of time.
Likewise, divisive ethnic, religious, or class-based tensions in society cause a shift
in voter preferences. At times, it is due to a dramatic shift in voter demographics
from one party to another. While many of these overlap in numerous ways - it is
not absolutely required that systemic change be multi-dimensional – and therefore
contingent upon combinations of social, economic, or political factors.
The social structures that define the relationship between voters and elites in
emerging polities must be looked at much differently than in mature democracies.
Agency plays a much different role. As Chibber & Torcal (1997) argue, party elites in
new democracies have greater autonomy in making strategic choices. In this framework,
how elites shape bottom-up political conflict in society determines the organization of
cleavage structures. Moreover, when comparing the evolution of these structures across
developing democracies, there is significant variation both between and within regions.
The roles of class, ethnicity, and religion all have different historical developments in
Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
For example, consider the role of the working class in Latin America. In part due
to significant urbanization, social class is historically, extremely important throughout
much of Latin America. Collier & Collier’s (2002) work presents the most ambitious
10

It at times can fracture, or substantially change a party system. For example, during the Israeli
presidential election in 1977 the Likud created a shift from a one-party dominant system to a
two-party dominant system. During the Taiwan presidential election in 2000, the People First
Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union split from the KMT, with both parties taking 20.3% and
8.5% of the 2001 legislative election respectively.
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work on the role of class and labor as a social cleavage in Latin America. Their work
offers credibility into the application of the Lipset-Rokkan framework. Due to the
slow development of universal suffrage, in Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile, all three
have developed class-based cleavage structures similar to that of Western Europe.
Moreover, in all three Latin American states, cleavage structures have frozen into
place for much of the 20th century. (Dix 1989, Coppedge 1998). Particularly in the
case of the Chilean party system, there is a very institutionalized party system, with
a well-defined social basis.11
In most Latin American polities, the Roman Catholic Church has also played a
dominant role in the development of cleavage structures. Primarily as a result of
colonial legacy, the church aligned closely with the state, completely suppressing entire
indigenous populations. A development that caused ethnic groups in the case of Latin
America to align vertically, or ‘ranked’ according to Horowitz (1985) opposed to across
social stratification. This subsequently excluded numerous ethnic groups from political
processes. With the recent exception of the MNR in Bolivia, such exclusion has
largely resulted in religion developing as a base for party support, and not ethnicity
(Van Cott 2000, Randall 2006). However, this has had the opposite effect in much of
Africa.
African party politics are defined, less by class and religion, and more so by ethnicity. As Ottaway (1999, 311) argues, there is an “overt or covert ethnic character of
the majority of the emerging political parties.” Indeed, it is clear that ethnicity shapes
electoraly behavior over consecutive elections at the executive and legislative levels
11

There is a clearly defined contrast between the Brazilian and Chilean cases. Brazil has a poorly
institutionalized party system, where universal suffrage developed rapidly, and clientelistic practices
still characterize party politics. Although one could argue, this offers further support for the
hypothesis that the development of salient cleavage structures is highly dependent upon timing
and magnitude of suffrage within social groups.
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(Nugent 2001). This is despite both legislation and constitutional design prohibiting
the formation of ethnic political parties in states like Tanzania, Ghana, and Cameroon.
While there are questions as to whether or not cleavages are based upon single ethnic
groups, or multi-ethnic; if both traditional parties-in-government and newly formed
opposition parties are going to have any realistic chance at winning seats, they are
going to have to draw support from one ethnic population or another (Scarritt 2006).
There is much greater variation in class, religious, or ethnic cleavage structures
than either Latin America or Africa. South Korea for example, because of ethnic homogeneity and legislation against union involvement in political parties, it is lacking in
ethnic and class-based cleavages. Instead, electoral support for parties in South Korea
has been primarily defined by regionalism (Kim 1998). Japan, equally homogenous,
also lacks salient cleavage structures based on ethnicity. With the LDP on the right,
against the more centrist DPJ; the primary determinant for electoral support within
the Japanese party system is nationalism (Umeda 2013). In all reality, India is what
personifies the complexity of Asian social structures.
There has been a competitive party system within Indian politics since independence in 1947. This has resulted in the establishment of several cleavage structures
within society. The Indian National Congress, which dominated Indian political space
from independence to the 1990s, draws support from all aspects of society, in particular
both upper and lower sections of the caste system, as well as a significant part of
the muslim population (Randall 2006). Whereas oppositional parties like the BJP,
up until 2004, almost exclusively drew support from the Hindu population; but have
recently gained support from both lower sections of the caste system, as well as smaller
parties with contrasting electoral bases (Hasan 2006).
Competition within a party system develops according to Lipset and Rokkan’s
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cleavage theory when new issues become salient in society.12 A salient social cleavage
develops, and in turn, relationships between typically competitive parties and voters
change as well. In such situations voters switch their partisan attachment to less
competitive parties, or even new parties. These divides, punctuated by significant
electoral competition, specifically resolve tension, ‘not adequately controlled . . . by
party politics as usual and result in significant transformation . . . in the general shape
of policy’ (10). During these periods of increased competition, political elites recognize
increased popular concern for a set of issues and the natural divisions among the
group.13
Consider the shift in party identification between the PJ and the UCR in Argentina.
Since the 1940s the PJ largely drew support from urban working class voters, while
12

Consider the role of slavery in 19th century America. One can see a dramatic change in voter
preference and party structures by looking at the American political landscape from 1856 through
1864. At the center of the 1860 election, one sees the emergence of a new grouping of political
beliefs and voter demographics crystalized by the diffusion of slavery across new states. The single
issue of slavery, augmented by the Civil War, defines voter preferences and political actors within
parties. Voter preferences, in this regard, can be seen as manifesting themselves as ballot decisions
of individual voters in whatever is closest to their own personal preferences (defined and prioritized
individually). Slavery was the salient issue at the time. It was fixed on social, political, and
economic forces, creating enormous amounts of turmoil in the American political system. The 1860
election was fought at the sub-national level. Before 1860, Democrats and Whigs were able to
compromise on slavery. However, the Whig party’s collapse following the Nebraska-Kansas Act
and President Taylor’s death in the 1850s created a void in what was respectively a two-party
system (Foner 1970). The collapse of the Whig Party pushed both actors, and voters, towards
new political parties (Holt 2003). However, it does not always have to be due to a clearly divisive
and socially pervasive issue such as slavery. The 1932 U.S. presidential election saw an increase in
party competition with the inclusion of minority voters. Coupled with ideological backlash against
New Deal policies, this shift lead to the Democratic Party gaining an advantage in national and
sub-national American politics.

13

Substantial increases in competition can produce a coalition that resides outside of the two-party
system and produce an additional party during a given election. These parties are generally
issue-based and geographically concentrated and develop out of a coalition in several ways. First,
the coalitions reside in a traditional party and the party decides to abandon the position that
supports a given coalition’s interest. Once systemic change begins, a political party will decide
which positions to include in the platform and which groups that correlate with these positions.
Coalitions become disgruntled with the new positions and gather their constituents to leave the
party. Second, issue salience can organically create a coalition. Traditionally, these derive from a
political, social, or economic crisis and are affiliated by way of political organizations or interest
groups.
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the UCR represented middle and upper classes (Lupu & Stokes 2009).14 However,
starting in the 1970s and culminating in the early 2000s, the Peronist party attracted
both working and middle class voters, (in due to the popularity of Menem’s neoliberal policies) whereas the UCR suffered substantial erosion of middle-class support.
Scholarship investigating this find that class, while historically critical in electoral
politics in Argentina and Latin America more generally, has become a less salient
cleavage, largely being replaced by “abortion, religiosity, and nationalist sentiment”
(Moreno 1999, 22).
In fact, while Moreno finds economic issues act as salient divides throughout the
region, he argues that in most countries these are less important than salient cultural
divides.15 He particularly emphasizes the role of social divides surrounding democracy
and authoritarianism in many countries, and that class-based cleavages have weakened
in the face of neoliberalism and globalization, an observation confirmed by case studies
such as Mainwaring and Torcal’s analysis of Chile (Torcal & Mainwaring 2003, 83).
In the second half of the 1990s, however, Moreno finds that even most democracyrelated divides had shifted in favor of emerging divides related to cultural questions
surrounding a growing indigenous rights movement in Central and South America.
With this in mind, let us reconsider the Argentina example. While class voting
blocs may have shifted, one still needs to consider poor economic performance and
ineffective policies. The UCR made a number of terrible economic choices while in
power, and by 2001 Argentina’s De La Rua was forced to default on Argentina’s
14

In a September 1986 survey, nearly 50 percent of survey respondents named the UCR as “the party
most bound to privileged sectors”; only 8 percent named the PJ. In contrast, 54 percent thought
the PJ offered “the most concrete solutions for neediest sectors,” and 73 percent thought it the
party that “best represented workers,” compared with 25 percent and 14 percent, respectively, for
the UCR (Lupu 2016, 12).

15

For instance, Molina and Perez (2004) find there was relatively weak class voting in Venezuela
under Chavez.
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IMF loans. This, combined with growing intra-party fractionalization, likely had a
substantial impact upon their electoral outcomes.16 Nonetheless, even to the extent
that Latin American politics is “about something,” the partisan attitudes and voter
choices have little influence on institutional elements. Roberts (2002) notes that:
Few Latin America party systems have ever lived up to [Bartolini and
Mair’s] exacting three-dimensional cleavage standards. In particular, the
cleavage structures of most Latin American party systems have had shallower roots in sociological distinctions of class and ethnicity. As pointed
out by Dix, most political parties in Latin America draw support from a
heterogenous cross-section of society (8).
Using survey evidence from the mid-1990s, Mainwaring and Torcal concluded that:
On average, Latin American voters have weaker individual level attachments to political parties than Western European voters. They are not
strongly anchored to parties through the traditional social cleavages that
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized. . . . Even after decades of some
apparent erosion of such cleavages in Western Europe, they remain far
more important in anchoring the vote than in most of Latin America (2003,
17).
This suggests that there are flaws when applying Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory
to party systems outside Western Europe.

2.3

Problems With a Cleavage-Based Theory of Party Competition

Croissant argues that “party systems in Southeast Asia exhibit a much lower ideological or programmatic orientation than party systems in the Western world” (Croissant,
Bruns & John 2002, 347). This is in part due to anti-Communist sentiment on the
part of political elites throughout much of the 20th century, where left-right ideological
16

A 2001 survey found that less than three percent of Argentine voters said that De La Rua’s
administration was managing things well or very well (Lupu 2016, 17).
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differences did not develop, unlike those in Latin America.17 In these instances there
may exist polarization (for instance, Indonesia), but it is primarily a matter of ethnic
or clan strife between political elites. In fact, many of the parties in Southeast Asia
are driven by a combination of ethnic social structures and clientelistic networks
(overlapping at times) where other cleavages may be highly salient, but end up reduced
to clan or group claims.18 Consider the Philippines for example.
Social class in the Philippines is an important social cleavage, especially in large
urban areas like metro Manila.19 However, outside of these areas, a combination of
ethnic tension (e.g. ethnic identity disputes or ethno-political conflict) and clientelistic
networks is what drives partisan attachment. The Philippines has 175 distinct ethnic
groups. In this case, political elites use ethnic groups to foster patron-client relationships (Gera 2016). Even in places such as the Southern Philippines, where ethnic ties
are the strongest, politicization of identity is a byproduct of patron-client relationships
and inequality (Taya 2010). So there is some relationship between social cleavages
and clientelism, at least in Southeast Asia. The question remains then, in what way
17

Much of the literature on political parties and party systems in Southeast Asia argues that political
parties not only programmatic platforms but also have shallow organizational structures. Certainly
these parties are difficult to typify – and resemble a hybrid party – embody characteristics of both
clientelistic and personalistic parties.

18

Thailand is the exception here. Social cleavages in Thailand are centered around an urban-rural
divide, (Bangkok and the periphery) along with a divide between Royalists and their opponents,
and a.weak divide between the Muslim minority in the South and the Buddhist majority. However,
because political parties were never allowed to institutionalize due to a number of reoccurring coups,
these cleavages are tenuously connected to the party system (Ockey 2005). The Thai party system
was first dominated by military and bureaucratic elites, and later in the 1990s and early 2000s
parties were dominated by capitalist elites (e.g. Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party) (Sawasdee 2006).

19

The role of class in electoral politics in the Philippines is further elaborated on in the following
chapter. While it is particularly important in Manila, I do not want to give the impression that it
doesn’t matter in rural parts of Philippines. Indeed, combinations of ethnicity and clientelism are
the primary drivers of political behavior. Social classes still interact in complex ways. Embedded in
this dynamic is the role of status and access to resources, and relationships are far less harmonious
than one might expect. For example, long-standing disputes over land rights and wages are
common among wealthy landowners and poor farmers. Clientelism, often directed toward the poor,
contributes to this contentiousness (Kerkvliet 2002).
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do social cleavages (further illustrated in Table 2.1 below) matter for representation
and political competition?

Table 2.1: Social Cleavages in Southeast Asia: 1946 to 2016
Country
Brunei
Cambodia
East Timor
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

SocioReligious
Economic
H
M
H
H
M
H
M
H
M
M
H

H
M
M
H
L
H
M
L
L
M
L

Cultural
Ethnic

UrbanRural

M
H
L
H
H
H
L
M
L
L
L

M
L
H
H
H
M
H
H
M
H
M

a

Cleavages are broken down into Low, Medium, and High
salience
b
Calculations made by the author based upon archival fieldwork from May 2016 to May 2017

In many instances there are several competing cleavages, for example because of
its colonial history, ethnic groups (along with religious identity) dominate politics
in Malaysia. Likewise, there is a growing urban-rural divide (particularly between
cities in Central Malaysia and rural parts of the north), and a class divide (best
seen between East and West Malaysia). However, the role these cleavages play in
determining shifts in voter identification and subsequent changes in party competition
is open for debate. While ethnic groups play a significant and undeniable role in
politics in Malaysia, one also has to consider other factors. The obvious example is
the 2018 Malaysian elections. The opposition appealed to multiple demographics over
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the need for government transparency, and not entirely ethnic politics, socio-economic
issues, or the urban-rural divide. Individual political attitudes toward the incumbent
party, and the ability of the opposition to utilize those opinions were more important
than salient social divisions.
Consider a more in-depth example, Indonesia, where the evolution of salient cleavages is more complex. Together, religion and ethnicity are the dominant cleavage
structures within Indonesia.20 Religion institutionalized as a cleavage in the 1910s and
1920s after Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch. In 1955, during the first –
and until 1999 – the only free election, political groups divided along religious and
secular lines. The Masyumi and the NU fought in parliament for the implementation
of shari’a law, while the PKI, primarily representing the urban poor, pushed a secular
agenda. However, Sakarno consolidated power, suspended parliament and banned
several political parties, including Masyumi.
Under Sakarno and later Sahurto, political cleavages were destroyed when the
regime suppressed social conflicts (Robinson & Hadiz 2004, 46-49 and 60-62). Independent trade unions and peasant associations were banned and power was centralized
under a neopatrimonal military regime. In regular – but rigged – elections, Golkar the
ruling party, won 60 to 100 percent of the votes. The two existing opposition parties
(the PDI and the PPP) were broadly representative of social strata, with the PPP
strongest in orthodox Muslim areas (Aceh and West Sumatra) and the PDI dominant
in areas with religious minorities (Bali and Flores). However, when Sahurto’s regime
fell in 1998, legitimate political competition and social cleavages returned to Indonesia.
20

Before the coup, there were other social cleavages in Indonesia. A division between “capital” and
“labor” existed, that is largely represented through the communist party (PKI). It surfaced in the
early 1920s and succeeded in attracting the majority of industrial and agricultural workers, yet even
it was expressed with religious overtones (Hindley 1970). The urban-rural divide played out in Java
and the Outer Islands between Masyumi (representing urban voters) and the NU (representing
rural voters) (Mortimer 1969, Geertz 1963).
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After the 1999 elections, many observers expected the new party system to be structured around previously existing social cleavages from the 1950s; surprisingly, it did
not, and while many of those cleavages were still important, they were formed around
parties differently (Ufen 2006). To be sure, religion was still the dominant division in
society, with ethnicity and regional identity being institutionalized through religious
affiliations.21 However, they are now based upon “tranditionalism versus modernism"
and “secularism versus moderate political Islam versus Islamism" (Tomsa 2013).22
Furthermore, the organizational basis of these differences is dwindling, and Muslim
mass organizations do not have the relationship with political parties they did in
the 1950s. This is due, in part, to clerics avoiding political involvement because it
negatively impacts their standing in society (Jung 2008, Sukma 2009). This leaves
religion, even as the dominant social cleavage in society, only shallowly connected to
the party system.
Instead, voters choose parties based primarily upon both clientelism and the
charisma of its leadership. This personalism has resulted in a highly leader-centric
party at the top and pervasive clientelism at the bottom, along with shallow ideological
platforms, and significant fractionalization, where party elites compete within the party
for access to resources. Overall, Indonesian political parties are driven by rent-seeking
and patronage instead of legitimate programmatic debates (Buehler & Tan 2007, Erb
21

Christians in Manado, Flores, and North Sumatra vote for non-islamic parties, Golkar or the PD.
While a class-based cleavage never returned to Indonesia, in regards to other social cleavages, the
urban-rural divide is quite strong. Particularly interesting, there is a regional pattern to such
votes (Liddle & Mujani 2007). Urban voters typically support the PD and PKS and rural voters
support Golkar and the PKB. Golkar, in particular, reinvented itself as a party of the periphery,
with strong support in Bali, Kalimantan, and central Sumatra (Tomsa 2008). While the PKB is
popular in East Java (Ananta, Arifin & Suryadinata 2005).

22

Religious differences surround, for instance, issues concerning religious education, constitutional
amendments, and pornography (Braun 2008, Platzdasch 2009).
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& Sulistiyanto 2009, Fionna & Tomsa 2017).23 According to Slater (2004) parties act
like a cartel, sharing decision-making, power, and the spoils of office.24
Certainly social cleavages exist in the world. However, it seems that while cleavages exist, political attitudes are equally important. There are numerous examples of
shifting political attitudes in societies clearly divided by class, ethnicity, or religion.
Minority and majority ethnic groups may hold very different attitudes about minority
rights to political representation, but attitudes often differ within those groups as
well (especially within majority groups). Likewise, in many countries the attitude
toward minority representation determines the fundamental issue divide within the
majority groups. A similar phenomenon can often occur within and between religious
groups in the form of sharp disagreements among adherents of a dominant religious
sect regarding the role of religion in political life.
While overlooked, individual political attitudes and strategic interaction between
parties and voters are important aspects of the explanation. This is especially true of
clientelism. Perhaps there exists a combination of clientelistic elements—by which
individuals seek tangible rewards based upon expectations surrounding economic
status and performance rather than policy. Juxtaposed against cleavage politics, these
alternatives represent blank spaces. However, in the application of social cleavages,
one should not ignore the fundamental nature of clientelism, which often involves
dense and close-knit social networks. These networks perform many of the same
functions as religious or ethnic groups and can typically be understood in “structural
23

While Indonesian political parties are considered significantly more institutionalized than those
in neighboring Thailand or the Philippines, they still suffer from a number of critical weaknesses,
characteristic of political parties in Southeast Asia more generally.

24

There is some debate surrounding the cartelization of Indonesian political parties. Ambardi (2008)
and Slater (2004, 2018) argue that in the post-Sahurto era, cartelization is a key characteristic of
Indonesian party politics. While the literature trends in this direction, Mietzner (2013) disagrees
and states that much of the literature focused on this debate neglects the competitiveness of
individual parties.
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terms as census-divides or cleavages” (Deegan-Krause 2007, 18).

2.4

A Theory of Partisan Attachment and Party Competition

What explains a substantial increase in the competitiveness of political parties in the
developing world, and why have partisan attachments for some of these parties shifted
dramatically in recent elections? To answer this, we must understand something
about how voters form political opinions and make voting decisions. We must also
understand how political parties make decisions that impact mass behavior. Because
party competition is fundamentally about changing attitudes and choices of voters
from one party to the next. Hence the focus on how voters relate to political parties.
They do so through party brands.
When a party’s platform, or brand is clearly defined, some voters form strong
attachments to it, so strong in fact they may support the party regardless of its
performance in office (Lupu 2016). However, at times, the party brand dilutes or
weakens due to some degree of inconsistency. When this happens, a voter’s partisan
attachment to the party erodes and they start considering the party’s policies while
in office more seriously when making voting decisions. Political parties then become
susceptible to voter’s retrospective evaluations. When established or incumbent parties
both dilute their brand, and perform poorly in office, partisan realignment occurs
and voters defect en masse to new or opposition parties. Party competition then
increases.25 This theoretical framework is outlined in Figure 2.1.
How do parties create brands, and how do these brands impact voters’ long-term
attachment to parties? Scholars who study these relationships have long focused on
advanced democracies, where choices between parties and their brands are relatively
25

This works in both multiparty systems where competition can either go up or down, and dominant
or hegemonic party systems where competition will only go one direction.
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stable over time (Baumer & Gold 1995, Snyder & Ting 2002). Although, how does this
relationship evolve in emerging democracies, where the party, and voter attachments
are both considerably less stable? Beyond the scope of this dissertation, what does
this mean for their political survival, when voters switch to different parties?

Economic/Poli*cal Crisis

Inconsistency
(Brand Dilu*on)

Erosion of Par*san
A<achment

Change in Party
Compe**on

Nega*ve Valence
(Poor Economic
Performance/Social
Conﬂict)

Figure 2.1: A Sequential Theory of Party Competition

2.4.1

How Parties Develop Brands

Party brands give voters some indication of the type of citizen the party represents.
It is not a stretch to imagine that voters have some criteria for evaluating parties in
mind.26 For some it is an ethnic attachment - to what extent does the party accurately
26

I assume voters have a range of possible parties. In both multiparty and hegemonic or dominant
party systems there are situations where voters consider the probability of a party winning an
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reflect their ethnic group. To others it is a economic attachment, and class may be an
important factor in their political identity. Some political parties may seem pro-poor
while others are perceived as reflecting the interests of the wealthy. For instance,
parties that favor the poor might push an agenda of redistribution; while parties that
favor more affluent voters might limit corporate regulation. Finally, some parties are
more clientelistic than others - and voters who are more interested in the monetary
value of their vote will sell to the highest (or perhaps most convenient) bidder.27 In
any case, voters form perceptions of party brands based upon what parties do and say
over time.28
Party elites may publicly advocate for a certain type of policy, cultivate dense
clientelistic networks, they may pass legislation, or associate with other like-minded
individuals, but no matter their behavior they send a signal to prospective voters.29
From a programmatic standpoint, “parties appeal to the middle classes, women, or
ecologists by presenting themselves as representative of their interests and values. . . ”
election. This is probably clearest in a party system where one party is unlikely to lose.
27

It is important to remember not to oversimplify such voters. They are not unidimensionally
clientelistic or ideological, and can sell their votes while still having a policy preference, even if
they do not vote on it. It is merely that immediate benefits outweigh benefits they might receive
from policies in the future.

28

It is likely, especially in new democracies where regional parties are stronger, that a voter can have
an attachment to a national party that is different than an attachment to a sub-national one. For
the sake of simplicity, I focus on national parties and single dimensions of partisan attachments.
However, multiple dimensions of attachment between regional and national parties would certainly
be possible.

29

There is some debate concerning whether voters uniformly interpret the same observation in the
same manner. That is, the effect (if any) partisanship has on the interpretation of information
(Converse 1964, Zaller 1992, Gerber & Green 1999, Bartels 2002). Cambell et al (1960) argue that
partisanship acts as a screen to interpret information. However, more recent scholarship has found
that partisanship and perception works two ways: partisan bias colors perceptions and perceptions
inform partisan bias (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2004, Layman, Carsey & Horowitz 2006). The
necessary question to answer is to what extent does it impede or promote change? As Franklin
and and Jackson (1983, 969) note, “as previous partisan attachment acts to restrain change, it is
like a sea anchor, which retards drift rather than arrests it entirely. If the tides of policy evaluation
are strong enough, conversations can and will take place.”
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(Przeworski & Sprague 1986, 82). From a clientelistic point of view, “parties identify
voter groups that would be amenable to the provision of benefits," in return for their
electoral support (Tzelgov & Wang 2016, 375). Voters then continually update their
prior beliefs toward parties based upon new observations.
This suggests that voters respond to the actions of party elites. They may not see
every action taken by the party representative in the legislature, or every clientelistic
transaction, but they observe some broadly important behavior that gives them
an understanding of trends within the party (Woon & Pope 2008, Ansolabehere &
Jones 2010). Voters then use these observations to update their perception of the
party brand (Zaller 1992).30 This departs from the literature in an important manner.
Green et al (2004) argues that a party prototype is the typical person who votes
for that party (Lupu 2016, 21). For example, working-class voters who think that
most working-class voters support the Labour party, will think that the working-class
voter is the Labour party prototype. This is the same for middle-class voters and
the Conservative party prototype. Instead, think of voters not as party supporters,
but party beneficiaries. Such a voter is the type of citizen whose interests the party
represents, and stands to benefit from its position in government. So the citizen who
votes for the Labour or Conservative party in British elections, or the Kenyan voter
who supports the Democratic party, does so because these parties are perceived to be
those who look out for working-class, or middle-class British, or Luhya voters more so
than Kikuyu.
30

Scholarship implies that a socialization process exists for new voters who model their political
behavior around that of family members (Achen 2002, Kroh & Selb 2009). For instance, they
may discuss politics with their close relatives, friends, or coworkers. There is also literature that
suggests voters intuitively understand who buys and sells votes, despite clientelism being prohibited
(Cruz 2013). In the interest of simplicity, I focus on unidimensional party brands, it is also possible
that parties have different brands for different groups of voters. Parties want to maximize votes
after all. For example, they may have a clientelistic brand for poor, rural voters and a more
programmatic brand for wealthier, urban voters (Lupu 2016).
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These prototypes are derived from a broader set of observations beyond that
of voting patterns. Voters rely on heuristics when forming political attachments,
including the actions of party elites, to determine the typical voter a party represents.
For example, when DAP party elites meet with Chinese interest groups in Penang,
and regularly support policies that benefit the Malaysian-Chinese in that community,
they are more likely to be seen as the party that represents the Chinese in Penang.31
Although, party brands, and by extension, party prototypes are not always clear.
Voters may have a sense of a party brand, but ideas surrounding it are sometimes
vague. With this in mind, party brands can be characterized as clear or strong, when
voters have a better understanding of it. Conversely, when voters have a poor sense of
the party brand, it can be considered weak or ambiguous. Party brands can become
stronger or more ambiguous over time, and as voters observe the behavior of party
officials, they update their perceptions of that strength or clarity. For example, a party
may represent multiple prototypes, where one individual brand may grow stronger
while another grows weaker.32

2.4.2

How Voters Form Party Attachments

Voters update their perceptions of party brands by observing the actions of the party
(Lupu 2016). Repeatedly observing what the party says and does, creates an image of
the party brand. They continually update that image each time they see how the party
behaves, this forms the basis for partisanship. These party attachments are similar to
group identities, where members of the group form an identity based upon attachment
31

Compared to the MCA who also try to mobilize the Chinese in Malaysia. However, their actions
at least by the majority of voters in Penang, are seen as less beneficial.

32

Huber et al (2005) argues there is an institutional effect that determines the degree voters can
observe party actions. I (along with Lupu) largely ignore the role of institutions here.
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to that group.33 These group identities are based upon stereotypes people have about
each group - what a prototypical poor person or a prototypical affluent person looks
like. Huddy (Huddy 2001) argues that a “prototype can either be the most typical
member of a group – an actual person – or a fictional member who embodies the most
common or frequent attributes shared among group members” (133–134).
The group prototype is what individuals use to determine their attachment to that
group. Individuals identify as a poor or affluent person, as Malay or Kikuyu, if “they
think they resemble, or fit that prototype” (Lupu 2016, 22).34 This is also relative
to other groups, where voters feel the greatest attachment to a group when other
group prototypes are dissimilar to their own, this is characterized as comparative fit.
Attachments to the group grow stronger as voters perceive they with closely fit with
the party (Lupu 2016).35 The weaker or more ambiguous the party brand, the less
partisan attachment the voter will have towards the party prototype. (Hogg, Abrams,
Otten & Hinkle 2004).
Partisan attachment will be strongest when voters perceive themselves as similar
to the party prototype and when other party prototypes are dissimilar. For example,
33

There is debate within political science about whether partisanship is based upon social groups or
rational choice (Fiorina 1981, Achen 1992, Gerber & Green 1998). While I rely on the concept
of group identity; in both this theory, as well as rational models, performance evaluations play a
strong factor in deciding competition.

34

There is a strand of literature on ethnic political attachment and partisanship that I have yet
to adequately discuss. In a brief overview, the evidence that ethnicity is a key identifier of
consistent party support, is mixed (Ishiyama & Fox 2006). It is possible for partisans of smaller
ethnic-based political parties to be swayed if they believe another party has a better chance
of winning (Chandra 2009). This is because while ethnicity is an important mechanism for
mobilizing voters, (Posner 2007) ethnicity is also a multi-faceted identity (Horowitz 1985, Fearon
& Laitin 1996, Chandra 2004) and voters can be more or less “ethnic” relative to their political
identity.

35

Partisanship is best viewed as a continuum where you have strong partisan attachment on one end
and weak partisan attachment on the other. So when party brands grow weaker or more ambiguous,
partisan attachment within the population also weakens and the party loses voters who previously
identified with that party.
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a Filipino voter may have a strong partisan attachment to the left-wing Philippine
Democratic party because she both fits closest with the party prototype and other
party prototypes, for example that of the more conservative National Unity Party, is
dissimilar. The question of comparative fit is important here.36 If a voter thinks her
or she resembles two parties’ prototypes then the partisan attachment to both parties
will be weak.37 Even when the voter has a clear understanding of other party brands,
if they see them as equivalent, they will will fail to form a strong attachment. What
happens when a party suddenly changes party brands?
As perceptions of the party changes over time, partisan attachment shifts along
with it. It ebbs and flows as the party brand grows stronger or weaker, possibly without
the voter even realizing it. Imagine a left-leaning party that suddenly becomes more
conservative. Suddenly a voter that had little attachment to a center-left party, now
benefits. Or a clientelistic party that decides to opt out of clientelism and become more
programmatic. A longstanding client of the party will not benefit in the same manner.
However, a voter who does not identify as a client may be more inclined to vote for a
now programmatic party. While they may not identify with them immediately, they
will certainly consider voting for them in future elections. In each case the attachment
of each voter grows stronger or weaker as the party brand changes. This is played out
36

The role of comparative fit is often overlooked in the partisanship literature. As Weisberg and
Greene (2003) argue, “too much of the work on party identification has examined identification
within the in-group without taking into account the views toward the out-group.”

37

This is evident in patron-clientelistic relationships, where a voter has a weak ideological attachment
to a party, and only votes for one party over another because of the benefits they receive. This
is not to say that such parties are completely clientelistic, as there is some evidence that shows
linkages between clientelism and ideology. Tzelgov and Wang (2016) show that economic interests
dictate their likelihood of targeting voters with clientelist benefits. This is more so with right-wing
parties than leftist ones. As Coppedge (1998) explains, “clientelism and ideology are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.. . . Clientelism is merely a means to build and maintain a power base; ideology,
where it exists, is what guides what that power is used for. Many parties are to some degree,
clientelistic, to some degree personalistic, and to some degree ideological; these three qualities will
vary independently” (552).
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when you map class-based cleavages against a clientelistic market.
The middle-class and working-class voters will shift partisan attachment based
upon the strength or clarity of party brands. The poor are typically the targets of
clientelistic parties, and they accept based upon either short time horizons or they
attach greater marginal utility to private goods. In either case, poor voters identify
as clients of a party because of the party brand. They see the party as willing and
capable of buying their vote at a given price. Their party attachment is based upon
clientelism. However, middle-class and more affluent voters are different.
Middle-class voters may reject a clientelistic party for several reasons. They might
object based upon self-interest or some moral reason. Beginning with the former,
they may view clientelism as a negative signal of the quality of governance. Even if
they are not the targets of clientelistic activity, they are consumers of public goods
distributed by the incumbent party. They also might object to a clientelistic party
because of moral or normative reasons. They view clientelism as incompatible with
democratic values and government transparency.38 Regardless of the reason for the
objection, middle-class voters do not identify as clients. Although, this may change
depending on the party brand.

2.4.3

Clientelism as a Party Brand

What about clientelism as a party brand? Lupu (2016) states that “patterns of
partisanship across Latin America suggest clientelism is not the basis for most voters’
attachment to parties” (7). I disagree with this, especially when considering political
parties in Southeast Asia. Clientelism is likely to continue flourishing, particularly
in countries like Thailand, Indonesia, or the Philippines, where modernization and
38

While the poor or working-class voter might feel the same, they nonetheless value the immediate
private goods over some moral objection.
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urbanization have done little to alleviate income inequality. For political parties in
these countries, the complex networks of clientelism have become part and parcel to
traditional networks of reciprocity and exploitation. Indeed, in some cases such as the
Philippines, these networks are complemented by violence and coercion (Quimpo 2007,
Sidel 1999). In this manner, clientelism and corruption more broadly, is a critical
aspect of party politics in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the majority of parties in Southeast
Asia would not be able to function effectively without it.
In the context of Southeast Asia, clientelism is not simply a method for linking
parties and voters, but is a critical aspect of the internal functioning of the party itself
(Hellmann 2011, Tomsa 2013). In fact, in the absence of established rules for party
procedures, decision-making processes particularly regarding candidate recruitment
and promotion are dictated by personal connections rather than merit. As a result,
parties are heavily fractionalized and corrupt, and clientelism – or “money politics”
in both Malaysia and the Indonesia – is a fundamental aspect of this. Furthermore,
any attempt to reduce the persistence of these features has failed. Hence, clientelism,
now and for the foreseeable future, is an underlying characteristic of party politics
in Southeast Asia. Thus, political parties use various forms of clientelism as a party
brand.39
Why use clientelism as a party brand? At the heart of this lies two questions:
1) Why parties buy votes and 2) why voters sell them. Parties buy votes, first and
foremost, because they want to maximize the number of votes they receive, this is true
39

This is despite the likelihood that clientelism poses costs to politicians (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). While
the use of clientelism may gain votes from the poor, it is likely to dissuade middle-class voters. As
Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez (2007) point out, because of budget constraints, spending on
clientelist goods decreases from the pool of resources that could be used to attract more affluent
voters.

50

in both developing democracies and mature ones (Stokes et al. 2013, Aldrich 1995).40
Parties use clientelism as a vote-maximizing strategy only when the cost of said vote
is low (Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004). Voters sell votes when their time horizons
are short and they value the immediate monetary benefits more so than benefits
they might receive through public goods in the future (Stokes 2007, Kitschelt &
Wilkinson 2007).41 This makes clientelism – specifically vote buying as a party brand
– an individual exchange.
This is different than programmatic party brands where political parties mobilize
voters en masse. Clientelistic political party organizations are built around the
mobilization of individual voter demands.42 A clientelistic party, in this case, transmits
to voters a signal of their willingness and ability to sell votes (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova,
Markowski & Toka 1999).43 On the other side of the coin, the voter sells their vote
when they determine the party is both willing to buy it, and capable of meeting
their price. This happens repeatedly, from election to election, creating a partisan
40

This is assuming political parties are 1) not risk averse, and do not fear the possible consequences
of getting caught. 2) They are not concerned with the normative issues surrounding transparency
and good governance. 3) They have the available resources to buy votes. Smaller opposition parties
that do not have the resources to buy votes, are then required to use legitimate programmatic
means to mobilize voters.

41

It is certainly possible where if a voter both sells a vote, and legitimately supports the party they
sold to, they are able to enjoy both immediate and future benefits.

42

It is likely that political parties in these systems are to some degree programmatic, clientelistic,
and personalistic. Where they buy individual votes, have some policy agenda, and base support
around charismatic leadership. For example, the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) both
has an agenda based upon Malay supremacy, and buys votes. Or the UCR in Argentina, who
campaigns on a center-left economic platform but also relies upon patron-client relationships. This
would be in line with the theoretical assumption that a party can have multiple brands and voters
can both sell votes and have legitimate policy preferences. It is also likely that a party, is to some
degree, personalistic as well, where they rely on media and personal charisma to win votes.

43

The ways through which parties use to attract voters is known, in Kitschelt’s (2000) words, as a
“linkage mechanism.” Where the type of linkage mechanism used by parties as their party brand has
important bearings not only on how voters cast their votes but also on how party representatives
associate themselves within the party (Epstein 2009, 347).
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attachment based not upon an ideological or programmatic identity, but a clientelistic
one.44 The voter identifies as a client of a party, and partisan attachment is strong, so
long as the party is willing and able to meet their demands.
However, this limits the political value of a voter, and programmatic appeals based
upon public goods and clientelism (upon private goods) are not entirely congruent.
As Kitschelt and Wang (2014) note, clientelistic parties are not always able to meet
societal demand for public goods. Therefore, when the only motivation for supporting
a party is a periodic monetary exchange, support is likely to quickly erode when
private benefits are absent, insufficient, or unappealing to the voter (Hopkin 2006,
407).45 If clientelism can be used as a party brand, and partisanship can be defined in
clientelistic terms, what happens when the brand weakens?

2.4.4

Weak Brands and Vulnerable Parties

How do these party attachments impact voter behavior? Voters with strong partisan
attachments have equally strong affinities to the party. This is true even when the
party experiences a period of significant economic decline, a scandal while in office, or
they do not fulfill campaign promises. Voters will give the party the benefit of the
doubt because in their minds the party will still look out for them, either through
public or private benefits. As Hirschhman (1970) argues, partisan voters will support
the party out of loyalty when nonpartisans will not.46
44

Indeed, there exists a small number of voters that would be unable to survive without this exchange
(This is taken by the author from an interview with a former UMNO representative in Khota
Bharu, Kelantan on December 1st 2016).

45

This has substantial repercussions for the party, wherein, they will face questions of legitimacy,
and possible backlash (Mainwaring 1999, Müller 2006, Teng 2015).

46

I use the terms “nonpartisan," “swing voter,” or “independent voter” interchangeably. In Mayer’s
words, a swing voter is one “who is not solidly committed to one candidate or the other as to make
all efforts of persuasion futile” (2008, 359). This makes a a swing voter conceptually distinct from
a core supporter or party stalwart.
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How do nonpartisans choose between political parties? From a programmatic
standpoint independent voters or swing voters may choose a party based upon policy
direction, (Downs 1957) From a clientelistic standpoint, this is different, and the
efficacy of both clientelistic and collective goods is what drives independent voters.
While independent voters have an interest in policy, and are not unidimensionally
clientelistic, they are less likely to switch parties based on clientelistic exchanges
than on policy grounds (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).47 Still, valence is important
to every voter, and party choices likely depend upon these issues as well (Kayser &
Wlezien 2011).
Valence issues are those issues on which all voters have the same position, for
example economic growth (Lupu 2016). Since all voters favor economic growth, political
parties form a consensus on the issue. Every party is for economic growth, and the
difference between them, is the degree in which they are more or less competent on
that particular issue, relative to other parties. As Stokes (1992, 148) states, “in valence
politics, nothing succeeds like success, or fails like failure.” Voters rate parties based
upon past performance, and not future proposals. In fact, just considering economic
performance as a valence issue, economic voting is an important aspect of voter behavior
throughout most democracies, developing and otherwise (Anderson 2000, Lewis-Beck
& Stegmaier 2000, Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007).

48

As partisans attachment erodes, and more voters stop identifying with the party,
47

There is, of course, some debate surrounding the role of swing voters in vote buying markets. It is
unclear if parties are more effective in obtaining votes by targeting swing voters, (Schady 2000) by
rewarding core supporters, (Perez 2006) or through a combination of both (Stokes & Dunning 2008).
It is While I discuss this in greater detail in the next chapter, the trend in the literature is that
parties target swing voters over core supports. Still, it is possible that because vote buying is illegal
that parties will target core supporters because they implicitly understand that these voters will
stay quiet in the face of a clientelistic offer.

48

Certainly there are other valence issues beyond economic success. Scholars suggest that both extreme
corruption and social unrest are critical valence issues among voters (Mainwaring 2006, Abney
et al. 2013).
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valence issues such as economic performance become more important. As Coppedge
notes, “the strength of partisan identification therefore moderates the effect of economic
performance on the vote” (2001, 187). This holds true regardless of whether voters
are ideological or clientelistic. Even clientelistic voters will stop supporting a party in
the face of an economic crisis or scandal, see for example the LDP in Japan, the PRI
in Mexico, or the PT in Brazil. In this situation, it is possible for the client to exit
the relationship with the patron and vote based upon programmatic ideals, or align
themselves with a party that offers other private benefits.49 In either case, the voter
decides retroactively that supporting that particular party is not in their best interest.

2.4.5

Brand Dilution

The branding model states that party behavior dictates partisan attitudes. When
party brands are clear, voters will believe they resemble the party prototype. As
long as voters can differentiate between party brands, then partisan attachment will
remain strong. However, party brands change over time. They shift on policy, or
become more or less clientelistic, and consequently the brand is diluted. As the brand
dilutes, voters partisan attachment waxes and wanes along with it. If this happens
often enough, combined with some issue that all voters agree upon, they will no longer
associate with the party, and partisan attachment will shift. What actions causes
parties to dilute their brands?
This is a matter of inconsistency. When voters see a party saying and doing things
that contradict past behavior, their perceptions of the party become poorly defined,
and the party brand weakens. Inconsistency weakens the party brand in two ways.
Perhaps there is some internal conflict within the party that sends conflicting signals to
49

If there is a significant economic crisis, and the party uses state resources to retain power, it is
likely they will not have enough to offer voters.
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the voters, making them more uncertain about who the party represents. For example,
some party members decide not to engage in clientelistic behavior while others do.
Perhaps parties confuse voters when they shift policy positions. For example, if a
party is initially seen as pro-poor, but then suddenly cuts government redistribution
programs. In these instances, voters’ new perceptions of the party conflict with old
ones, making the brand unclear.
When parties become inconsistent they may move closer or further away from
voters. Some voters may come to realize they resemble the party prototype more than
they previously thought, while others realize they no longer resemble the prototype.
Consider a clientelistic party that transitions to a programmatic one. It may lose
poor voters, but it stands to gain in the long-term, middle-class and wealthier voters.
How successful the party is dependent upon the distribution of voters in the political
space. If this distribution of voters is flat, or uniform, then inconsistency will always
lead to erosion of partisanship in the short-term.50 While some voters move closer or
further away, all voters will initially be uncertain about the party’s new position. The
stronger the initial partisan attachment, the longer it will take before they completely
identifying with a new party (Zuckerman, Dasovic & Fitzgerald 2007).
Some voters will take longer to switch parties than others. This depends on how
large or public the inconsistency is. If the shift in brand is small, for example a minor
policy shift, it will go unnoticed by the majority of voters. If it a sizable shift, for
example opting out of clientelism, then more voters will notice. Equally important, for
voters with a long history of political support for one party, new information will make
little difference in their partisan attachment. However, for new voters or those with
50

However, if the party weakens its brand along one dimension, and strengthens it along a different
dimension, the result will be less clear.
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overall weak partisan attachments, new information will have a bigger impact.51 The
effect of inconsistency will therefore depend upon the characteristics of the individual
voter.
Why would a party dilute its brand?52 If parties want to maximize votes, why
would they ever dilute their brand, and risk alienating voters? If we assume that
political parties are unitary actors, it would seem irrational that parties would act this
way. However, parties are not unitary actors, and are complex organizations made up
of diverse individuals (Sartori 1976). At times these individuals may have divergent or
conflicting opinions about the direction of the party. This is especially true in times
of crisis.
New democracies will particularly face times of crisis that may divide the party.
Party leaders in these situations may face regime instability, weak institutions, or the
threat of a military coup. This is alongside economic instability and factions that are
loyal to previous leadership. In this situations party leaders will seek unity for the
country, however, other members of the party may have differing opinions on what
that unity looks like. This search for legitimacy and a unified front leads to party
dilution. Even during periods of stability, there can be intra-party competition or
party fractionalization that leads to dilution.
If there are conflicting views on the direction of the party, and members take
actions that differ from those of party elites, there can be brand dilution. For example,
if party elites advocate for a conservative economic policy position during a campaign,
and other party members support conflicting policies, there will be dilution and voters
will receive conflicting signals. There is another example as well, when parties either
51

This is consistent with literature on older voters (Converse 1969, Converse 1976).

52

There is some debate on whether a party’s ambiguity always has a negative effect. In some cases,
scholars argue, ambiguity can have a positive effect on voters. (Shepsle 1972, Bartels 1986).
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opt out of clientelism or increase clientelistic activity. When party elites want to move
in a more ideological direction and restrict clientelistic activity, while other party
members wish to continue relying on clientelism to mobilize voters, there will be brand
dilution.

2.5

Partisan Realignment and the Implications for Competition

Theories of party competition often emphasize party efforts to attract votes, for
example, spatial models like Downs (1957). Emphasizing partisan attachment and
party strategy, however, has not been a typical focus for spatial models of competition.
Indeed, Downsian spatial models that take into account party interests in fostering
partisan attachment might develop new expectations regarding party competition
(Lupu 2016, 178). However, this would require moving beyond the unrealistic expectation that partisan attachment is “impervious to party strategy” (Kitschelt 1994, 31).
This has implications for not just voters but the competitiveness of the party system
as well.
If party brands matter in this way, we should observe their effects on both political
attitudes and voter behavior. In the realm of attitudes, we would expect to see party
inconsistency weaken voters’ partisan attachments. When looking at voter behavior,
we should see the combination of brand dilution and bad performance, broadly defined,
lead to partisan realignment. For example, the substantial growth in the middle-class
leads to weakening party attachment, ending with a rejection of a clientelistic party
and partisan realignment. This should, in the aggregate, result in an increase in party
competition.
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2.6

Instances of Partisanship and Clientelism in Malaysia

UMNO, the major party within what would become the Barisan Nasional, ruled
Malaysian politics from 1957 to 2018.53 They used a number of illicit mobilization
strategies, including vote buying, packaged around a combination of affirmative action
programs and developmental policies to stay in power. When the PRI declined in
power at the end of the 20th century, UMNO as the head of the Barisan Nasional,
became the longest running dominant party in the world. Although, there would be
cracks in the party machine. The party along with the coalition started to fragment.
Support of the Chinese and Malay middle classes eroded, and seen in figure 2.2 on
the following page, the BN vote share has continuously declined since the early 2000s.
In the 2008 election, UMNO suffered a major defeat when the BN lost its twothirds majority in parliament for the first time since 1974; the ruling coalition also lost
control of five state governments, another unprecedented event. Going into the 2013
election, UMNO was uncertain of victory and worried that party factionalism that
had undermined the BN’s performance in 2008 would continue to hinder attempts to
recover loss of support in later elections. In 2013, UMNO was overwhelmingly rejected,
and for the first time lost the popular vote. Only due to substantial gerrymandering
and malapportionment, were they able to hold onto enough seats to retain power.
However, in 2018 they suffered massive losses. UMNO and the BN lost across the
board, and for the first time they were forced to contest power as the opposition
coalition. To understand why their support eroded, we must consider the UMNO
party brand.

53

While coalitions are critical to electoral success in Malaysia, it is obvious that UMNO, as head of
the coalition, dictates party strategies.
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Figure 2.2: Barisan Nasional Vote Share: 1974 to 2018

An assessment of Malaysia’s economic history, especially industrialization during
the 1990s, would indicate a combination of policies linking a highly interventionist
“developmental state,“ an extensive reliance upon privatization, and affirmative action
directed toward Malays in rural areas (Johnson 1982, Gomez & Kaur 2014). The
developmental state and privatization both can be characterized by close state-business
relations. This state-business relationship was created to develop domestic enterprises
through a system of selective patronage. Affirmative action, introduced in 1970, determined who received privatized rents, while selective patronage was instituted by the
state to promote wealth amongst Malay voters (Gomez & Saravanamuttu 2013, Gomez
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& Kaur 2014).The affirmative action-based New Economic Policy (NEP) served to
eradicate poverty and redress income inequality between the Malay Bumiputera and
other, wealthier ethnic groups. It was designed to increase Bumiputera participation
in the corporate world. Seen in Table 2.2 below, Bumiputera ownership of corporate
entities increased from 1.5 percent in 1969 to almost 20 percent in 2006. This system of
selective patronage through affirmative action would create, and subsequently embed
state-business ties in UMNO.

Table 2.2: Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies: 1969 to 2006 (Percent)
1969

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

1999

2004

2006

Bumiputera
1.5
Chinese
22.8
Indian
0.9
Foreign Owned 62.1

2.4
27.2
1.1
63.4

9.2
NA
NA
53.3

12.5
NA
NA
42.9

19.1
33.4
1.2
26

19.2
45.5
1.0
25.4

20.6
40.9
1.5
27.7

19.1
37.9
1.5
32.7

18.9
39
1.2
32.5

19.4
42.4
1.1
30.1

a

Source: The data is taken from the Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2011-2015. Also found in
(Gomez & Kaur 2014, 3)

UMNO and the BN’s use of developmental programs contributed to strong economic
growth in the 1980s (Jomo, Rasiah & Felker 2013). With the emphasis on industrial
promotion, the ruling coalition transformed Malaysia from a commodities-producing
agricultural economy to one that is well diversified and extremely industrialized.
However, this employment of development policies wrapped around selective patronage
would eventually embed unproductive and wasteful state-business ties involving major
parties in the BN, specifically UMNO. The manner of implementation of these policies
would contribute to acute factionalism in UMNO, disputes that would contribute
to enormous loss of support during the general elections in 1990, 1999, 2008 and
2013 (Welsh 2004, Pepinsky 2009, Ostwald 2013). By 2009, the need to review the
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facilitation of this unique development model would become evident amid growing
concerns over a persistent electoral losses.
Najib, (Prime Minister from 2009 to 2018) called for the elimination of “rentseeking” and spoke of political reforms that allowed for the proper functioning of
political parties, including how they would mobilize voters. This did not include
institutional oversight, nor was there any mention of amending unfair electoral practices
including gerrymandering and malapportionment. UMNO was aware that electoral
reform would work against its interests (Slater and Wong 2013), and they subsequently
retained control over the Election Commission, the unit that is responsible for ensuring
that political parties abide by the conditions under which they were established. This
resistance to change was due to the system of patronage used to mobilize voters, which
in turn, had contributed to persistent factionalism, a critical factor that threatened
its hegemony.54
In an attempt to unify Malaysia, Najib used his 1Malaysia slogan to endorse
numerous policies to address the lives of the poor in the Malay heartland, in addition
to counter domestic outcomes of the 2008 global financial crisis. Najib’s policies,
however, would be characterized by race-based initiatives for a number of reasons.
Regional cleavages had emerged with hardcore poverty rampant in rural areas in
Bumiputera-majority states, including Sabah, Kelantan, Perlis and Kedah, where the
opposition had secured a strong presence (Gomez & Kaur 2014). If this collection of
policies did not explicitly protect or even promote Bumiputera economic interests,
UMNO’s support in rural areas would at risk. Even though regional and social
inequities had emerged because of an abuse of provisions within race-based policies of
54

This is different than opposition party brands. For example, DAP representatives in Penang stated
in interviews with the author on September 9th that when faced with evidence of corruption,
offending candidates are removed from the party.
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the NEP, and were exacerbated by the system of patronage in place, Najib declared
an end to “rent-seeking behavior.”
But problems emerged that would undermine Najib’s check on corruption. In
spite of the pledge to curb patronage, major projects were selectively privatized
There were a number of corporate scandals that exposed illicit relationships between
high-ranking BN politicians and business interests involving government-controlled
firms.55 Corruption remained rampant, and a key problem in UMNO; one leader
in Sabah had reportedly received a RM40 million donation from one individual.
Sarawak’s chief minister Taib Mahmud and his family were criticized for having
amassed enormous wealth by through the abuse of state resources. Meanwhile, Najib
himself was implicated in a scandal involving kickbacks from corporations during the
acquisition of military equipment.
Malaysia’s mix of domestic policies, while allowing for significant development
during the 1990s, would eventually stall. Heavy industrialization projects involving
automobile, steel, and cement production either have failed to develop domestic
markets, or have been been bought out by foreign manufacturing firms. The failure
to incorporate highly enterprising Malaysian-Chinese firms in these sectors was the
key reason why his developmental state policies had performed so badly (Jomo,
Rasiah & Felker 2013). Meanwhile, privatization through selective patronage, has only
contributed to increasing intra-Bumiputera wealth and income inequality, a significant
factor for UMNO’s growing loss of Malay support. Affirmative action, though successful
in creating an educated Malay middle class, has resulted in considerable misuse of
resources in rural areas.
Fractionalization and party feuds due to crony-based patronage severely diminished
55

These scandals included the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ), Sime Darby and National Feedlot
Corporation (NFC), enterprises in which the government had a majority stake.
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UMNOs institutional strength. Specifically, factionalism between party elites and
lower-ranked party members or state-level representatives.56 This arose from the
pervasiveness of patronage that defined UMNOs brand. First, disputes over the
allocation of rents to have resulted in in-fighting between UMNO candidates during
elections. Second, party elites prevent younger party members, particularly the
well-educated, from ascending UMNO’s hierarchy (Gomez & Kaur 2014). These
party elites are unwilling to relinquish key party positions for fear of losing access
to state and party resources. UMNO, inevitably, re-nominates representatives and
state assemblymen with tarnished records, in spite of their proclamations over ending
patronage and rent-seeking behavior.
UMNOs party brand – an odd mix of patron-client relationships, affirmative-action,
and development policies – eventually loses traction with supporters. This is especially
true of middle-class voters in urban areas (Ng, Rangel, Vaithilingam & Pillay 2015).
Instead of rebranding itself, and legitimately advocating for free and fair elections,
UMNO continues down the same path. This backfires among voters, even party
hardliners reject not just UMNO but other parties within the BN. Their brand, once
clearly defined, became ineffective. The rising cost of living in Malaysia, alongside
rising income gaps between ethnic group, and streams of corruption scandals, the
1MDB scandal being the most prominent, leads to partisan realignment.57
Ultimately, I argue that you see a decline in party identification with high levels of
electoral volatility because parties do not form clear/strong brands. There are several
56

Interviews between state representatives in Kedah and Kelantan on January 17th and 24th, 2017
and the author suggest a disparity between party elites and younger party members, or state-level
party members. The subjects of these interviews stated they felt "pressured into" using clientelism
as a mobilization strategy.
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Author interviews with former UMNO, PAS, and DAP representatives find that the 1MDB scandal
has a nation-wide effect. While it clearly influences English-speaking, urban voters, it is also a
topic of conversation amongst rural voters as well.
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dimensions to this. They are unwilling or unable to offer substantial programmatic
benefits, and since representatives fight for resources, they are unable to consistently
offer the same level of benefits, election to election. They may be able to offer greater
monetary benefits for a vote, or a greater amount of patronage in one election, only
to be able to offer less the following election. Especially considering the finite amount
of goods available to the party. This results in voters – as clients – switching between
a core group of parties.
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Chapter 3
Vote Buying and Party Competition:
Clientelism in Malaysia
3.1

Introduction

Clientelistic electoral linkages can be characterized “as the proffering of material goods
in return for electoral support," whereas vote buying, a specific subclass of clientelism
involves the exchange of goods for votes at the individual level (Stokes 2007, 659).1
While previous work has found vote buying to be common in the developing world,
(Auyero 2001) the measurement of its prevalence is difficult to determine (GonzalezOcantos, De Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio & Nickerson 2012). Because of its relationship
to poverty and an incongruence with democratic norms there is an inherent stigma
attached to vote buying, and survey questions that directly ask respondents about
it are likely subject to substantial levels of measurement error. Therefore standard
surveys typically misrepresent the amount of vote buying that occurs (Bradburn,
Sudman, Blair & Stocking 1978, DeMaio 1984).
Acknowledging the existence of social desirability bias related to vote buying,
researchers have begun to use an unobtrusive survey technique (a list experiment)
1

This is different than a programmatic redistribution of goods where benefits are based upon an
investment of public goods in a district (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). More importantly, it is
necessary to note that I reduce the discussion of clientelism in this paper to vote buying. It is more
sensible to focus on vote buying narrowly and to use clientelism and the related literature as a
broad foil in the introduction, literature review, and theory sections only.
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to measure the prevalence and role of vote buying in Nicaragua (Gonzalez-Ocantos
et al. 2012), Mexico (Nichter & Palmer-Rubin 2015), Lebanon (Corstange 2010),
Romania and Bulgaria (Mares, Muntean & Petrova 2017), and the Philippines (Hicken
et al. 2014). Using a research firm I implemented the same survey technique to
measure vote buying during the 13th Malaysian General Election. Using that data,
this paper will add to the existing literature on clientelism, specifically addressing how
patron-client relationships fit within Malaysian politics along with further exploring
how the BN stayed in power and what led to their decline.
As Weiss (2014, 1) argues, “compared to the robust field of studies in neighboring
democracies such as the Philippines or Indonesia, the state of this field in Malaysia is
weak at best.” Much of the existing literature on electoral politics in Malaysia focuses
on election results in single constituency or state (Loh 2001, Brown 2005, Welsh 2004).
While there has been recent scholarship on corruption or illiberal democratic policies
more broadly during Malaysian elections, much of this is either qualitative in nature
or focuses on opaque campaign finance, very little of it focuses on patron-client relationships (Weiss 2006, Weiss 2014, Gomez & Kaur 2014). How does clientelism work
in Malaysia, and what does this mean for party competition?
Certainly “money politics” in a vague sense exists in Malaysia (Gomez & Jomo
1999, Weiss 2007, Gomez 2012, Weiss 2014). However, the significance of patron-client
relationships, and how they impact Malaysian politics has yet to be sufficiently examined. This paper will quantify the degree of vote buying in Malaysia during the
13th General Election. It will map the social, political, and economic demographics
within Malaysia that are most likely to sell their votes. It will further explore how
these relationships affect party competition within Malaysia’s party system. Generally
speaking then, who do parties target?
While there is some evidence to suggest otherwise, clientelistic political parties
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typically target swing voters over core voters (Cox & McCubbins 1986, Dixit &
Londregan 1996, Hicken 2011).2 The logic is fairly straightforward, using a decentralized network of party brokers and campaign workers, it is easier and more efficient to
monitor voters who are on the fence politically.3 Going after hardline supporters is
unnecessary because they will support the party regardless, while targeting immovable,
loyal opposition supporters is a waste of time and money.
In addition to swing voters, the very definition of clientelism suggests a relationship between vote buying and poverty. Certainly it is easy to conclude that with
few exceptions, clientelism is almost exclusively a feature of electoral politics in less
advanced democracies. Subsequently, the bulk of the empirical research finds that
parties consistently target poor, rural voters in a society (Hicken 2011). They do so
because poor voters both value handouts and are more risk averse than wealthier
voters (Scott 1969, Kitschelt 2000, Wantchekon 2003). However, Malaysia is not a
significantly poor state. How prevalent then is vote buying in Malaysia?
This paper finds that during the 2013 General Election, vote buying occurred
approximately 13 percent of the time. Moreover, the findings suggest that Malaysia
is largely consistent with the clientelism literature more broadly. During the 2013
General Election, clientelistic parties targeted rural, poor, and uneducated voters
more so than wealthy, urban, and educated voters. They targeted Malay voters over
other ethnic voting blocs. They likewise targeted swing voters over core supporters.
Such relationships have a significant impact on party competition.
2

While the majority of the empirical evidence suggests that clientelistic parties target marginal
voters over core supporters, there are a few significant findings that suggest otherwise (WeitzShapiro 2006, Magaloni 2006). The variation in the results has yet to be explained, and as Stokes
(2007) points out, there are both conceptual and methodological issues within the field. Therefore,
while it is clear that parties use both strategies to mobilize voters, the exact mix of the two is
unclear.

3

For a more thorough explanation of the role of brokers, see (Stokes et al. 2013).
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The findings imply that clientelism, specifically vote buying, in Malaysia was
used to maintain and extend influence of the BN. This largely fits with the existing
qualitative research on clientelism in Malaysia. It is difficult then, to discern whether
or not the BN was in power because they were truly popular, or simply as a matter
of a dense and efficient clientelistic network. Vote buying in this context ultimately
suppresses legitimate party competition. It limits an individual’s vote to a monetary
value, shortcutting democratic representation. However, electoral outcomes of the
14th general election suggest that clientelism may no longer be working for the BN.

3.2

Who Do Parties Target?

3.2.1

Swing vs Core Voters

What type of voter do parties target? In what has become the clearest theoretical
trend in the literature, Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) proposed a voter model wherein
“two parties compete by offering distributive rewards to voters, both will focus on
the swing, or ideologically indifferent, voters” (Stokes et al. 2013, 32).4 In this case,
it makes little sense for a party with limited resources to reward either, already
loyal voters, or those who steadfastly support the opposition. However, as Cox &
McCubbins (1986) point out, core supporters are more consistent in their responses to
rewards than swing voters. Furthermore, that “candidates are generally less uncertain
about the electoral responses of support groups than they are about the electoral
responses of swing groups” (376).
The foundation of this relationship is that parties will not renege on the distribution
4

While the general consensus is that representatives offer swing voters, this relationship is not entirely
clearly defined. I suspect that politicians, at times, reward core supporters with clientelistic benefits.
This is because vote buying and clientelism more broadly are still illegal, and they are less likely to
get caught. In any case, loyal voters are rewarded to some degree when the party representative
assumes office.
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of rewards after an election, and voters will not turn on the party within the privacy
of the voting booth. To resolve this uncertainty, Stokes (2005) modeled this as an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma in which political machines embed themselves within the
networks of voters, which in turn allows them to make inferences about electoral
behavior, decreasing the secrecy of the ballot. The political machine, in this case, is
able to credibly threaten or outright punish voters that renege on the agreement. It is
this social embeddedness that requires the role of a broker.5
Not only is the party better able to monitor voter behavior through a broker, but
they are able to determine with better efficiency the needs of the voter. For example,
if the Argentine Justicialist Party (PJ) offers a voter a bag of rice in return for her
vote, when she really needs medicine for her children; this is not very efficient. It will
likely result in a bargaining failure between this voter and the PJ. However, through
the use of a broker, the party is better able to determine what will effectively buy a
vote. Parties in this case rely upon the local knowledge, and networks, of brokers.
Moreover, brokers are further able to use these networks, and inherent understanding
of their neighbor’s ideological proximity, to determine who is a swing voter and who
is a core voter.
In a perfect world a resource-rich party would continually maintain office. However,
this is not the case, and market inefficiency does exist. There is a variable level
of competency of the broker. Brokers, at times, make mistakes in offering rewards
to voters. Moreover, such competency is revealed to the voter, but not the party
leadership. Thus if they are offered identical rewards by different brokers, they are able
to choose based upon the individual competency of the broker. Brokers subsequently
compete with each other over blocs of voters (Stokes et al. 2013, 76 - 89). Given this
5

More than just a theoretical argument, this has been proven empirically as well (Cruz 2013)
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competition, and that a broker’s resources are finite, a broker may or may not be able
to offer sufficient rewards to obtain voter loyalty. Considering this, let us examine the
role of the swing voter in a clientelistic relationship more carefully.
The swing voter is politically moderate, and “nearly indifferent between parties on
the basis of policy positions and traditional loyalties, and are more likely to switch their
votes on the basis of particularistic benefits" (Dixit & Londregan 1996, 1148). The
emphasis, more on particularistic benefits, and less on ideological or policy position is
important. If swing voters in developing democracies are more inclined to vote for
a party based upon some particular benefit, it gives an incentive for parties to use
clientelistic practices to cultivate voter loyalties. On the other side of the equation,
it gives these voters incentives to sell their vote to further some social position, or
to mitigate some economic hardship. This makes clientelism, more specifically vote
buying, an economic exchange (Schaffer 2002b).

3.2.2

Clientelism and Poverty

Since vote buying is an economic exchange, poverty is the clearest predictor of clientelism (Stokes 2007, Hicken 2011). Indeed, when making even a cursory examination
of instances of clientelism, one cannot help but note that it is almost exclusively
(but not entirely) a matter of politics in the developing world.6 As the third wave
of democratization occurred, these new democracies were collectively poorer than
previous waves of democratization. Scholars have studied clientelism everywhere
from Latin America (Calvo & Murillo 2004, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012, Stokes
6

Vote buying is greater in poorer regions than wealthier regions. Vote buying is also greater in poorer
countries within regions. Regional Barometers in both Latin America (2002) and Africa (2005) find
that, respectively, 7% and 20% of the population had been offered money for their votes. When
comparing incomes for those years, the average GDP per Capita was $2,800 in Africa and $7,000 in
Latin America (Stokes et al. 2013, 153).
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et al. 2013), to Asia (Chandra 2004, Chandra 2007, Hicken et al. 2014), to Africa
(Van de Walle & Butler 1999, Wantchekon 2003) and everywhere in between. But
why does poverty encourage clientelism? There are two general explanations for this.
Political parties want the largest return for their money, so it makes sense that
they would target poor voters over wealthier ones. Not only do parties get more “bang
for their buck,” but poor voters appreciate a handout more so than wealthier voters
(Calvo & Murillo 2004). As Dixit and Londagren (1996, 1137) state “poor voters
switch more readily in response to economic benefits because the incremental dollar
matters more to them.” This diminishing marginal utility of income offers the voter
a choice between the party with the most appealing program, or one that offers the
greatest material benefit. From purely a material standpoint, nothing is at stake for
the voter trading his or her vote. His or her vote matters little for the outcome, and
programmatic goods will be distributed regardless. Thus, it makes sense to accept
money or goods for a vote, no matter the value.
Likewise, poor voters are unable to wait for long-term material goods, and therefore
prefer direct and immediate handouts over policy change or programmatic goods
in the future (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). As Kitschelt explains, “poor and uneducated citizens discount the future, rely on short causal chains, and prize instant
advantages such that the appeal of direct, clientelist exchanges always trumps that of
indirect, programmatic linkages promising uncertain and distant rewards to voters”
(Kitschelt 2000, 827).7
In contrast, wealthier voters have enough assets to be indifferent to clientelistic
7

Recent work from one study has cast doubt on this explanation. Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2006)
show that poor Argentines were certainly more risk averse than were their wealthier compatriots.
However, risk aversion had no independent effect on one’s propensity to sell one’s vote. Furthermore,
when comparing two equally poor voters, the more risk-averse one was no more likely to sell her
vote than was the less risk-averse one
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offers and subsequently prefer programmatic parties over clientelistic ones.8 The role of
the middle class in the advent of democracy also has foundations in both classical and
more contemporary political theory. Aristotle (1996, 107 - 108) argues that the middle
class is critical to democracy. More contemporary work argues that the middle class
demands democracy (Lipset 1959, Dahl 1973, Brandi & Büge 2014, Glassman 2016).9
This has several theoretical implications. Wealthier, urban voters will be less likely to
accept a party’s monetary offer and parties will consequently be more likely to target
poor, rural voters. More to the point, they will likely target the most marginalized of
voters. However, with a 2013 GDP per Capita of $10,288, Malaysia is certainly not a
poor nation. How then does it fit within this literature?

3.3

Electoral Politics in Malaysia

Malaysia has been a parliamentary system since independence in 1957 (with the
addition of Sabah and Sarawak in 1963). While Malaysia has been relatively stable
throughout its political history (with the exception of a state of emergency as the
result of electoral violence from 1969 - 71), Malaysia has never been completely democratic. While elections regularly occur, they are not completely free and fair, and
civil liberties such as freedom of speech, press, and association are routinely curtailed
(Zakaria 1989, Case 1993, Weiss 2014). With this in mind, Malaysia is better classified
8

Wilson & Banfield (1963, 106) Came to the conclusion this is how clientelistic party machines
declined at the end of the 19th century United States.

9

There is empirical support for this as well. The Latinobarometer survey from 2008, finds that
Latin Americans who perceive themselves as being middle-class are the strongest supporters of
democracy. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2009) also finds support for the thesis
that members of the middle class regard democratic values, among others, as being particularly
important. According to the study, compared to the poor, members of the middle class – defined as
persons having an annual income greater than US $4,268 in PPP terms (circa US $12 a day) – view
democratic institutions and individual liberties such as honest elections and free speech as being
more important (Brandi & Büge 2014, 52).
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as a “semi-democratic" system or a “hybrid regime”, in line with Levitsky and Way’s
(2010) competitive authoritarianism. As a part of this system, gerrymandering is
widely and consistently used to successfully increase the number of ethnically Malay
electoral districts (Lee 2013, Weiss 2014).10
This gerrymandering and malapportionment – along ethnic or communal lines –
reflects the primary cleavage structures existing within Malaysian society.11 Although
there is variation at the sub-national level, Malaysia’s population is made up of 67%
Bumiputera (Malay and indigenous populations), 25% Chinese, 7% Indian, and 1%
“other".12 Party politics are indeed structured around such ethnicities, with a coalition
of parties, the Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front) dominating Malaysia’s electoral
space since independence (Pepinsky 2009). This multiparty coalition is made up of
the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), with approximately ten smaller parties
mostly representing Sabah and Sarawak. In reality all parties within the BN are
subservient to UMNO, and depend upon the party to win seats in the legislature
(Gomez & Kaur 2014).13 These primary parties, with UMNO holding a hegemonic
position within the BN, are firmly entrenched in Malaysian society (Mauzy 2013).
Coalitions are a necessary part of Malaysian politics. They must appeal to voters
within other ethnic groups, for example a Malay candidate must be able to appeal to a
Chinese voter even when such voters vote along ethnic lines. The BN as a coalition has
10

Gerrymandering is conceptualized as the opportunistic demarcating of constituency to favor one
party over another.

11

In Malaysia, as Gomez (1998) points out, when electoral districts are averaged across Malaysia,
one rural vote is worth two urban votes.

12

Eastern Malaysia is made up of approximately 30% Iban in Sarawak and 25% in Kadazandusun
Sabah.

13

This is with the exception of the Parti Bersaka Bumiputera Bersatu, (PBB) the major political
party in Sarawak.
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been incredibly successful in occupying Malaysia’s electoral space, more so than other
multiethnic coalitions in parliamentary systems (Weiss 2014). From 1957 to 2008,
(with the exception of the 1969 election) the BN has held a two-thirds majority in
the federal parliament, along with control of nearly every legislature at the state level.
In 2008, the BN lost its supermajority along with five state legislatures. Opposition
coalitions have come and gone over the course of Malaysia’s electoral history. The
current opposition coalition, formed in 2008, is both the most enduring and most
effective.
This coalition (informally known as the Pakatan Rakyat) is made up of the
Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), and the Parti Islam
SeMalaysia (PAS). In 2013 the opposition coalition won the popular vote 50.8% to
47.38%, along with 40% of the seats in the federal legislature, and control of four state
legislatures. While the BN held onto a majority, there were a significant number of
protests, and cries of electoral fraud were widespread. Under these circumstances, as
Crouch states, “the Malaysian electoral system [has been] so heavily loaded in favor
of the government that it is hard to imagine that the ruling coalition, as long as it
remained united, could be defeated in an election.”14 Yet in the 2018 election, the BN
suffers a surprising and considerable defeat.
In 2015 the Pakatan Rakyat reformed as the Pakatan Harapan (PH). The 14th
general election in 2018 saw a massive defeat of the BN. The PH won 47.33% of the
popular vote. More importantly, the PH won a simple majority of seats in the Dewan
Rakyat, with 113 seats. With the addition of the Sabah Heritage Party having won
another 8 seats and the United Sabah Alliance, winning one seat, two independents
informally aligned with PH, this gives the opposition alliance a total of 122 seats in
14

The quote is taken directly from Case (2013, 121) with the original source being Harold Crouch’s
unpublished manuscript.
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the new Parliament, enough to form a government.15 Conversely, the BN won 36.42%
of the vote and 79 seats, a loss of 54 from the previous election.16
For both the BN and the opposition coalition, elections are extremely expensive.17
Candidates are only allowed to spend no more than 200,000 MYR in parliamentary
elections or 100,000 MYR in state assembly elections. Moreover, financial reports
are not audited on a consistent basis, and many candidates – particularly from the
BN – spend considerably more than allowed. Likewise, party expenses are not well
accounted for, and the BN has a major resource advantage in comparison to the
opposition.18 In addition to a financial advantage, the BN have a monopoly on media
as well. UMNO owns Utusan Malaysia, the MCA owns The Star, and the MIC owns
several Indian newspapers (Ufen 2013, 3). This broadly suggests that money and
influence are a critical part of elections in Malaysia.19
More than just campaign financing, money politics plays out at the ground level
as well. The most recognizable facet of the 2013 elections in Malaysia is that, “a
15

There were several allegations of vote buying during the election. Bersih, a group of NGOS that
advocates for electoral reform pointed out that several BN candidates were publicly reprimanded
for handing out food, petrol, and other goods in their respective districts. Likewise, PAS candidates
were seen handing out money to religious leaders in Kalantan (Bersih Media Statement 2018).

16

For a visual description of the electoral outcomes in the 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2018 elections, see
Appendix A
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More on this point, elections in Malaysia have historically been called rather abruptly, leaving poorly
funded opposition parties and candidates with little opportunity to develop effective campaign
strategies. Meanwhile, BN parties hold mass rallies, disguising them as official addresses, relying
heavily upon the use of government workers and state funds, facilities, and equipment during their
campaigning (Gomez 1998, 266).

18

The issue of how money politics and campaign finance has shaped both electoral outcomes and
internal relationships within the BN been discussed more openly in recent years. As former Prime
Minister Mahathir has stated publicly, “The UMNO I led before was quite powerful. Look at the
assemblies, the spirit. The UMNO today is about money. Leaders in UMNO are loyal because
they get something – the contracts. All the office holders receive money” (Welsh 2016, 225)
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While the opposition owns several newspapers as well, they are not widely circulated. Television
and radio sources are also biased in favor of the BN (Ufen 2013).
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substantial proportion of Malaysian voters – across regions, communities, and classes
– want a politician whom they know and who knows them” (Weiss 2014, 8). While
this varied in practice at the sub-national level, both candidates and voters expect
a “personal touch" as part of the relationship, and as Scott (1972, 8) argues, this
defines a classical patron-client relationship. While Weiss (2014) argues that vote
buying is not as observable, patronage more broadly is an overt and significant part of
relationships between voters and representatives in Malaysian politics. However, vote
buying and patron-client relationships as part of Malaysian politics require further
understanding.
Beyond vote buying, patronage in Malaysian politics can be looked at from two
different perspectives, at the macro and micro levels. At the micro level, representatives and campaign workers would hand out food and housing items to poor voters
during a campaign, in particular rice, cooking oil, or transportation vouchers to travel
to and from the polling stations.20 In some cases these transportation vouchers were
given to voters as rewards for voting for the party. At times, though, they were also
given indiscriminately to both loyal and swing voters alike.
At the macro level, patronage includes development projects (e.g. hospitals, bridges,
and universities) that are almost exclusively offered by BN politicians. These projects
signal an ability of the representative to understand and deliver on local voters preferences. This type of patronage also encourages voters to measure success of the
party in a developmental context, opposed to some other metric, for example good
governance (Loh 2001). Poor voters in rural parts of Malaysia have in the past seemed
to emphasize developmental and local politics over national issues of corruption and
transparency. Such preferences heavily favor the BN, with their resource advantage,
20

This type of aid at the individual level is not limited to just perishable goods. In some cases,
representatives gave assistance to voters whose homes were damaged by a storm.
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over the opposition.
Such developmental and redistributive policies led to significant growth in the 1990s
and has been a cornerstone of the BN platform, helping them to continually maintain
power since 1974. However, these policies contained provisions for wasteful and inefficient patronage systems with direct ties to the BN, specifically UMNO (Gomez &
Jomo 1999).The implementation of these programs led to significant fractionalization
within UMNO. which contributed to a enormous loss of support during the 1990, 1999,
2008, and 2013 elections (Welsh 2004, Pepinsky 2009b, Ostwald 2013).21 After the
1999 election, this led to UMNO leadership attempting to restructure their developmental model in an effort to regain support by rural voters. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
(prime minister from 2003 to 2009) further advocated for liberalizing civil liberties
and curbing the patronage and corruption that was embedded in the the BN.
Badawi attempted to please rural constituents by emphasizing agricultural sectors
of Malaysia’s economy, and urban ones by limiting corruption. As a result, the BN
faired remarkably well during the 2004 election, winning 90% of the parliament and
64% of the popular vote.22 They won control of rural areas previously lost to PAS
in the 1999 election. The also maintained support from urban middle-class voters.
Because of the electoral outcome, UMNO and the BN therefore saw no need to cub
rent-seeking behavior, subsequently failing to develop effective political reforms to
combat corruption and oversee functioning of political parties. Likewise, UMNOs shift
in development models to alleviate poverty in rural areas was equally ineffective. This
left poor, rural Malays in the same predicament as before., with the same system of
21

During the 2008 and 2013 elections PAS campaigned on mismanagement of development projects
by state-level BN representatives.
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While they would have a far better outcome in 2008 and 2013 elections, the opposition saw a
massive setback during the 2004 elections. PAS retained only 7 of its 27 seats. They lost control of
Terengganu and only maintained control of Kelantan by a single seat.
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patronage firmly embedded in BN practices.
Most of the poor, rural population in Malaysia are Malays (Ng et al. 2015). Furthermore, Malays (and by extension the Bumiputera) are the poorest of the three
major ethnic groups in Malaysia. In 2009 the average Chinese household had 1.38
times and 1.25 times as much income as Bumiputera and the Indian population respectively. Likewise, the median financial assets of a Bumiputera household is only 1RM,
while the median financial assets for a Chinese household is 2,135RM (Khalid 2014,
120-121). This is in part due to the failures of the National Economic Plan (NEP)
implemented after the 1969 electoral violence (Ali 2015). Meanwhile, UMNO has
taken efforts to not only win elections in rural Malaysia, but dominate rural society.23
While they lost the 1959 and 1999 state elections in Kelantan and Terengganu to PAS,
using developmentalism as a platform, UMNO and the Barisan Nasional has largely
controlled rural areas of Malaysian political space for the last six decades. Keeping
the resource advantage and developmentalist ideology of the BN in mind, and given
both the social class of rural Malays as well as the relationship between clientelism
and poverty, there are the following two hypothesis.
H1: Malays are more likely to sell their vote than other ethnic groups.
H2: The BN is more likely to buy votes than the opposition coalition.
While there is certainly variation both between states and electoral cycles, the
BN has done well campaigning in rural parts of both Eastern and Northern Malaysia.
The 1999 General Election is summarized by Loh & Saravanamuttu (2003, 176) “as
a poll between the politics of developmentalism – improved material standards of
living, rapid economic growth and stability assumed by many that only the BN could
23

In 1970 they established the Social Development Division in an attempt to promote development
at the local level in a manner consistent with UMNOs agenda (Welsh 2016).
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provide – and the politics of reform in the direction of intangibles like rule of law.”
Furthermore, patronage in this context is not limited to just development projects. It
also includes the distribution of state assistance as well.24
The distribution of government assistance such as BR1M have also been an effective
campaign strategy for the Barisan Nasional, especially among the rural and lower
income groups of its constituency. The BN’s success in rural areas suggests a support
base that is more open to clientelist relationships. It is through these relationships that
the BN – using government assistance programs - distributes patronage to voters.25
BN representatives and campaign workers in rural areas claimed that if the opposition
took power, voters would not be able to enjoy the benefits of government assistance
programs. However, preferences are different among urban voters, and such state
assistance programs are largely irrelevant with these voters.
With the development of a robust middle-class, there have been shifting preferences
among urban voters in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor (Loh & Saravanamuttu 2003,
Ufen 2009, Ng et al. 2015).26 These voters are increasingly demanding national-level
programmatic appeals (e.g. education and housing reform). They further demand
greater democratic electoral reform, electoral transparency, and better representation within parliament. Indeed, the results of both the 2008 and 2013 elections saw
middle-class Selangor voters of all ethnic groups completely rejected the BN on basis
24

BR1M or “Bantuan Rakyat 1 Malaysia” is the best example of this. It is an unconditional cash
handout program developed through the Prime Minister’s office. In practice it is non-partisan,
however, its distribution through party offices such as the BN headquarters in Sitiwan and Kota
Kinablu during the campaign points to the likelihood that it is being used as patronage opposed to
purely a bureaucratic transaction.

25

For example, the BN sweep of Rembau, Negeri Sembilan suggests that their use of targeted state
assistance programs and developmental promises directed toward rural voters is effective.

26

In part, due to the NEP, the Malaysian middle-class has grown substantially in the last twenty years,
in particular the Malay middle-class (Aziz 2012). While the middle-class has yet to consolidate,
and ethnicity is still the dominant cleavage, this has impacted electoral outcomes, resulting in
UMNO and PAS vying for the urban Malay-Muslim voting bloc(Noor 2004).
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of a lack of transparency and overall corruption. This suggests that money is not an
insurmountable electoral advantage.27
One can assume that unlike poor voters in rural Malay villages in peninsular
Malaysia or indigenous populations in East Malaysia, cash handout programs or
general state assistance is of no interest to urban middle-class voters. These voters are
also unlikely to be interested in clientelistic exchanges or patronage more generally.
Moreover, urban middle-class Chinese and Malay voters would be more inclined to see
cash handout programs and state assistance as abuse of tax revenue, and patronage as
incongruent with democracy. In fact, instead of accepting money from parties or the
government, qualitative evidence from the last election found that Chinese and Malay
middle-class voters are more likely to donate money to a campaign (Weiss 2014). From
this, one can then form the following two hypotheses.

H3: Vote Buying is more likely to appeal to lower income voters than higher income
voters.
H4: Vote Buying is more likely to appeal to rural voters than urban voters.

3.4

Non-Clients and the Middle-Class

I argue that when the middle-class is sufficiently large, voters will reject clientelistic
offers. When this happens, changes in party competition will occur.28 How does
evolutions of clientelism cause party system change? If changes in voter preferences
is what drives changes in clientelistic practices, we should see differences in voter
27

For example, despite a well financed political machine, and a significant resource advantage, the
BN only won Titiwangsa by 866 votes in the last election.

28

I view changes in the party system as a sustained increase in party competition over time. In
contrast to other theories of party system change, this happens at the micro-level, when voters
reject clientelism and linkages between voters and parties shift.
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attitudes across both time and income groups. Consider the previous illustration of
the PRI in Mexico. As wealth increases, the middle class develops, and the incumbent
party struggles to mobilize voters.29 In this situation, the voter and the party broker
cannot agree to a price. If this event happens often enough, and voters continually
look to their outside option, a challenging party assumes office.30 Keep in mind, this
does not explain why new parties would enter into the political arena, merely how the
deficiencies of clientelism allow for the opposition to win seats and for systemic change
to occur. While the theoretical perspective best offers leverage in explaining party
system change with dominant or hegemonic parties, it also illuminates the changing
relationship between a party and different demographics.
At what point does the opposition party offer a credible alternative to the incumbent party? It is necessary for there to be dissatisfaction with the incumbent party
(Tavits 2008). This dissatisfaction in a mature democracy, stems from an ideological
or policy-based disjunction between the electorate and the party. I argue however,
in a new democracy, where parties are more personalistic and less ideological, this
dissatisfaction is largely due to clientelistic relationships between voters and party
29

Why is Malaysia useful in this regard? The Malaysian middle-class (and the economy more broadly)
grew substantially at the end of the 20th century. Between 1990 and 2000, the Malaysian economy
was transformed at that point, from an agricultural economy to an newly industrialized market
economy. This is even with the 1997 Asian market collapse. By 1999, nominal per capita GDP had
reached $3,238. New foreign and domestic investment played a significant role in the transformation
of Malaysia’s economy. Manufacturing grew from 13.9% of GDP in 1970 to 30% in 1999, while
agriculture and mining which together had accounted for 42.7% of GDP in 1970, dropped to 9.3%
and 7.3%, respectively, By the end of that same time period, manufacturing accounted for 30%
of GDP. Major products include electronic components – Malaysia is one of the world’s largest
exporters of semiconductor devices – electrical goods and appliances. From 1988 to 1996, Malaysia’s
economy expanded at 8 percent, the second fastest after China, resulting in manufactured goods
such as microchips and semiconductors making up 80 per cent of exports. Per capita income
doubled from 1990 to 1996. Infrastructure projects were greatly increased in this time.

30

When do politicians opt out of clientelism? Weitz-Shapiro (2012) argues that they do so when
political competition is low and poverty is also low.
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representatives.31 These relationships, whether good or bad, are particularly magnified
at a local level, between voters and party brokers, and can quickly determine the
amount of support a party receives.
Stokes et al (2013) offer the clearest theoretical explanation of the role of the broker
in patron-client relationships. As the authors argue, there are clear informational
challenges (i.e. who to target, their preferences and behaviors, etc) when distributing
clientelistic benefits to voters at the local level. This requires the use of a broker.
Brokers act as party representatives, or intermediaries, “who provide targeted benefits
and solve problems for their follorers; in exchange, they request followers’ participation
in political activities such as rallies - and often demand their vote” (75). This repeated
interaction allows them to understand who is willing to sell their vote, and for what
price.
This makes brokers critical to patron-client relationships. Indeed, because clientelism is a quid pro quo exchange – where goods are conditional upon votes – and
monitoring of voters is required to complete the exchange, brokers are essential. It
is brokers who are embedded in the social networks, who provide local knowledge to
the political party, that distribute benefits to targeted voters. For example, parties
depend on brokers to act as intermediaries when mobilizing ideologically indifferent
swing voters. Certainly the only way for parties to understand the preferences and
behaviors of those voters willing to sell their votes, is through the use of brokers.
Brokers are locally powerful individuals who use their resources and influence
to develop clients. In this manner, they collect votes for parties by building large
blocs or networks of voters willing to accept targeted benefits over ideological ones.
This is where both competency of the broker in building voter blocs plays out. A
31

Kitschelt (2000) argues that declining relevance of ideology in party competition will lead into
reappearance of clientelistic links at the grass-roots level.
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competent broker knows their neighbors, “and they are able to solve their neighbors’
problems effectively because they know who needs what (Stokes et al. 2013, 93). This
allows a broker to cultivate a network of clients that is a mix of ideological loyal,
ideologically neutral, and even opposing voters. Party leaders subsequently evaluate
the competency of a broker by the size of their block of clients – how well they are
able to collect votes.
A good relationship between a voter and a competent broker allows the broker to
efficiently buy votes from critical (i.e. poor) voters. Moreover, a party broker that
is viewed as competent by local voters, is further likely to buy votes more efficiently.
The voter’s understanding of a respective broker’s competency is greater, and they
expect to receive the maximum amount for their vote. It is important to note the
following. At a broader level, if the broker is able to develop a large bloc of voters;
and if the party machine is financially established with numerous brokers at their
disposal, there is the increased potential for a dominant party to develop. Therefore,
it seems that if clientelism is extremely high, and you have a well embedded political
machine, with particularly competent brokers, a potentially stable dominant party
system develops.32
However, consider if the opposite is true. If you have a situation where voters
have a poor relationship with party brokers, this unknowingly causes problems for the
incumbent party. The individual relationships between different brokers and voters
within their districts is certainly not constant. First, since vote buying is inefficient
time wise, and voters want to maximize what they receive for their vote, they are less
likely to sell votes to a broker they do not view as competent. The level of competency
is how voters determine the probability they receive the highest utility from selling
32

Consider for example, Tammany Hall in 19th century New York City. Or the previous example of
the PRI.
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their vote. While the broker may be able to successfully secure votes from the poorest
of voters, where the threshold for accepting an offer is lower, they would be unable to
secure votes from those voters that are even marginally better off financially. In this
framework, you are likely to see outright bargaining failure between the two. This
eventually results in the wealthier voter looking to an alternative party.
When does this opposing party consistently make an attractive alternative to a
middle class voter? Based on retrospective voting, “electoral success of new parties
depends on the extent of voter disappointment – both in terms of poor representation
and poor performance – with the existing parties” (Tavits 2008, 115).33 The middle
class in this case is disappointed with the party in government, and subsequently looks
to an alternative party. Obviously economic voting is a part of this.34 More than that,
previous scholarship has shown that voters are more willing to punish a party, than
reward it (Pacek & Radcliff 1995, Tavits 2008). In such a situation the developing
middle class would be in a position to punish the governing party for it’s inability to
make a compelling offer.
Therefore, social class is the driver that pushes for electoral reform. Indeed,
democracy, government accountability, and the rule of law are, after all, demands
characteristically articulated by burgeoning entrepreneurs and middle classes. They
are typically considered the architects of modernization. More to the point, election
reform in many countries around the world has been an undertaking of the middle and
(sometimes) upper classes - from the progressives in the early 20th century United
States to the urban middle classes of Taiwan, Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, and
33

One might ask, why does the incumbent party not distribute public goods in order to secure votes,
and thus hold an advantage over opposition parties. Public goods are distributed to an entire
district, to both loyal supporters, and those of the opposition. Whereas clientelism is an individual
exchange targeting specific supporters.

34

See Lewis (2000) and Tucker (2006).
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the Philippines today. The targets of reform, in contrast, are often the poor. This
has several theoretical implications. That wealthier, urban voters will be less likely
to be offered, let alone accept a party’s monetary offer. Second, that parties will
consequently be more likely to target poor, rural voters. More to the point, they will
likely target the most marginalized of voters. Consider the role of the middle-class in
the Filipino politics, where vote buying is a considerable aspect of electoral politics.
Social class is an important and very real social cleavage to most Filipinos. Nonetheless, it can be difficult to discern class boundaries in the Philippines (Turner 1995).
Typically classes are divided into five groups in the Philippines – labeled A,B,C,D,E –
and delineated by wealth and lifestyle (Schaffer 2005). Class A are the “super rich.”
They include hacienda owners and chief executives. Class B are the “normal rich,” for
example high ranking government officials, medium-sized farm owners, and professional
classes. Class C is the middle class. It includes people who lead comfortable, but not
luxurious, lives. This includes small farm or business owners, mid-level management,
and municipal officials. Class D is the lower class. Their households have some
comforts, but they basically live a hand-to-mouth existence. They tend to be farm
tenants, blue collar workers, or low paid white collar workers. This also includes
taxi drivers, or small shop owners in public markets. Class E are those people who
face great difficulties in meeting their basic needs. They might be street vendors,
farm hands, or manual laborers. They may also be unemployed or hold irregular
jobs (Laquian & Laquian 1998, 111–112).35 Estimates of social classes within the
Philippines using these designations vary somewhat. Depending on the survey, classes
A, B, and C - the middle and upper classes - together make up between 7 and 11%
of the population, class D between 58 and 73%, and class E between 18 and 32%
35

People in urban areas, for example Manila, understand these categories enough to identify where
they fit within them.
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(Schaffer 2002a, 4).36
Together, these classes are not often decisive when determining electoral outcomes.
Whoever wins the vote of the D and E classes typically wins the election. Such was
the (successful) strategy of presidential candidate Joseph “Erap“ Estrada, who ran
in 1998 on the platform of “Erap para sa Mahirap.“ (Erap for the poor). He won
38% of the class D vote and 48% of the class E vote, largely without the support of
ABC voters, of whom only 23% cast their ballots for him. Going into the election
Estrada knew he did not need their votes, and did not spend campaign resources trying
to mobilize them. Some middle class and upper middle class voters had reportedly
said they would leave the country if Estrada were to win. His reply, broadcast on
national television, was that “they can start packing“ (Laquian & Laquian 1998, 111).
Even politics within Makati City - the wealthy financial center of the Philippines is determined largely by the vote of the poor. When Mayor Jejomar Binay’s bid for
reelection in 1995 was opposed by Makati’s wealthy voters he responded disdainfully
that “you only compromise five percent of the people here, and when it comes to votes,
yours don’t matter, we can even do without counting them“ (Gloria 1995, 83). His
assessment was correct, and he won (Schaffer 2002a, 4).
Relatedly, recent work has shown that clientelism and vote buying specifically are
a part of bigger strategies used by candidates in the Philippines. Vote buying tactics
(the most prevalent forms used more benign goods such as food and clothing, but
offers of money were not uncommon) were used to obtain the loyalty and dependency
of their poor constituencies (Canare, Mendoza & Lopez 2018). I suspect this leaves the
36

There are certainly other ways that Filipinos determine social class. Class is, after all, in part a
cultural construct. It obviously has something do to with wealth or one’s place in the economy.
But it is also constructed out of shared values and commitments. When speaking about wealth,
speakers of Tagalog could also distinguish between “mayayaman” (the rich) from “mahihirap” (the
poor). When speaking of politics and social order they might differentiate “elitista” (elites) from
“masa” (masses) (Schaffer 2002a, 4-5).
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Filipino middle and upper middle classes largely feeling frustrated with the nature of
electoral politics in the Philippines. Extrapolating from this, it makes sense they would
be advocates for electoral change.37 Where does this leave clientelism in Malaysia?

3.5

A List Experiment in Malaysia

Obtaining accurate and truthful responses to sensitive survey questions is a significant
methodological challenge in contemporary political science research. Asking substantive questions about issues similar to clientelism can lead to significant biases due
to dishonest responses. Even seemingly harmless questions about individual voter
turnout are known to result in inaccurate answers due to the perceived consequences
in answering them (Blair, Imai & Lyall 2014). In some situations, most notably
conflict settings, the use of direct questions may even endanger both interviewers
and participants, in addition to yielding inaccurate measurements (Gonzalez-Ocantos
et al. 2012). The list experiment is able to avoid this outcome.
Using a Malaysian research firm I implemented a list experiment in Malaysia from
December of 2016 to February of 2017.38 The experiment randomizes a sample of
participants into control and treatment groups. A question is presented along with a
list of the following four non-sensitive items to the control group:
I am going to read you a list that mentions various activities, and I would like for you
to tell me if they were carried out during the last electoral campaign. Please, DO
NOT tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.
37

Beyond that of the Philippines, the role of the middle class in the decline of clientelism, and the
advent of democratization more generally is somewhat different. Modernization theory aside, the
1997 economic crisis and the effectiveness of political leadership made a significant contribution to
the role of the middle-class in democratization in Southeast Asia. As Case (2013) argues, “more
often than lineal patterns of growth, steep crisis has aroused middle-class interest in democracy –
and less for the intrinsic joy of participation than for fear of losing their hard won statuses” (249).

38

The entire survey is found in Appendix A.
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You read or watched news about politics;
You talked about politics with other people
Candidates visited your home or workplace;
You worked on a campaign;
The treatment group is given this same question and list with the following item
added, the sensitive item of interest to the researcher:
You were given a gift/money or someone did you a favor
Participants are then asked to count the number of items on their list that fit certain
criteria. The question does not ask participants to reveal to the interviewer the specific
activities; they only have to tell the interviewer how many activities were carried out.
Consequently, the question provides the participant with a high level of privacy since
the interviewer is unable to discern which activities the respondent indicates. Because
participants intuitively understand this anonymity, the social costs associated with
answering accurately should be substantially reduced, providing less reason to give
inaccurate responses when asked sensitive questions.
Since participants are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups, the
two groups will, on average, be identical in regards to both observable and unobservable
characteristics. Thus, an estimate of the proportion of participants receiving money or
a favor can be obtained easily by comparing the mean number of items indicated by
the participants in each group to the list experiment question. If vote buying does not
occur, there would be no difference in the mean number of items reported (Blair et al
2012). Systematic differences in the means provide a point estimate on the number of
people reporting vote buying activities (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012, 204 - 206).39
39

For example, if the average number of items indicated by the control group is 3.50 and the average
number of items indicated by the treatment group is 3.75, there is a difference of 0.25. One can
conclude that 25 percent of participants received money or a favor.
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Because the respondent is correct in assuming that interviewers cannot determine
whether they personally received money or a favor, until recently, there were clear
limitations to the list experiment (Corstange 2009, 49). Their main drawback is a
potential loss of statistical efficiency due to the aggregation of responses. Furthermore,
it also only allowed for group analysis, so researchers could not understand the demarcations of vote buying at the individual level. For example, the experiment would
only be able to illuminate whether parties target women rather than men, or whether
poor or middle class voters are targeted, opposed to individual level estimations.
Recently, researchers have been able to explore multivariate relationships between
individual characteristics of respondents and their responses to the sensitive information (Blair & Imai 2012, 50). Imai (2011) and Blair and Imai (2012) successfully
conduct a multivariate regression analysis using data obtained from a list experiment.
Using Imai’s estimator, one can derive the exact likelihood function, opposed to an
approximate one. This improves the efficiency of list experiments. Moreover, using
this estimator one can “assume that the addition of sensitive items does not alter
responses to the control items and that the response for each sensitive item is truthful”
(Blair & Imai 2012, 56).

3.6

List Experiment Results and Analysis

Before I analyze the results, I first evaluate the design of the list experiment. There
are two assumptions to consider: the first assumption is no design effects and the
second assumption is no floor or ceiling effects. A list experiment is considered to
have a design effect when an individual’s response to the non-sensitive items changes
depending on whether or not the sensitive item is present. For the list experiment
difference-in-means estimate to be valid, the mean for support for the non-sensitive
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items must be the same on average across treatment and control (Imai 2011). Following Blair and Imai (2012), I use the List package in R to test for such effects. The
p-value on this test is 0.59, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no design effect.
It therefore appears the experiment did not violate assumption 1.
Floor or ceiling effects are when the mean is close to 0 or 5. When looking at
the data presented in Table 3.1 on the following page, it appears that I was able to
avoid violating assumption 2. First, the potential for floor and ceiling effects appears
to be quite small. Out of the 500 survey respondents in the control group, only
7.8% said zero activities were carried out in the last election and only 4.40% said
that four categories were carried out. Additionally, the modal response to my set of
non-sensitive items was just under two, with approximately 52% of the respondents in
the control group providing that number.

Table 3.1: Summary Values for List Experiment Data
List Items
Response Value
0
1
2
3
4
5
Total

Control Group
Treatment Group
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
39
7.80
42
8.27
106
21.20
112
22.05
257
51.40
233
45.87
76
15.20
71
13.98
22
4.40
24
4.72
26
5.11
500
508

a

This table displays the number and percentage of respondents for
each value of Y, the number of items that the respondent supports
in the list experiment, for both the control and treatment group.
It is also important to also determine whether there is balance among demographic covariates across the treatment and control groups. The randomization analysis indicates
that in the overall the treatment and control groups are well balanced in all covariates.
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The T-tests in Table 3.2 below shows that, in general, the means of the both groups are
indistinguishable from each other. Given this result, I can move forward in the analysis.

Table 3.2: Difference in Means Test for Sensitive Item
Control Items
Est.
SE
Sample 1.872
(.04)
N
500
a

Treatment Item
Est
SE
2.002
(.05)
508

Difference in Means
Est
SE
0.130
(.06)**

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

The difference of means between the control and treatment, shown in Table 3.3 on
the following page, are statistically significant. While fairly wide, the 95 percent confidence interval is between 0.01 percent and 25.9 percent. Thus, one can safely conclude
that vote buying happens within the sample 13 percent of the time. This supports the
first hypothesis that vote buying is a significant part of the 13th Malaysian general
election. The subgroup analysis, where I calculate the difference of means for each
demographic within variables can be found in Appendix A.
There are two maximum likelihood models used in the paper, found in Tables
3.4 and 3.5, one with the constraint h0(y; x,0) = h1(y; x,1) and the other without
it. Substantively, this constraint implies that a respondent’s answer to the sensitive
item is not correlated with their answer to the control items after adjusting for the
pretreatment variables (Imai 2011 p 411). The coefficients in the sensitive item column
are coefficients that predict whether someone will answer yes to the sensitive item in
the list experiment (i.e., they accepted money or a favor for their vote). These can
be thought of as showing the demographic correlates of those that affirm clientelism
without any potential social desirability effects. The coefficients in the control items
columns predict the manner in which a respondent will answer the non-sensitive items.
The use of ordinal or nominal variables as independent variables warrants special
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attention here. Imai’s (2011) estimator treats these variables similarly to a logistic
regression model. This is to say, a factor variable is treated as a categorical variable,
although if it is a numerical variable; it treats it as a continuous variable. Termed the
proportional odds assumption, it is quite common to treat such variables as continuous,
or, more precisely, as having interval-level measurement with linear effects. The advantage of this approach is that interpretation is simple; yet, it requires making the strong
assumption that categories of the ordinal variable are equally spaced (O’Connell 2006).
Although, even variables with interval-level coding do not necessarily have linear
effects, and it is often questionable to believe that the categories are equally spaced.
Tests of this assumption nearly always result in its rejection, particularly when the
sample size is large, (Clogg & Shihadeh 1994) the number of independent variables
is large, (Brant 1990), or there is a continuous explanatory variable in the model
(Allison 1999). It is then necessary to examine the data using separate tests for each
independent variable of interest, in this case, the income and education variables.
To test the proportional odds assumption, otherwise known as the parallel regression assumption, I use a Likelihood-Ratio Test for both variables in the control and
treatment data. The Likelihood-Ratio Test results in an insignificant p-value (.129)
for the variables in the control data. However, the test results in a significant p-value
(.008) for both the variables in question within the treatment data, suggesting we
should not treat either of these variables linearly.40 Typically this would require the
use of a different model, one that relaxes the proportional odds assumption; however,
this would negate the advantages of Imai’s model. To address this issue, I dummy
apart both the income and education variables, and include theoretically important
aspects of each variable in the statistical models.
40

The other variables had insignificant Likelihood-Ratio Tests.

92

I include, as two separate dummy variables, those respondents that have a primary education and those that have a Bachelor’s degree. Education is compulsory in
Malaysia, and the majority of voters in Malaysia have a primary education; although,
voters with a Bachelor’s Degree are more likely to be middle-class in Malaysia. I
also include, as a dummy variable, respondents with an income between 2,000 and
5,000 ringgit per month. This covers the 2014 median income for Malaysia, and likely
represents voters that are solidly working class and fringe middle-class, and are not
at risk for food or housing insecurity, but neither are they financially secure. I also
include dummy variables for ethnicity, religion, and gender.
In these models, a positive coefficient means someone is more likely to sell their
vote, whereas a negative coefficient means they are less likely. In looking at the
results more closely, it appears that clientelism in Malaysia generally conforms to the
broader literature on the topic.41 Parties, specifically the BN coalition, target poor,
under-educated, rural Malay voters.42 This can be seen in the full breakdown of the
41

This is with the exception of party affiliation. While party affiliation is not included in the statistical
model due to correlation with coalition support, when examining the subgroups, it is those with no
party affiliation that are more likely to sell their votes. This makes me consider two explanations.
1) That developing democracies have poor linkages between voters, (which is certainly supported
by the existing comparative politics literature) and the more relevant explanation; 2) that parties
go after swing voters and not core voters. While party affiliation is not statistically significant,
coalition support is, which in the context of Malaysian electoral politics makes considerable more
sense.

42

When looking at the Malay dummy variable, it is positive and statistically significant in in the
first statistical model, and positive in the second. When looking at the subgroup analysis in the
appendices, Malays are more likely to accept vote buying. This leads me to suggest that the type
of ethnic group you belong to determines whether you accept money or a favor for your vote.
Chinese, Indian and Indigenous populations are less likely, whereas Malays are the opposite. In
regards to specifically Malaysia, this ties to income as well. In both statistical models, working class
voters, (2,000 to 5,000 ringgit per month) are more likely to sell their votes. As income increases,
middle-class voters are more likely to reject patron-client relationships. Considering Malays are at
the bottom in regards to economic inequality. So from an economic perspective, it makes sense
that they are more likely to sell their votes. This also fits with the Malay middle class rejecting
UMNO starting in the early 2000s. Similar to type of ethnic group, in looking at the subgroup
analysis, Muslims are more likely to accept money for their votes. This would further lead me to
suggest the type of religious group matters for vote buying, although Muslim voters are also more
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subgroup analysis in Appendix A, where income, ethnicity, occupation, and education
are all statistically and substantively significant. In the above models, those with
more education are less likely to sell their votes. Likewise, those with stable, but not
sizable income streams are more likely to sell their votes. This is also not surprising,
as education and income are closely linked. While this backs up the previously listed
hypotheses and fits within the literature on clientelism more broadly, in the context
of Malaysia this is not especially surprising, poor, rural Malay voters are the support
base of UMNO and the Barisian Nasional and vote buying is largely consistent with
their party brand.
It seems that through a platform of developmentalism, patron-client relationships
are a critical part of the Barisan Nasional strategies for mobilization. Moreover, these
patron-client relationships are largely consistent with the literature on clientelism
. With a significant resource advantage the Barisan Nasional used this to maintain
their hegemony over Malaysian political space. On this point, the BN used clientelism
to maintain its political power in the 13the general election. This is consistent with
literature on both dominant party systems and hybrid regimes more broadly, wherein
parties use clientelism to both gain or maintain popular support while keeping a
moderately open structure of electoral participation. Hybrid regimes, in this case
the BN, use clientelism to engender authoritarianism and suppress citizen opposition,
preventing their exit through traditional democratic competition, as certainly there
are those clients that cannot survive without resources distributed from their patrons.
What does this mean more generally speaking?

than likely going to be Malay. So there is an interaction between the these variables.
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Table 3.3: Difference of Means Between Treatment and Control Groups
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Variable
Female
Age
Malay
Muslim
Education
State
Urban/Rural
Occupation
Income
Number of Vehicles
Cost of Vehicle
Party Affiliation
Coalition Support
Fair Elections
Honest Elections
a

Control
Obs Mean
505 1.463
505 38.265
505 1.657
505 3.211
505 3.603
505 8.707
505 479088
505 3.010
505 3.004
505 2.895
505 1.768
505 2.625
505 1.800
482 1.817
505 3.756

Treatment
Obs Mean
505 1.489
505 38.980
505 1.606
505 3.178
505 3.630
505 8.687
505 487699
505 2.855
505 3.140
505 2.899
505 1.879
505 2.661
505 1.820
482 1.811
505 3.695

Two-Tailed
Diff. in Means
-0.026
0.715
0.051
0.033
-0.026
-0.198
-8611.0
0.155
0.136
-0.004
-0.111
-0.036
-0.020
0.006
0.061

Paired T-Test
Ha: Diff Not = O
0.3758
0.2898
0.2697
0.7054
0.6214
0.9394
0.8059a
0.1931
0.1104
0.9523
0.0524
0.8142
0.7109
0.8935
0.0817

Population taken from the respondent’s zip code using the 2010 census. This variable is then reordered
to an 8-point scale.
b
There are 1014 total observations, including missing data. After missing data there is 1008.

Table 3.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimator: Unconstrained Model
Variable
Intercept
Male
Age
Malay
Primary Education
Bachelor’s Degree
Urban/Rural Divide
Occupation
Working Class
Coalition Support
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a
b
c

Treatment Item
Est
SE
-1.608
1.445
0.556
0.443
0.030
0.019
0.867*
0.455
0.739
0.538
-1.453*** 0.487
-0.334** 0.151
-0.214** 0.108
1.670*** 0.517
-0.593** 0.263

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
N = 1008
Log-likelihood: -1382.311

Control Items (0)
Est
SE
-0.275
0.267
0.200*** 0.068
-0.001
0.003
0.089
0.071
-0.463*** 0.139
-0.016
0.073
0.042
0.028
-0.023
0.018
-0.058
0.077
-0.087** 0.041

Control Items (1)
Est
SE
3.907
2.345
1.712**
0.832
-0.127*** 0.044
-4.108*** 1.817
-1.538
1.081
6.257
5.288
1.238*** 0.434
0.583**
0.264
3.991*** 1.350
1.500**
0.601

Table 3.5: Maximum Likelihood Estimator: Constrained Model
Variable
Intercept
Male
Age
Malay
Primary Education
Bachelor’s Degree
Urban/Rural Divide
Occupation
Working Class
Coalition Support
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a
b
c

Treatment Item
Est
SE
1.040
3.006
1.554** 0.844
-0.025
0.037
0.975
0.734
0.441
0.906
-2.464** 0.978
-0.451
0.364
-0.129
0.161
2.720*** 0.873
-0.494
0.391

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
N = 1008
Log-likelihood: -1418.101

Control
Est
-0.408
0.001
0.002
0.062
-0.303**
0.021
0.059
-0.047**
0.049
-0.110**

Items
SE
0.282
0.003
0.004
0.073
0.126
0.078
0.032
0.019
0.078
0.041

On the surface, relationships between patrons and clients seemingly reflects a
consensual agreement wherein both actors expect gains. One might even suggest
that the prevalence of clientelism in a political system increases voter options in their
attempt to gain access to private goods by adding additional value to their vote.
Likewise, patron-client exchanges do not explicitly force citizens to unwillingly restrict
their vote choice and clients have the option to accept or reject the resources offered,
clientelism manipulates behavior in a non-coercive way and the impact of clientelism
on political behavior cannot be equated with typical suppression of political behavior
under authoritarian rule. The question of clientelism as a voluntary exchange is
challenged by the asymmetry of state power – coercive by definition – when citizens
who do not fulfill their duties as clients face exclusion in the distribution of goods and
services provided as patronage.
The conditions that keep the probability of exiting office low primarily depend
upon two characteristics. a) The dominant party has a monopoly or near monopoly
over the distribution of clientelistic goods and there is existing sanctions against
clientelistic activity, and the dominant party has the monopoly on clientelistic activity.
b) “money politics" or clientelistic exchanges is a significant aspect of the economy
with few economic or social incentives to deviate from this (Trantidis 2015). Such
conditions create blockages to ‘exit’ and allows for the dominant party to continue
patronage systems unabated. For this system to end, it is necessary for social groups
to demand political and social change, where opposition parties and programmatic
goods emerge.
The loss of vote share combined with the success of opposition parties in states like
Terengganu and Kelantan, where substantial development has occurred, makes this
type of patronage on the part of BN strategies is less and less successful. Furthermore,
the support of the Chinese and Malay middle class for the BN eroded in the early 2000s.
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To put this in context, the explosive growth of the Malay and Chinese middle-class in
urban areas of Malaysia has led to voter preferences that are clearly in disjuncture
with a clientelist redistribution of goods.

3.7

Discussion

Vote buying and clientelism more broadly is still illegal and numerous emerging
democracies have put policies or institutions in place to restrict or limit clientelistic
activity.43 Consider Thailand for example, where clientelism is an open and significant
aspect of electoral politics. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was created
through the 1997 constitution to limit electoral fraud.44 It not only regulates national
and local elections, but it has broad law enforcement powers as well. It has the ability
to investigate and indict candidates who violate election laws, it has the power to
investigate party finances and donor lists, and disqualify a candidate or call for a
re-count of a particular district. It was designed to be an impartial and unbiased
arbiter of Thai elections. How successful then, has the ECT been in preventing
clientelism?
After the 2007 legislative elections in Thailand the Electoral Commission investigated 83 of 480 members of parliament, the overwhelming majority of these were for
the People’s Power Party (PPP) including the party leader, Yongyuth Tiyaphairat.45
Faced with dissolution by the Electoral Commission, PPP leadership stated they
43

See for example: the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria or the Elections
and Boundaries Commission (EBC) in Belize.

44

Prior to 1992 elections were overseen by the Ministry of Interior. However, the Ministry of Interior
was, at times, influenced by members of parliament. The ECT in its current form was revised
through the 2007 constitution.

45

After the 2007 election three members of the PPP were later disqualified, along with two from the
Thai Nation Party, two for the Motherland party, and one for the Democrat Party.
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would simply find a new party (Kokpol 2002).46 After the 2011 elections the ECT
disqualified five candidates from the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT). Despite broad powers
granted by the Thai constitution, the ECT has had little success in changing the
clientelistic political culture in Thailand. There was still significant vote buying in
both the 2007 and 2011 general elections, at both the national and provincial level.
Parties spent upwards of ten to fifty million baht (Pensute 2014).47
Thus, on paper, both legislation that prohibits and sanctions vote buying and
government administrations that oversee elections should act as a deterrent and curb
the prevalence of vote buying. However, it at times, only has a partial effect. These
types of steps to limit clientelism are ultimately only half measures, while they may
work in the short-term, they will not have the desired long-term effect. It is necessary
for there to educational measures at the micro level that complement law enforcement
or legislative activities at the national level.48 For example, it has been shown that
NGOs can effectively deter voters through civic education of both instigators, i.e.
political parties and candidates, and recipient voters (Lockwood 2013).49
46

The party was eventually dissolved due to electoral fraud. Party elites were stripped of their right
to run for office for five years, with other party members allowed to run under the Pheu Thai Party.

47

It is possible for vote buying to exist on such a grand level, that legislative measures to control it
would be fruitless.

48

Green and Vasudevan (2018) have found experimental evidence in India that educational measures
through mass media can result in a 4 to 7 percent reduction in vote share of vote buying parties.

49

The Thai NGO PollWatch, a volunteer election monitoring organization, is an example of this. It
is also further evidence of the role of the middle class. One survey found that 64% of PollWatch
volunteers in the 1992 election belonged to the middle class (LoGerfo 2000, 228-29). In fact,
PollWatch prefers to recruit its members from the middle class. As one scholar observed during
the 1995 election, “since low education levels are seen as one of the main supports of election fraud,
PollWatch actively recruited ‘educated people’ - students, teachers, business people, lawyers, civil
servants - to work at the volunteer level” (Callahan 2017, 9). Thus, as in the rest of Southeast Asia,
there is a class dimension to electoral reform: urban middle class organizations such as Pollwatch
are trying to discipline how the rural poor vote. As one scholar commented on the 1992 election,
“these middle class stalwarts were acting to ensure that Thailand’s largely rural electorate would
choose only ‘good’ politicians who did not buy votes” (LoGerfo 2000, 229).
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I admit that the wishes of the middle class – elections free of vote buying, fraudulent
voting, intimidation, or ballot box stuffing – often clash with other social classes. This
is to say, that advocates for electoral reform often times do not understand how these
reforms impact the preferences of poor voters. More importantly, when outside expectations of moral electoral behavior are imposed upon voters who do not share these
expectations there may be unintended consequences. It is possible, even likely, that
such an imposition creates voter reactions that can range from alienation to reinforcing
the very behaviors the reformers seek to change (Schaffer 2008).50 Nonetheless, these
class divisions have, on occasion, been overcome by a shared interest in the principles
of democratic governance.

50

There are likely significant class divisions because of this. In the case of the Philippines, some
wealthier voters look down on poor voters for allowing themselves to be “herded, fed, and paid.”
(Espina 2001). This is echoed in Thailand as well, In Thailand there exists, “a conviction among the
middle classes that democracy belongs to the middle class, and that the lower classes are incapable
of effective participation in a democratic system. The middle class frustration with the common
practice of vote-buying is the most dramatic indication of this attitude” (Ockey 2005, 245–246).
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Chapter 4
The Political Dimensions of Malaysia’s BR1M
Policy: Party Brands and Party Competition
4.1

Introduction

Fiscal interventions such as cash transfer programs are arguably the fastest-growing
socio-economic policies in the developing world. Designed to address poverty, the
government makes direct cash payments to low-income households or individuals
either unconditionally (unconditional cash transfers – UCTs) or under a formal set of
conditions the recipients are required to meet, (conditional cash transfers – CCTs) for
example children must be required to go to school. The first, and what has become
the largest started in Brazil in the mid-1990s, Bolsa Familia, (Family Allowance) has
significantly decreased poverty and inequality in Brazil.
Such programs vary in scope, policy goals, and details, but all of them use goods
and services to address the needs of the poor. Since inception, there are approximately
130 UCTs and 64 CCTs in the developing world, many of them such as Mexico’s
Progresa/Oportunidades impact millions of poor voters, and have become a staple of
these countries’ social welfare programs. While the economic effect of cash transfer
programs is clearly understood, the effect of such programs on political competition is
less clear.
While cash transfer programs are relatively new, the idea that citizens reward
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politicians who provide them with economic benefits is common across several strands
of political science research. Whether this is framed as good economic performance or
retrospective voting, (Fiorina 1978, Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000, Anderson 2007) or
redistribution that benefits one demographic over another, (Boix 2003, Acemoglu &
Robinson 2005) it is clear that economics can play an important role in the decision to
cast a vote. It is then useful to know to what extent macro-level government programs
can influence voters’ political behavior. A number of models have been developed,
all of which attempt to understand this question at the individual level (Key, 1966;
Downs, 1957; Drazen et al., 2006).
Out of this development comes a division surrounding the effect of these programs
on electoral outcomes. There is one side of the literature that argues that cash transfer
programs can positively impact the electoral success of incumbent representatives.
While another argues that political competition matters, and these programs either
have a null effect, or favor the opposition. Clearly, existing literature that focuses on
this relationships is divided, leaving the question unanswered. What is the impact of
cash transfer programs on institutionalized competition between political parties?
To answer this question, I extend Noam Lupu’s (2016) theory of party branding
to explain how parties use fiscal interventions like cash transfer programs as a party
brand to mobilize voters, and how this effects party competition when voters either
accept or reject that brand. The theory is relatively simple. Government transfers are
often targeted at a particular group of individuals, not just in an attempt to alleviate
poverty of that group, but because the government favors them. For example, the
government may target swing voters who may be persuaded to support the incumbent
in the next election. Or they may target members of one particular ethnic group over
another.
Over time, these voters form partisan attachments to parties based upon what
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parties say and do. Attachments that are group identities, akin to the attachments
people form to social groups. As Green et al argue, (2004) these attachments are
largely based upon perceptions of both their own political identity and to what extent
the party represents this identity, relative to other parties. The party forms a party
platform around dimensions of this identity. This platform – or what a party stands for
and what they use to connect to the voter – is the party brand. The more ambiguous
the party brand, the weaker the partisan attachment is and the less competitive the
party becomes. When the party brand is strong, so is the level of attachment.
Using data collected at the subnational level, this paper shows that the ruling
coalition used Malaysia’s cash transfer program (BR1M) as a party brand to maximize
votes and retain its support base in rural Malaysia. In this sense, it wasn’t a new party
brand, but an attempt to rely on their existing brand of development and patronage
through BR1M to maintain power. However, I show that their branding efforts failed,
and BR1M actually had a negative and statistically significant effect upon the 2013
election. While UMNO and the BN increased both the number of handouts and the
overall amounts, the effect was also negative and statistically significant for the 2018
election. This contributes to the literature in comparative politics in several ways.
First, it adds to the development literature, giving us an opportunity to better
understand the effects of redistributive politics and cash transfer programs in the
developing world. Second, it contributes to an understanding of electoral politics in
Malaysia. UMNO used BR1M to double down on their existing brand, and failed. This
paper clarifies the extent to which this strategy of mobilization was ineffective as part
of UMNOs party brand, the degree to which it contributed to their breakdown, and
impacted competition between parties, particularly in the context of the “Malaysian
Tsunami.” Finally, it extends Lupu’s (2016) theory of party branding and party
breakdown beyond Latin America to Southeast Asia.
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4.2

Redistribution and Party Competition

What is the effect of cash transfer programs on party competition? As Duch and
Stevenson (2008) broadly point out, while there is variation, economic voting is a
pervasive aspect of electoral politics. They argue, rational voters are attentive to cues
in regards to the responsibility of political parties for economic policy outcomes; and
that under conditions of uncertainty, these voters base their vote on the representative’s record of economic performance. Furthermore, not only do rational voters
have strategic expectations concerning economic outcomes, they also have rational
expectations concerning relative electoral strength of competing candidates (Cox 1997)
Subsequently, the connection between programmatic redistribution and voting
behavior is relatively clear. The expectation is voters who benefit from redistribution
will support a candidate that effectively carries out redistribution policies, and during
times of growing economic inequality, these demands increase (Zucco 2011). However,
this is not always the case, and literature suggests that redistribution policies can
fail or have negative effects for a number of reasons. Scholarship points to electoral
rules and the geographic distribution of voters, (Jusko 2010) backlash from those
voters who will pay for the policy, (Boix 2003, Acemoglu & Robinson 2005) the policy
implementation itself, (Przeworski 2010) and divergent voter preferences within the
same social classes (Mares 2003) as negatively impacting the political outcome of
redistribution policies. Nonetheless, all of these assume the median voter demands
some kind of redistribution policy, in return for political support.
Thus, while reversed, a clear relationship between political competition and redistribution policies exists. Besley et al (2010) find that in the US, policies that support
low economic growth are associated with low levels of political competition. Likewise,
there are several formal models that suggest higher levels of political competition
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result in superior policy outcomes (Fearon 1999, Besley 2006, Hatfield 2015). Scholars
find that competition between political parties can enhance long-term investments
into human capital as well as production (Weingast 1995, Brueckner 2006).
This relationship works somewhat differently with a clientelistic redistribution of
goods. Clientelism is the provision of private benefits (goods or services) by politicians
to voters in exchange for political support. The exchange between representatives and
voters (or patrons and clients) is its most defining characteristic of this relationship
(Stokes 2005, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Stokes et al. 2013). The types of excludable
goods range dramatically from money or individual goods before an election, special
favors such as jobs, or state resources distributed as patronage, a subclass of clientelism.1 Nonetheless, regardless of the goods involved in the exchange, the scholarship
typically finds that a positive relationship between the distribution of clientelistic
goods and competition exists (Wilkinson 2007, Levitsky 2007, Kopeckỳ 2011, WeitzShapiro 2012).2
At the macroeconomic level there is clearly a robust strand of research that
says a state’s economic change is closely tied to voting behavior (Powell Jr &
Whitten 1993, Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000, Anderson 2000). Nevertheless, a voter’s
financial health is tied to macroeconomic policy to varying degrees, and because
of confounding factors, it is difficult to discern the causal effect of macroeconomic
policy at the individual level. Most households will be in a strong financial position
when general macroeconomic factors are positive. It can therefore be difficult or even
impossible to determine how “direct improvements to households” financial situations
1

Beyond this, Cole (2009) finds that state-owned banks are much more likely to distribute loans to
farmers in advance of elections in highly contested districts. Meanwhile, Dinc (2005) finds that
government-owned banks are more likely to distribute loans in elections years than off years, in
what is termed the “political business cycle.”

2

This is with the exception of Gottlieb and Kosec (2017) who find that because of coordination costs,
you do not see an increase of private transfers at the expense of public ones.
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affect their view of incumbent government and opposition parties" (Galiani et al. 2016,
22). However, as an alternative to large-scale federal funding, cash transfer programs
give us an opportunity to study the effects of a national policy on the political behavior
of an entire demographic in society.

4.3

Cash Transfer Programs and Party Competition

Cash transfer programs contain elements of both classes of redistribution. They
are implemented in manners similar to that of clientelism, and benefit individuals
that would typically be targets of clientelistic exchanges. Similar to patron-client
relationships, they are distributed directly to individual households that have short
time horizons and prefer tangible benefits over policy promises that might deliver
much more in the future (Kitschelt 2000). However, cash transfer programs lack both
the monitoring and the excludability necessary for the distribution of private goods
through clientelistic exchanges. Therefore, even when used as patronage, they are still
distributed to entire classes of voters, and consequently fit within a programmatic
redistribution (Zucco 2011).
One side of the literature has consistently found that voters who receive conditional
cash transfers are more likely to support the incumbent, (Licio, Rennó & Castro
2009, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni 2009, Zucco 2013, De La O 2013) and that
incumbent vote shares are more likely to increase in subnational areas where cash
transfer programs are in distributed (Zucco 2008, Nupia 2011). To illustrate this
further, Nupia (2011) finds that during the 2010 Colombian presidential election,
incumbent candidate, Juan Manuel Santos had better results in municipalities where
the cash transfer programs Familias en Accion saturated a substantial proportion of
the population. Likewise, Serdan (2006) finds that the during “the 2006 presidential
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election incumbent candidate Felipe Calderon performed better in municipalities with
larger coverage of the program Oportunidades” (Corrêa 2015, 65).
Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011) found that Uruguayan beneficiaries of
the CCT program Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) were
more likely to support President Tabare Vazquez in opinion surveys. Finally Queirolo
(2009) found that these voters were more likely to support the incumbent candidate,
Jose Mujica, in the 2009 election. Indeed, the classical model from Key (1961, 1966)
argues that voters reward incumbents for policies successfully, and punishes those that
are implemented at the expense of the voters. It would be then be easy to conclude
that incumbents who campaign on redistributive policies are more likely to improve
their electoral chances. However, there is another side to this argument, and scholars
have also argued that political institutions mediate the effect of economic factors.
For instance, Anderson (1988) successfully argues Key’s models work best in a
two-party system, and salience of either the incumbent or the opposition’s political
ideology is not a significant factor. Likewise, Drazen and Eslava (2006) argue that
redistribution policies send a signal to voters that politicians are representing their
respective interests, and thus, alters their political preferences toward the representative
in response to a future benefit.3 Non-beneficiaries of a redistribution policy also use
that information to form preferences toward both the incumbent and the opposition.
They are then able to support the incumbent party on the basis of being a future
beneficiary of this policy, or reject them under the assumption of having to pay for it.4
Individual case studies of cash transfer programs in Mexico, (Yuriko 2007) Honduras,
3

For an alternative take on this, see Smith and Bueno de Mesquita BdM2012. They argue, that
the possibility of winning prizes can push voters to support a party even if they dislike the party’s
policies.

4

As de la Briere (2006) notes, a lack of transparency of redistribution policies and specifically cash
transfer programs results in frustration for the non-beneficiary, and punishment for the incumbent
party.
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(Linos 2013, Galiani et al. 2016) and Brazil (Zucco 2011) find there are electoral benefits
the opposition, in such cases the effect is dependent upon partisanship, and varies
between districts. Likewise, Correa (2015) suggests these programs do not make
incumbents at the national level electorally more successful. Hence, there is also still
a significant amount of uncertainty about how cash transfer programs affect political
competition, especially outside of Latin America (Galiani et al. 2016).
To fill this gap in the literature, I extend Noam Lupu’s (2009, 2016) theory of party
branding to explain how cash transfer programs effect competition between political
parties. Lupu argues that sudden shifts in partisanship result in otherwise established
parties suddenly becoming less competitive. I further argue that these voters do
not disappear from the electorate, they find new parties to support, subsequently
increasing competition.5 Using Malaysia as a case study, I show that government
parties used Malaysia’s unconditional cash transfer program to reaffirm support from
its constituents. Yet, this failed, and how voters responded to the policy was dependent
upon how closely they fit with the party brand.

4.4

Party Brands

Party brands give voters some indication of the type of citizen the party represents.
It is not a stretch to imagine that voters have some criteria for evaluating parties in
mind.6 For some it is an ethnic attachment – to what extent does the party accurately
5

I use clientelism as part of the party brand. Lupu (?, 7–8) argues that clientelism is not relevant to
the party brand. That voters who sell votes still form partisan attachments to parties that are not
based upon existing patron-client relationships. I disagree, and argue that a present patron-client
relationship is part of the attachment.

6

One should that assume voters have a range of possible parties to choose from. In both multiparty
and hegemonic or dominant party systems there are situations where voters consider the probability
of a party winning an election. This is probably clearest in a party system where one party is
unlikely to lose.
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reflect their ethnic group. To others it is a economic attachment, and class may be an
important factor in their political identity. Some political parties may seem pro-poor
while others are perceived as reflecting the interests of the wealthy. For instance,
parties that favor the poor might push an agenda of redistribution; while parties that
favor more affluent voters might limit corporate regulation. In any case, voters form
perceptions of party brands based upon what parties do and say over time.7
Party elites may publicly advocate for a certain type of policy, cultivate dense
clientelistic networks, they may pass legislation, or associate with other like-minded
individuals, but no matter their behavior they send a signal to prospective voters.8
From a programmatic standpoint, “parties appeal to the middle classes, women, or
ecologists by presenting themselves as representative of their interests and values. . . "
(Przeworski & Sprague 1986, 82). From a clientelistic point of view, “parties identify
voter groups that would be amenable to the provision of benefits,” in return for their
electoral support (Tzelgov & Wang 2016, 375). Voters then continually update their
prior beliefs toward parties based upon new observations.
This suggests that voters respond to the actions of party elites. They may not see
every action taken by the party representative in the legislature, or every clientelistic
7

It is likely, especially in new democracies where regional parties are stronger, that a voter can have
an attachment to a national party that is different than an attachment to a sub-national one. For
the sake of simplicity, I focus on national parties and single dimensions of partisan attachments.
However, multiple dimensions of attachment between regional and national parties would certainly
be possible.

8

There is some debate concerning whether voters uniformly interpret the same observation in the
same manner. That is, the effect (if any) partisanship has on the interpretation of information
(Converse 1964, Zaller 1992, Gerber & Green 1999, Bartels 2002). Campbell et al (1960) argue that
partisanship acts as a screen to interpret information. However, more recent scholarship has found
that partisanship and perception works two ways: partisan bias colors perceptions and perceptions
inform partisan bias (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2004, Layman, Carsey & Horowitz 2006). The
necessary question to answer is to what extent does it impede or promote change? As Franklin and
Jackson (1983, 969) note, “as previous partisan attachment acts to restrain change, it is like a sea
anchor, which retards drift rather than arrests it entirely. If the tides of policy evaluation are strong
enough, conversations can and will take place.”

110

transaction, but they observe some broadly important behavior that gives them
an understanding of trends within the party (Woon & Pope 2008, Ansolabehere &
Jones 2010). Voters then use these observations to update their perception of the
party brand (Zaller 1992).9 This departs from the literature in an important manner.
Green et al (2004) argues that a party prototype is the typical person who votes
for that party (Lupu 2016, 21). For example, working-class voters who think that
most working-class voters support the Labour party, will think that the working-class
voter is the Labour party prototype. This is the same for middle-class voters and
the Conservative party. Instead, think of voters not as party supporters, but party
beneficiaries. Such a voter is the type of citizen whose interests the party represents,
and stands to benefit from its position in government. So the citizen who votes for the
Labour or Conservative party in British elections, or the Kenyan voter who supports
the Democratic party, does so because these parties are perceived to be those who look
out for working-class, or middle-class British, or Luhya voters more so than Kikuyu.
These prototypes are derived from a broader set of observations beyond that
of voting patterns. Voters rely on heuristics when forming political attachments,
including the actions of party elites, to determine the typical voter a party represents.
For example, when DAP party elites meet with Chinese interest groups in Penang,
and regularly support policies that benefit the Malaysian-Chinese in that community,
they are more likely to be seen as the party that represents the Chinese in Penang.10
9

Scholarship implies that a socialization process exists for new voters who model their political
behavior around that of family members (Achen 2002, Kroh & Selb 2009). For instance, they
may discuss politics with their close relatives, friends, or coworkers. There is also literature that
suggests voters intuitively understand who buys and sells votes, despite clientelism being prohibited
(Cruz 2013). In the interest of simplicity, I focus on unidimensional party brands; because it is also
possible that parties have different brands for different groups of voters. Parties want to maximize
votes after all. For example, they may have a clientelistic brand for poor, rural voters and a more
programmatic brand for wealthier, urban voters (Lupu 2016).

10

Compared to the MCA who also try to mobilize the Chinese in Malaysia. However, their actions
at least by the majority of voters in Penang, are seen as less beneficial.

111

Although, party brands, and by extension, party prototypes are not always clear.
Voters may have a sense of a party brand, but ideas surrounding it are sometimes
vague. With this in mind, party brands can be characterized as clear or strong, when
voters have a better understanding of it. Conversely, when voters have a poor sense of
the party brand, it can be considered weak or ambiguous. Party brands can become
stronger or more ambiguous over time, and as voters observe the behavior of party
officials, they update their perceptions of that strength or clarity. For example, a party
may represent multiple prototypes, where one individual brand may grow stronger
while another grows weaker.11

4.4.1

How Voters Form Party Attachments

Voters update their perceptions of party brands by observing the actions of the party
(Lupu 2016). Repeatedly observing what the party says and does creates an image of
the party brand. They continually update that image each time they see how the party
behaves, forming the basis for partisanship. These party attachments are similar to
group identities, where members of the group form an identity based upon attachment
to that group.12 These group identities are based upon stereotypes people have about
each group - what a prototypical poor person or a prototypical affluent person looks
like. Huddy (2001) argues that a “prototype can either be the most typical member of
a group – an actual person – or a fictional member who embodies the most common
or frequent attributes shared among group members” (133–134).
The group prototype is what individuals use to determine their attachment to that
11

Huber et al (2005) argues there is an institutional effect that determines the degree voters can
observe party actions. I (along with Lupu) largely ignore the role of institutions here.

12

There is debate within political science about whether partisanship is based upon social groups or
rational choice (Fiorina 1981, Achen 1992, Gerber & Green 1998). While I rely on the concept
of group identity; in both this theory, as well as rational models, performance evaluations play a
strong factor in deciding competition.

112

group. Individuals identify as a poor or affluent person, as Malay or Kikuyu, if “they
think they resemble, or fit that prototype” (Lupu 2016, 22).13 This is also relative
to other groups, where voters feel the greatest attachment to a specific group when
other group prototypes are dissimilar from their own. Attachments to the group grow
stronger as voters perceptions of how they fit with the party.14 The weaker or more
ambiguous the party brand, the less partisan attachment the voter will have towards
the party prototype. (Hogg et al. 2004).
Partisan attachment will be strongest when voters perceive themselves as similar
to the party prototype and when other party prototypes are dissimilar. For example,
a Filipino voter may have a strong partisan attachment to the left-wing Philippine
Democratic party because she both fits closest with the party prototype and other
party prototypes, for example that of the more conservative National Unity Party,
are dissimilar. The question of comparative fit is important here.15 If a voter thinks
he or she resembles two parties’ prototypes then the partisan attachment to both
parties will be weak.16 Even when the voter has a clear understanding of other party
13

There is a strand of literature on ethnic political attachment and partisanship that I have yet
to adequately discuss. In a brief overview, the evidence that ethnicity is a key identifier of
consistent party support, is mixed (Ishiyama & Fox 2006). It is possible for partisans of smaller
ethnic-based political parties to be swayed if they believe another party has a better chance
of winning (Chandra 2009). This is because while ethnicity is an important mechanism for
mobilizing voters, (Posner 2007) ethnicity is also a multi-faceted identity (Horowitz 1985, Fearon
& Laitin 1996, Chandra 2004) and voters can be more or less “ethnic" relative to their political
identity.

14

Partisanship is best viewed as a continuum where you have strong partisan attachment on one end
and weak partisan attachment on the other. So when party brands grow weaker or more ambiguous,
partisan attachment within the population also weakens and the party loses voters who previously
identified with that party.

15

The role of comparative fit is often overlooked in the partisanship literature. As Weisberg and
Greene (2003) argue, “too much of the work on party identification has examined identification
within the in-group without taking into account the views toward the out-group.”

16

This is evident in patron-clientelistic relationships, where a voter has a weak ideological attachment
to a party, and only votes for one party over another because of the benefits they receive. This
is not to say that such parties are completely clientelistic, as there is some evidence that shows
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brands, if they see them as equivalent, they will fail to form a strong attachment.
What happens when a party suddenly changes party brands?

4.5

How Attachment Erodes

As perceptions of the party change over time, partisan attachment shifts along with
it. It ebbs and flows as the party brand grows stronger or weaker, possibly without
the voter even realizing it. Imagine a left-leaning party that suddenly becomes more
conservative. Suddenly a voter that had little attachment to a center-left party, now
benefits. Or a clientelistic party that decides to opt out of clientelism and become more
programmatic. A longstanding client of the party will not benefit in the same manner.
However, a voter who does not identify as a client may be more inclined to vote for a
now programmatic party. While they may not identify with them immediately, they
will certainly consider voting for them in future elections. In each case the attachment
of each voter grows stronger or weaker as the party brand changes.
There are numerous examples of shifting political attitudes in societies clearly
divided by class, ethnicity, or religion. Minority and majority ethnic groups may
hold very different attitudes about minority rights to political representation, but
attitudes often differ within those groups as well (especially within majority groups).
Likewise, in many countries the attitude toward minority representation determines
the fundamental issue divide within the majority groups. A similar phenomenon can
often occur within and between religious groups in the form of sharp disagreements
linkages between clientelism and ideology. Tzelgov and Wang (2016) show that economic interests
dictate their likelihood of targeting voters with clientelistic benefits. This is more so with right-wing
parties than leftist ones. As Coppedge (1998) explains, “clientelism and ideology are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.. . . Clientelism is merely a means to build and maintain a power base; ideology,
where it exists, is what guides what that power is used for. Many parties are to some degree,
clientelistic, to some degree personalistic, and to some degree ideological; these three qualities will
vary independently (552).
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among adherents of a dominant religious sect regarding the role of religion in political
life.
Voters with strong partisan attachments have equally strong affinities to the party.
This is true even when the party experiences a period of significant economic decline,
a scandal while in office, or they do not fulfill campaign promises. Voters will give
the party the benefit of the doubt because in their minds the party will still look out
for them, either through public or private benefits. As Hirschhman (1970) argues,
partisan voters will support the party out of loyalty when nonpartisans will not.17
How do nonpartisans choose between political parties? From a programmatic
standpoint independent voters or swing voters may choose a party based upon policy
direction (Downs 1957). From a clientelistic standpoint, this is different, and the
efficacy of both clientelistic and collective goods is what drives independent voters.
While independent voters have an interest in policy, and are not unidimensionally
clientelistic, they are less likely to switch parties based on clientelistic exchanges
than on policy grounds (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).18 Still, valence is important
to every voter, and party choices likely depend upon these issues as well (Kayser &
Wlezien 2011).
Valence issues are those issues on which all voters have the same position, for
example economic growth (Lupu 2016). Since all voters favor economic growth, political
parties form a consensus on the issue. Every party is for economic growth, and the
17

I use the terms “nonpartisan,” “swing voter,” or “independent voter” interchangeably. In Mayer’s
words, a swing voter is one “who is not solidly committed to one candidate or the other as to make
all efforts of persuasion futile" (2008, 359). This makes a a swing voter conceptually distinct from
a core supporter or party stalwart.

18

There is, of course, some debate surrounding the role of swing voters in vote buying markets. It is
unclear if parties are more effective in obtaining votes by targeting swing voters, (Schady 2000) by
rewarding core supporters, (Perez 2006) or through a combination of both (Stokes & Dunning 2008).
While it is possible that because vote buying is illegal that parties will target core supporters
because they implicitly understand that these voters will stay quiet in the face of a clientelistic
offer.
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difference between them, is the degree in which they are more or less competent on
that particular issue, relative to other parties. As Stokes (1992, 148) states, “in valence
politics, nothing succeeds like success, or fails like failure.” Voters rate parties based
upon past performance, and not future proposals. In fact, just considering economic
performance as a valence issue, economic voting is an important aspect of voter behavior
throughout most democracies, developing and otherwise (Anderson 2000, Lewis-Beck
& Stegmaier 2000, Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007).

19

As partisan attachment erodes, and more voters stop identifying with the party,
valence issues such as economic performance become more important. As Coppedge
notes, “the strength of partisan identification therefore moderates the effect of economic
performance on the vote” (2001, 187). This holds true regardless of whether voters
are ideological or clientelistic. Even clientelistic voters will stop supporting a party in
the face of an economic crisis or scandal, see for example the LDP in Japan, the PRI
in Mexico, or the PT in Brazil. In this situation, it is possible for the client to exit
the relationship with the patron and vote based upon programmatic ideals, or align
themselves with a party that offers other private benefits.20 In either case, the voter
decides retroactively that supporting that particular party is not in their best interest.
The next step, however, to test the limitations of this theory cross-nationally.

4.6

BR1M Policy

Most of the poor, rural population in Malaysia are Malays (Ng et al. 2015). This is in
part due to the failures of the National Economic Policy (NEP) implemented after the
19

Certainly there are other valence issues beyond economic success. Scholars suggest that both extreme
corruption and social unrest are critical valence issues among voters (Mainwaring 2006, Abney
et al. 2013).

20

If there is a significant economic crisis, and the party uses state resources to retain power, it is
likely they will not have enough to offer voters.

116

1969 electoral violence (Ali 2015).21 However, while the NEP largely failed to close the
income gap between ethnic groups, it did result in the development of an urban, Malay
middle-class. Certainly, significant aspects of the NEP were driven by ethnic and class
differences, and the Barisan Nasional (UMNO in particular) used these differences
as a platform to mobilize rural Malay voters. UMNO has taken efforts to not only
win elections in rural Malaysia, but dominate rural society.22 Using developmentalism
as a platform, UMNO and the Barisan Nasional has largely controlled rural areas of
Malaysian political space for the last six decades.
UMNO and the BN’s use of developmental policies contributed to strong economic
growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Jomo, Rasiah & Felker 2013). These developmental
and redistributive policies have been a cornerstone of the BN platform, helping them
to continually maintain power since 1974. However, these policies contained provisions
for wasteful and inefficient patronage systems with direct ties to the BN, specifically
UMNO (Gomez & Jomo 1999).The implementation of these programs led to significant
fractionalization within UMNO, which contributed to a enormous loss of support during
the 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2013 elections (Welsh 2004, Pepinsky 2009b, Ostwald 2013).23
After the 1999 election, this led to UMNO leadership attempting to restructure their
developmental model in an effort to regain support by rural voters. Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi (prime minister from 2003 to 2009) further advocated for liberalizing civil
liberties and curbing the patronage and corruption that was embedded in the the BN,
although this was largely unsuccessful.
21

The NEP was replaced by the National Development Plan in 1990, which was then replaced by the
National Vision Policy in 2001. All of these continued affirmative action policies for Bumiputera.

22

In 1970 they established the Social Development Division in an attempt to promote development
at the local level in a manner consistent with UMNOs party brand (Welsh 2016).

23

During the 2008 and 2013 elections PAS campaigned on mismanagement of development projects
by state-level BN representatives.
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Najib, (Prime Minister from 2009 to 2018) also publicly called for the elimination
of “rent-seeking” and spoke of political reforms that allowed for the proper functioning
of political parties, including how they would mobilize voters. However, this did
not include institutional oversight, nor was there any mention of amending unfair
electoral practices including gerrymandering and malapportionment. UMNO was
aware that electoral reform would work against its interests (Slater and Wong 2013),
and they subsequently retained control over the Election Commission, the unit that
is responsible for ensuring that political parties abide by the conditions under which
they were established. So while there were overtures made by Najib and UMNO to
curb patronage and institute electoral reforms, it was empty rhetoric, and the system
of patronage used by the BN to mobilize voters continued unabated.
In an attempt to unify UMNO, and retain its traditional support base, Najib
used his 1 Malaysia slogan to endorse numerous social and economic policies that
addressed the lives of the poor in the Malay heartland. However, this only serves to
characterize Najib’s policies as race-based initiatives that are in line with the NVP
and its predecessors. Regional cleavages had emerged with hardcore poverty rampant
in rural areas in Bumiputera-majority states, including Sabah, Kelantan, Perlis and
Kedah, where the opposition had begun to develop a strong presence (Gomez &
Kaur 2014). If Najib’s collection of policies did not explicitly protect or even promote
Bumiputera interests, UMNO’s support in rural areas would be at risk. UMNO
developed BR1M to specifically address this problem.
In 2012, as part of the Barisan Nasional’s “1 Malaysia program,” Prime Minister
Najib Razak introduced the unconditional cash transfer program Bantuan Rakyat 1
Malaysia (1 Malaysia People’s Aid), or BR1M. Modeled after Brazil’s Bolsa Familia
and Mexico’s Oportunidades Program, BR1M gives direct cash assistance to either
households with incomes less than 3,000 ringgit, or single individuals with incomes
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less than 2,000 ringgit. Shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it has increased in scope since
its inception.
Table 4.1: Total BR1M Handouts in Millions and Total Amount Spent in Ringgit:
2012 to 2014

Amount in Ringgit
Number of Handouts

2012

2013

2014

2.09b RM
4.18m

2.9b RM
6.8m

3.64b RM
6.96m

Table 4.2: Total BR1M Handouts in Millions and Total Amount Spent in Ringgit:
2015 to 2017
2015
Amount in Ringgit
5.35b RM
Number of Handouts
7.44m

2016

2017

5.36b RM
7.28m

6.31b RM
7.22m

While it is used to both relieve poverty, and ostensibly unite Malaysia across
ethnic groups, BR1M should be considered politically motivated for a number of
reasons. Najib instituted his 1Malaysia program to counter the opposition’s image of
a transethnic coalition. Furthermore, Najib’s policies feature a distinctly race-based
agenda. Regional cleavages have developed with increasing poverty in Bumiputeramajority states, including Sabah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Kedah, where opposition
parties had a growing level of support. If Najib had not addressed the economic
interests of the Bumiputera population, he risked substantially losing support for
UMNO in rural areas of Malaysia (Gomez & Kaur 2014).24 More directly, there is
strong evidence that BR1M was used as patronage by the BN.25 So how does this
break down according to demographics?
24

Bumiputera or “sons of the soil” is a term used to describe Malay supremacy.

25

BR1M is supposed to be non-partisan, however in practice, its distribution through party offices
such as the BN headquarters in Sitiwan and Kota Kinablu during the 2013 campaign points to the
likelihood that it is being used as patronage (Weiss 2014).
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In looking at a 2017 national survey of BR1M recipients, the majority of respondents
in the sample are Malay, (55%) with 23.5% and 7.5% of the sample Chinese and Indian,
respectively. In contrast, the Orang Asli or ‘Original People’ (Malaysia’s indigenous
population) make up less than 1% of survey respondents. There are more male
respondents than female respondents, (70.6% to 20.4%). Finally, the overwhelming
majority of BR1M recipients sampled, (82%) are married (Kaji Data Research 2017).
This is consistent with the distribution of BR1M to primarily households. However,
the data does not adequately distinguish between individual recipients and household
recipients. Likewise, the data does not reflect urban and rural divisions.
In looking at Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is clear that with the exception of Selangor,
the majority of BR1M handouts for 2012 and 2017 were distributed to rural areas of
Malaysia.26 Indeed, rural states that have traditionally been UMNO or BN strongholds
like Kelantan, Kedah, Perak, Sabah, Sarawak, and Johor received the majority of
BR1M handouts in both 2012 and 2017. Meanwhile states or federal territories that
are more urban, and have traditionally supported opposition parties like Penang,
Kuala Lumpur, Putra Jaya, and Labuan received less handouts. This is also true
when you consider the distribution of Malay voters across Malaysia.
In looking at Figures 4.3 and 4.4, Malaysia also had higher distributions of BR1M
to states with a larger number of Malays. For example, states with high Malay
populations such as Kelantan, Johor, and Kedah received a larger number of handouts
than states or federal territories with less Malays, such as Penang, Kuala Lumpur,
and Malacca. Similar to the urban/rural divide, states with a higher proportion of
Malays are also states that support UMNO and the BN.27 This, and the urban/rural
26

Selangor is somewhat unique, it is the most developed state in Malaysia, with both the highest
GDP per capital, and the lowest poverty rate. Also, while being an opposition stronghold, it has a
majority [53.6%] Bumiputera population (Malaysian Department of Statistics 2010).

27

Sabah and Sarawak are somewhat unique cases. They have high populations of Bumiputera largely
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divide, points to BR1M being used as part of the party brand to reinforce the support
of its base amongst poor, Malay-Muslims in rural areas of the country.

Figure 4.1: Handouts by Level
of Urbanization in 2012

Figure 4.2: Handouts by Level
of Urbanization in 2017

Figure 4.3: Handouts by Number of Malays in 2012

Figure 4.4: Handouts by Number of Malays in 2017

because of the number of Orang Asli that qualify for Bumiputera status, but typically receive less
of the benefits from the BN.
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Regional and social inequities emerged because of an abuse of provisions within
race-based policies of the NEP and its successors, subsequently exacerbated by the
system of patronage in place. Nonetheless, such policies of development and patronage
are the cornerstone of the UMNO platform. It is used to connect the party to voters,
with BR1M clearly a part of UMNO’s party brand. While BR1M is used in a manner
consistent with patronage, it also contains elements of programmatic distribution.
This gives us a critical opportunity to understand redistribution in Malaysia, how
Malaysian voters behave in the presence of a tangible and quantifiable benefits — that
resemble what is delivered by clientelism — but in the absence of any expectation
to vote in a certain way, or to be part of specific patron-client relationships. If there
is a relationship between voters who receive cash handouts in a manner similar to a
clientelistic distribution, to what extent is this reflected in competitive elections?
UMNO and the BN lost a considerable number of seats in the 2013 and 2018
elections.28 In 2013 the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) won the popular
vote by a substantial margin, 50.8% to 47.4%. In this election, the BN lost seats
in Johor, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perak, states it had previously dominated, and
their reliance upon a gerrymandered first-past-the-post system with pronounced
constituency malapportionment is the only reason it held onto power. In 2018, it lost
a substantial amount of seats – across the electorate – in both urban and rural areas.
States that had formerly been UMNO strongholds, clearly voted for the opposition.
The question remains, to what extent did UMNOs use of BR1M as a party brand
contribute to this?
28

This is noted in tables in the Appendices.
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4.7

Variables, Data, and Methods

The dependent variable is party competition. To measure party competition, I
use the incumbent party vote share, or percentage of total votes the incumbent
party has secured in a given election, for each state.29 This is what Elkins (1974,
683) calls fractionalization, “or the split of the vote (or seats of the legislature)
among parties or candidates.30 Vote share has been used to understand relationships
between competition and cash transfer programs in the past, and adequately captures
how electoral support and legislative power is distributed throughout the electorate
(Corrêa 2015, De La O 2013, Labonne 2013). Indeed, it has been a critical aspect to the
study of party competition for several decades. It is a necessary, if not foundational,
part in the measurement of the Effective Number of Parties.31 Outside of ENP, party
vote share as an independent or dependent variable has been used to understand party
competition in other studies as well.
For instance, it has been used to investigate relationships between local budget
outcomes and the degree of party competition (Solé-Ollé 2006). Meanwhile, Ferris et
al (2014) use party vote share as a variable to explain party competition in Canada
from 1867 to 2011. Indeed, they find that it highly correlates with other measures of
29

I recognize there are states where opposition parties were the incumbent party, Penang for example.
However, when using either BN vote share, or UMNO’s vote share, the results almost exactly the
same.

30

While coalitions (e.g. the Barisan Nasional or the Pakatan Harapan) are necessary to win office in
Malaysian politics, elected officials still campaign, win elections, and represent given districts as
members of a party. Equally important, party vote share allows us to measure competition at an
appropriate level.

31

While ENP has most often been used to measure party system fragmentation, it has a strong
foundation as a measurement of competition. Sartori (1976, 120) notes, “. . . in particular, the
tactics of party competition and opposition appear related to the number of parties; and this has,
in turn, an important bearing on how governmental coalitions are formed and are able to perform."
Conceptually it represents either the distribution of votes across political parties or their seats in
the legislature (Lijphart 1994, Cox 1997, Clark & Golder 2006, Greene & Bevan 2018).
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party competition. They find that vote share shows the same pattern across time as
ENP does. Likewise, Díaz-Jiménez and Vivero-Ávila (2015) use it to understand how
competition increased as Mexico went from a dominant party system under the PRI
to a legitimate multi-party system. However, there are limitations to the use of vote
share as a measure of party competition.
Vote share is decided ex post, and is conditional upon the election itself. Thus,
neither alone nor part of the ENP, it does not effectively capture salient political
events and subsequent electoral uncertainty, which is arguably the fundamental aspect
of electoral competition.32 For example, if the electorate remains relatively constant
in composition and size, (e.g. a 60–40 split) with generally mundane political issues,
then there is less uncertainty about the outcome. On the other hand, if you have
sensitive political issues with a shifting electorate, then a 60-40 split might become
quite competitive, because the probability of victory is unknown. Nonetheless, as a
quantitative measure of competition, vote share is still a useful option.
The independent variable is the number of BR1M handouts per capita for 2012
and 2017 by state or federal territory.33 There are thirteen states and three federal
territories, for a total of sixteen observations for both the 2013 and 2018 elections.34
32

Uncertainty surrounding who wins and loses is a critical aspect of elections.

33

I use the number of handouts for the previous year, to account for lagged relationships.

34

There is some debate as to whether Sabah and Sarawak should be included in subnational
comparative analyses of Malaysia. As Tom Pepinsky (2017) notes, there is reason to consider
both states “regions of exception,” and other prominent subnational comparative studies of
voting behavior have excluded them, for example, (2015). As Pepinsky goes onto argue, “while
East Malaysia is likely best understood as a region of exception for questions of money politics
and patronage, it may actually not be a region of exception for understanding the relationship
between indigenous identity and support for the BN” (Pepinsky 2017, 1064). Since the concepts of
interest within this paper are partisan identity and party competition, the differences in historical
development between East and West Malaysia does not impact the relationship between Bumiputera
voters and either regional or national political parties. In fact, considering this dynamic, and the
percentage of Bumiputera living in Sabah and Sarawak, this makes both states rather similar
to states in West Malaysia. Likewise, I trust that statistical tools can account for the problems
associated with regions of exception.
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The Malaysian government did not publicly release BR1M data at the subnational level,
only the total amounts for each year at the national level. I took the observations from
news sources for each state and matched them against the total amounts released by
the government sources. With each observation I looked for different sources reporting
the same amount, to account for accuracy of the data. Approximate numbers are
where only one source was found, opposed to multiple sources for the same data
point. A breakdown of BR1M totals by state for 2012 and 2017 is shown in Figure 4.5
below.35

Figure 4.5: Distribution of BR1M by State in 2012 and 2017
35

I collected data on the number of BR1M handouts from 2014 to 2016 as well. Although I judged
this data to be less accurate due to the lack of supporting sources.
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To test theoretical implications in this paper, I use a linear Bayesian model with
minimal priors, one million iterations, and a burn-in rate of one hundred thousand
for the 2013 and 2018 elections.36 To show why I use a Bayesian model, I give the
results of frequentist linear models in the Appendices. Although, the frequentist
models support the main findings in this paper, because of the small sample size,
the results tend to be less informative about the parameters being estimated. The
Bayesian model, on the other hand, allows us to better estimate uncertainty over the
relationship between dependent and independent variables. In Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are
the summary statistics for the posterior distributions of each model.37
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for the Posterior Distribution: 2013 Election
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Variable
Median SD Lower Upper
Handouts
-0.43 0.24
-0.91
0.04
Ethnicity
0.47 0.35
-0.26
1.10
Mahathir
-0.11 0.26
-0.62
0.40
Urbanization
-0.08 0.25
-0.58
0.41
Women
-1.08 0.41
-1.87
-0.25
Alpha
0.00 0.18
-0.37
0.34
Deviance
32.77 4.93 26.94 45.95

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for the Posterior Distribution: 2018 Election
2
1
3
4
5
6
7

Variable
Median SD Lower Upper
Handouts
-0.64 0.28
-1.18
-0.09
Ethnicity
0.47 0.42
-0.41
1.29
Mahathir
-0.35 0.30
-0.96
0.23
Urbanization
-0.25 0.28
-0.81
0.31
Women
-0.65 0.49
-1.57
0.35
Alpha
0.00 0.22
-0.44
0.40
Deviance
38.35 4.93 32.54 51.49

36

Minimal priors are used to avoid outliers. As a robustness check, I assume homogenous causal
effects and pool the data. The results of the statistical model are found in the Appendices. The
results are consistent with the primary models, with greater statistical significance.

37

The convergence diagnostics are found in the Appendices.
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To account for alternative factors that affect both party competition, and the
application of cash transfer programs, I use several control variables in each model.38
I control for ethnicity for several reasons. Elections in Malaysia are typically defined
by ethnic voting (Brown 2005, Pepinsky 2009). Malays are the dominant ethnic group
in Malaysia, and are more likely to receive BR1M handouts than other ethnicities
(Kaji Data Research 2017).39 I control for the level of urbanization in each state,
because cash transfer programs impact urban and rural populations differently (Cross
& Johnson 2011). Also, because urban populations vote differently than rural ones,
for example there are significant differences between East and West Malaysia (Welsh
2004).40 I control for gender, because women have increasingly played an important role
in Malaysian politics, particularly Malay-Muslim women’s groups (Mohamad* 2004).
The data for each of the control variables is taken from the 2010 Malaysian census.
Finally, because voters might support a party leader instead of policy, I use the number
of seats UMNO won in each state. This accounts for the possible effect Mahathir had
on voters when he switched to the opposition party.41
38

I use Bayesian Model Averaging to assess model uncertainty. The results are found in the Appendices.
While the posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP) for the independent variables are relatively high,
which supports their inclusion in the model, the PIPs for the control variables are relatively low.
However, because of their theoretical importance, I include them in the statistical modeling. As
Montgomery and Nyan (2010) state, it is important to “use theory to guide our judgments...”

39

To measure ethnicity, I use the number of Malays per capita in each state. This lets us examine
the partisan attachment of Malay voters. This also accounts for religion as well. Islam plays
an increasingly contentious role in Malaysian society, and BR1M has been distributed to Malay–
Muslims over other religious or ethnic groups (63% of respondents in the sample discussed earlier
are Muslim (Kaji Data Research 2017)).

40

Urbanization is the proportion of urban population as a percentage of the entire population, and
defined as “Gazetted areas with their adjoining built-up areas, which had a combined population
of 10,000 or more at the time of the Census 2010”

41

Since the BN’s vote share started to decline before BR1M, it is possible that UMNO was becoming
less competitive, and then used BR1M to regain votes. This would make the relationship endogenous.
I use a Haussman test to address questions of endogeneity, the p-values were 0.75 and 0.98 for each
model respectively, and therefore, the variables can be considered exogenous.
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4.8

Analysis

I contend that, in Malaysia, the cash transfer program BR1M was used by UMNO
as part of their party brand to win votes. The theory posits that partisan voters, in
this instance poor, rural Bumiputera voters, attach themselves to the party brand
because of their political identity. These voters feel a greater attachment to UMNO’s
party brand relative to other parties, for example, PAS. This is true of a clientelistic
party or voter as well. When a clientelistic party decides to opt out of clientelism
and become more programmatic, a longstanding client of the party will not benefit in
the same manner. However, a voter who does not identify as a client may be more
inclined to vote for a newly programmatic party. As perceptions of the party changes
over time, partisan attachment shifts along with it.
With a Bayesian linear model, the mean of a quantity of interest can be interpreted
in the same fashion as a frequentist linear regression model. This is to say that a
one unit increase in variable X is expected to increase variable Y by the value of the
corresponding beta. Substantively, this means that a decrease in the vote share of
the incumbent party is an increase in party competition. In looking at the results
in tables 4 and 5 on the following pages, a coefficient of -0.440 and -0.640 for the
2013 and 2018 models, suggests a negative relationship between the number of BR1M
handouts and party competition.42
As seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, both the 2013 and 2018 model outcomes specify
that as the number of BR1M handouts increase in each state or federal territory, the
vote share of the incumbent party decreases accordingly. When looking at Figures
42

While predicted values are not useful in a linear model, because the probability of observing an
exact value under a cumulative distributive function is zero, they are useful for assessing model fit.
In looking at figures B.4 and B.5 for the 2013 and 2018 models in the appendices, the exact value
is within the 90% confidence interval 87.5%.
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4.6 and 4.7, the relationship is negative and statistically significant at 95% for both
models. So leading up to the 13th General Election, poor voters identified as the
UMNO party prototype, relative to other parties. However, UMNO voters started to
reject the party in 2013, and completely rejected the party brand, and therefore the
distribution of BR1M handouts, in 2018.
Table 4.5: 2013 Model Statistical Outcomes
Ethnicity Handouts Mahathir
Mean
0.46
-0.44
-0.11
SD
0.35
0.24
0.26

Urbanization Women Deviance
-0.08
-1.07
33.69
0.25
0.41
4.93

Table 4.6: 2018 Model Statistical Outcomes
Ethnicity Handouts Mahathir
Mean
0.45
-0.64
-0.35
SD
0.42
0.27
0.30

Urbanization Women Deviance
-0.25
-0.63
39.27
0.28
0.49
4.93

BR1M was a cornerstone of Prime Minister Najib’s development plan, and was
certainly used by UMNO to maximize votes. This is to say, Najib used BR1M to
salvage some measure of support for the party. Therefore, its negative relationship
with party competition in both elections has important implications for the party
system in Malaysia. It suggests that not only are party brands changing, but voters
are changing with them.
Exactly how certain can we be about this effect? In this case, uncertainty can be
defined as the amount of the posterior distribution that is equal to and less than zero.
For example, we can say there is a 95% probability of finding a value equal to or less
than -0.64, and a 5% probability of finding a value above -0.64 for the 2018 election.
Likewise, one can say there is a 95% probability of finding a value equal to or less
than -0.44, and a 5% probability of finding a value above -0.44 for the 2013 election
This indicates a strong probability that BR1M negatively influenced the incumbent
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vote share during both elections.

Figure 4.6: Posterior Distribution for the 2013 Election with 95% Credible Intervals

Even still, BR1M is not the only dimension to UMNO’s platform; ethnicity is also
important. In fact, not only is ethnicity a critical aspect of Malaysian elections, but
it has been a fundamental aspect of UMNO’s party brand for decades. While not
statistically significant in any of the models, ethnicity is positive. This suggests that
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as the number of Malays increase, party competition decreases. This seems relatively
intuitive, and supports much of the literature that says Malaysian politics is driven by
ethnicity.

Figure 4.7: Posterior Distribution for the 2018 Election with 95% Credible Intervals

Urbanization is negative in all of the statistical models. This suggests that urban
voters largely rejected UMNO and the distribution of BR1M. This too is intuitive.
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Urban areas have long been the stronghold of the opposition. Furthermore, wealthy
voters are less likely to support income redistribution. “As government’s intervention
in the economy for the sake of income redistribution is something citizens may support
or reject on strictly ideological grounds" (Corrêa 2015, 64). Indeed, there is evidence
to support this, Schaffer (2005) argues that urban, middle-class voters view the poor
as nothing more than cattle, easily bought by political parties. Nonetheless, while it
is negative, urbanization is not statistically significant in any of the statistical models.

4.9

Discussion

Previous scholarship addressing the relationship between cash transfer programs and
party competition have left the question open for debate. Using Malaysia as a case
study, I build upon a theory of party branding to explain how cash transfer programs
are used by political parties to increase their likelihood of retaining office. In the
case of Malaysia, the governing coalition used BR1M as political capital to maximize
Malay votes. The party brand wasn’t inconsistent, it was strengthened through BR1M,
nevertheless, this plan failed. Exploring the relationship between BR1M and failure
in the electorate gives us the opportunity to add to social science literature in several
ways.
It lets us expand Lupu’s (2016) theory of party branding to include a discussion of
party competition, while also testing its robustness outside of Latin America. At least
in the case of Malaysia, the evidence presented in this paper supports the theory that
parties develop brands to connect with voters. In particular, it supports aspects of the
theory that explain how changing partisan attitudes affects the electoral space, when
they reject the party brand, and the implications this has for party competition. This
ultimately allows for greater theory building within the study of comparative party
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politics. This also allows us to explore circumstances surrounding the BNs surprising
defeat by the opposition coalition.
In this instance, the rejection of BR1M – and UMNO – by voters is an example
of changing partisan attitudes in the face of numerous scandals, rising cost of goods,
and declining purchasing power in Malaysia. As Lupu (2016) points out, this is the
tipping point in which even otherwise loyal voters reject the party brand. As such, the
litany of corruption and abuses in the delivery of clientelism undermined the receipt of
targeted benefits, aligning clients and non-clients alike, against the BN. Furthermore,
the complete rejection of the BN by non-Malays combined with the mutual emphasis
on Malay-Muslims in rural areas left UMNO and PAS competing for the same block
of votes (Ostwald, Schuler & Chong 2019). As Ostwald et al argue, this puts UMNO
at a crossroads going forward; either rebrand as a more progressive party, or continue
with its Bumiputera-first agenda.
Given UMNO has recently forged an alliance with PAS, it is likely going to be the
latter. This solidifies the ethnic and religious agenda in rural Malaysia, while also
giving PAS access to votes and resources outside historically Malay-Muslim strongholds.
The Sungai Kandis by-election three months after the 2018 General Election illustrates
this perfectly. PAS chose not to field a candidate, while encouraging its supporters
to vote for UMNO, “claiming that PH threatened Malay rights and the primacy of
Islam” (Ostwald, Schuler & Chong 2019, 51). Yet, the UMNO candidate lost by
approximately 23% of the vote, which only serves to underscore the core theoretical
contribution of this paper, that doubling down on the UMNO brand currently fails
even in the Malay heartland. However, despite its contributions, there are still inherent
limitations.
The statistical models do not take into account neither hardline supporters of
UMNO, nor single-issue voters who care nothing for the implementation of BR1M
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and support UMNO based purely on ethnicity or religious piety. This likely points
to why ethnicity is positive and statistically significant in the pooled model. While
a theory of party branding can add to the explanation of UMNO’s sudden decline,
the use of BR1M should be taken as a dimension of their decline in electoral fortunes,
and not a complete answer for the success of opposition parties. Most importantly,
I do not have data from the district level, hence I cannot comment on the variation
in the relationship that occurs within states, only between them. Finally, more work
needs to be done concerning all aspects of this paper. The literature concerning cash
transfer programs, specifically BR1M, and contemporary Malaysian electoral politics
is an open field of study.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The ultimate goal of this project was to use Southeast Asia, specifically Malaysia,
as a case study to explore changes in party competition in developing democracies
through shifts in party attachment. In particular, I seek to explain how shifts in party
attachment impacts both party competition, and the strategies that politicians use to
win office. The theoretical explanation for this depends stems from party brands as a
way for political parties to connect with voters. Strong connections between parties
and voters are essential to effective democratic institutions, yet in new democracies
these relationships are poorly understood.
The existing explanations for these changes stem from Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal
(1967) text. They argue that shifting social cleavages explains changes in competition
between political parties, effectively changing the party system itself. That salient
cleavages such as ethnicity, religion, and class become more or less dominant within
society, and as they shift, parties and voter attachment shifts with them. However,
this paradigm is problematic for several reasons. Chief among them that the cleavage
paradigm is less applicable to emerging democracies.
Certainly social cleavages exist. The role that ethnicity has played in shaping
politics in Southeast Asia cannot be denied. Moreover, I do not think that it will
become less important as ethnic groups in places like Terengganu in Northern Malaysia,
or Aceh in the Sumatra Islands of Indonesia face the political problems of the 21st
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century. Likewise, I do not think that religion or class will become less important
in Manila or Kuching. It is simply that these cleavages are not the only thing that
defines linkages between voters and political parties. Clientelism also plays a role in
this.
The Lipset & Rokkan paradigm does not adequately address strategic relationships
between voters and parties. Clientelism, and more specifically vote buying are a critical
part of party politics in the region. This is also true of developing democracies in
general, where parties are weaker and democratic norms have yet to be institutionalized.
To take into account the role that clientelism and vote buying play in the changing
dynamics of competition, I offer an alternative theoretical framework.
Using an adaption of Noam Lupu’s theory of party branding, I argue that when
a party’s platform, or brand is clearly defined, some voters form strong attachments
to it, so strong in fact they may support the party regardless of its performance in
office (Lupu 2016). However, at times, the party brand dilutes or weakens due to
some degree of inconsistency. When this happens, a voter’s partisan attachment to
the party erodes and they start considering the party’s policies while in office more
seriously when making voting decisions. Political parties then become susceptible to
voter’s retrospective evaluations. When established or incumbent parties both dilute
their brand, fragment, and perform poorly in office, partisan realignment occurs and
voters defect en masse to new or opposition parties. Party competition then increases.
In the case of Malaysia UMNO actually doubled down on their brand, shifting
to a more pro-Malay stance over time, and that that muddies its ethnic cooperation
brand and this leads to a loss of support from Chinese, Indians and middle-class
Malays, further driving UMNO towards its base in an unvirtuous cycle. This is to stay,
they stuck with what put them into office, a reliance upon poor, rural Malays. One
dimension of my dissertation is to further understand this party brand, and how it
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relates to voters. While there has been substantial work involving electoral politics in
neighboring countries, for example the Philippines, Malaysia has been comparatively
understudied. To what extent is clientelism a part of this?
Vote Buying is shown to be a significant factor. With a difference of means of 0.13,
which suggest that during the 2013 Malaysian general election vote buying happened
approximately 13% of the time. Typically the most you could do at this point is
compare difference of means between subgroups. However, using a statistical estimator
created by Kosuke Imai, one can take the results of the list experiment and use them
to make predictions at the individual level. When you look at the predicted values for
differences between ethnic groups, Malays are more likely to sell their vote.
Likewise, when you look at income in Malaysia, poorer voters are more likely to
sell their vote. When you consider rural and urban voters, those voters living in towns
with less than 10,000 people are more likely to sell their vote than voters in larger
cities. Finally, voters that support the dominant coalition are more likely to sell their
vote. In both a general difference of means test, and a more sophisticated statistical
model, the BN’s party brand was in full effect during during the 2013 election.
In looking at the data closer, a clear pattern emerges. Where the BN used vote
buying to mobilize poor, rural Malay voters, opposed to other ethnic groups or social
classes. This is both consistent with the clientelism literature more broadly, and
congruent with the application of party branding to Malaysia. This helps us further
understand the role of the BN voter prototype. It also allows us to understand how
clientelism was used in Malaysia. Although this is not the only aspect of their brand.
UMNOs party brand is also evident in their use of their welfare policy BR1M. Created
in 2012 as part of the Prime Minister’s development program. it’s used to both as a
redistribution policy for poor voters, and to solidify the Malay-first agenda.
BR1M is clearly used a part of the party brand. The distribution of handouts
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for both 2012 and 2017 were skewed to rural parts of Malaysia. This also true in
regards to ethnicity, for both 2012 and 2017, handouts were distributed in states
with a higher Malay populations. In many instances it was delivered from the party
offices themselves. Furthermore, BR1M has increased in both number of handouts
and amounts in the 5 years since 2012. The BN relied upon their party brand. They
assumed that these voters would continue to support them.
Using the incumbent vote share as a proxy for competition during the 2013 and
2018 elections, it is clear that the number of BR1M handouts have a negative and
statistically significant effect on party competition. This effect is even stronger when
you pool the data. It’s not significant, but ethnicity is also positive in all of the models.
Again, I do not think ethnicity is going to suddenly become less important. Just
that clientelism is also necessary to consider, relative to ethnic or class voting blocs.
Although certainly someone could say, “I’ll take your handout, but still not vote for
you.” In the end, BR1M would be the last example of this brand dilution that put the
nail in the coffin, when even UMNOs base rejected them.
The policies implemented by UMNO and the BN resulted in an odd development
where an urban, middle-class Malay demographic has developed. These are largely
bureaucrats living in Kuala Lumpur who no longer want to subsidize the lives of rural
Malaysians. The BN failed to recognize the growing political power of this group, and
their shifting political preferences. Instead of trying to accommodate these voters, and
develop multiple dimensions of their brand, they stuck with what got them into office.
However, urban Malay voters, who might have accepted BNs mobilization strategies
twenty or thirty years prior, completely rejected the party brand. So they relied upon
poor, rural voters. Rural voters have increasingly become dissatisfied with ineffective
development policies – these policies are the very backbone of UMNOs brand. Yet
throughout the sixty years UMNO was in power, Malays were still the poorest ethnic
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group.
Likewise, there is evidence through recent surveys that a majority of Malay voters
want amend constitutional advantages for Bumiputera. The aspects of the economic
plans critical to UMNOs success. They argue these benefits are not effective, and only
serve to divide Malaysia. Still, there is evidence to suggest that instead of rebranding,
UMNO is going to continue with the Malay-first agenda. For example, they’ve recently
developed a partnership with the Islamic party, PAS. Nonetheless, despite the work
that has been made, there are rather significant theoretical and empirical limitations.
Despite attempts to address it, endogeneity is likely to be an issue. For example,
it is certainly possible that payments or benefits increased as support for UMNO
eroded in the early 2000s. This is paralleled in figure 1.1 found in the Introduction,
where clientelism in Malaysia spikes when party competition increased in the early
2000s. In the 2013 election, there was significant vote buying in Perak, where elections
were quite competitive. Consider what Summers (2004, 98) suggests about The 19th
century United States when he states, “a rustic who put himself up for sale in the
morning could be bought relatively cheap, the smart ones waited until later to take
bids, knowing that the tensions of an election day would press party workers to raise
their prices, usually.”
In addition, political institutions are going influence the role that clientelism
plays in society. At a macro-level democratization and the overall strengthening of
democratic institutions decreases the effectiveness of clientelism. At the ground level,
certainly the rules that govern elections matter. Electoral systems that encourage
personal votes likely also encourage clientelism. For instance, personalized contests
allow for representatives and parties to organize and monitor money and goods traded
for votes. In the American context electoral rules prohibiting clientelism existed
between the 1860s and 1880s. However, these were routinely violated, it wasn’t until
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the Australian ballot was implemented, and coupled with a professional bureaucratic
class, did vote buying and patron-client relationships decline.1
The last great reform of the Gilded Age, the Australian ballot, made votes as
commodities worthless. Without knowing if they were getting a return on their
investment, poll workers would withhold payments; meanwhile parties no longer
needed to invest resources into inefficient mobilization strategies. This had the largest
effect in rural areas, where everyone knew one another. It leveled the playing field
between wealthy and poor parties, and once the curtain closed on the polling booth,
allowed tenant farmers to vote without fear of reprisal from wealthy creditors. Free of
bribery and intimidation, reformers expected the electorate to develop well-informed
policy preferences, nonetheless, voters more or less voted the same (Kuo 2018). As
one New Hampshire Republican wrote to Senator William Chandler, “the ballot law
which we have used in this state for four years . . . has served the state well and the
Republican party better” (Summers 2004).
Moreover, there are conceptual issues with the nature of clientelism. It is open
for debate whether parties target core supporters, or swing voters. There is less of
a risk when targeting existing supporters, while offering swing voters is useful when
an election is particularly competition. While it makes a contribution, the work in
this dissertation does not exactly settle that argument. Likewise, goods are not equal.
Obviously vote buying is clientelistic, and certainly illegal, whereas other forms of
redistributive policies might be more programmatc and less clientelistic, for example,
pork barrel projects for specific ethnic groups in a district are likely patronage, but
far less clientelistic than outright vote buying.
In addition to conceptual issues, there are also limitations to the data as well. I
1

It also largely disenfranchised illiterate or slow readers (Summers 2004).
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attempt to make an argument based upon two recent elections. However, the survey
experiment does not measure the use of patron-client relationships over time. It only
examines the role it played in the 2013 election. Thus, I can only speculate as to
the shifting views toward clientelism in Malaysia. Likewise, the BR1M data only
extends to the state level. While it contributes to explanations for variations in voter
behavior between states, it cannot explain variation in vote behavior within states.
For example, voters who support PAS over UMNO in Terengganu and Kelantan.
More importantly, this does not speak to the continuing success of the opposition.
Some would argue, the PH has not effectively dealt with Malaysia’s debt and they
could very well lose the next election. In looking at history, both the LDP in Japan,
and the PRI in Mexico came back to win office after losing. It is absolutely possible
for the BN to do the same. Ultimately, this could simply be a matter of vote choice,
not party attachment. I could absolutely be wrong about the underlying mechanics of
all this.
I tried to connect theory in Latin America to data collected in Southeast Asia.
Although, because of the limitations in my dissertation, my contribution should
be considered a contribution to theory generation, instead of investigation into the
causal relationship between vote buying and party competition. Yet, still there is a
contribution to be made. This project illuminates answers to a number of puzzles
within comparative politics. It addresses literature that questions whether or not vote
buying is effective, and what this means for the quality of governance. It addresses
the nature of party politics in Southeast Asia, filling a gap in the nature of dynamics
of clientelism and party competition in Malaysia. These questions are important, and
deserve answers.
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Figure A.1: Dewan Rakyat Results 2004
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Figure A.2: Dewan Rakyat Results 2008

Figure A.3: Dewan Rakyat Results 2013
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Figure A.4: Dewan Rakyat Results 2018
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Survey Questions
Read the following statement to the subject:
You are being asked to participate in this study because you participated in the
previous election. The purpose of the research is to better understand relationships
between voters and parties in Malaysia. You will be read a series of questions. The
survey is voluntary and anonymous, and you do not have to answer any question you
do not want to, and will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes. Any questions can be
directed towards the survey enumerator.

1. Male: 1 Female: 2
2. What year were you born?
3. What was your last full year of education?
1 No formal education
2 Primary school / Secondary school
3 Certificate / Diploma / Advanced Diploma
4 Bachelor’s Degree
5 Master’s Degree
6 PhD

4. What is the postcode where you stay?

178

5. What is the occupation of the main income earner in your household?
1 Business Owner
2 Professional/Manager/Executive
3 Other White Collar
4 Skilled/Semi-Skilled Worker
5 Unskilled Worker
6 Student
7 Housewife
8 Part-Time/Temporary Worker
9 Unemployed
6. How much does your family earn per month? (Code one number)
1 Less than 2,000 RM
2 2,001 to 5,000 RM
3 5,001 to 8,000 RM
4 8,001 to 12,000 RM
5 12,001 to 15,000 RM
6 More than 15,000 RM
7 Not willing to disclose
7. Which of the following items, which are in working condition, do you have in your
household?
1 Air Condition Yes No
2 Laptop Yes No
3 Home Internet Yes No
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8. How many cars are there in your household, either for private and/or business use?

1=0
2=1
3=2
4=3
5=4
6=5
7 = 6 plus
8a. What is the value of your most expensive car in your household? You may have
multiple cars, but we are only interested in the most expensive one. Would you say it
is in the range of:
1 60,000RM and below
2 60,001RM to 100,000RM
3 100,0011RM to 150,000RM
4 150,001RM or more
9. What ethnic group do you belong to?
1 Malay
2 Chinese
3 Indian
4 Other (write in):
10. Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (If NO code as 0) IF YES:
What religion or religious denomination do you belong to?
1 No Religious Denomination
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2 Buddhist
3 Muslim
4 Traditional Chinese Religion
5 Christian Denomination
6 Hindu
7 Sikh
8 Roman Catholic
9 Other (write in):
11. How important is religion in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means
“Very Important” and 1 means “Not Important.” (Code one number):
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

12. Do you affiliate with a political party? (If NO code as 0) IF YES: What political
party do you affiliate with?
1 No Affiliation
2 United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
3 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)
4 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)
5 Democratic Action Party (DAP)
6 People’s Justice Party (PKR)
7 Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAN)
8 Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM)
9 Parti Amanah Negara (PAN)
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10 Other (Write In):

13. Which coalition did you support in the last election? (If NO code as 0)
0 No Affiliation
1 National Front (Barisan Nasional)
2 People’s Pact (Pakatan Harapan)
3 Independent Candidate
4 Other Party
14. Please tell me if you are agree or disagree with the following phrase: The elections
for parliament are fair
1 Yes
2 No
3 Don’t Know
4 No answer
15. Do you think that honest elections play an important role in deciding whether
you and your family are able to make a good living? (IF NO code as 4) IF YES: How
important would you say this is—very important, fairly important, not very important
or not at all important?
1 Very important
2 Rather important
3 Not very important
4 Not at all important
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16. I am going to read you a list that mentions various activities, and I would like for
you to tell me if they were carried out during the last electoral campaign. Please, DO
NOT tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.
You read or watched news about politics;
You talked about politics with other people
You were given a gift/money or someone did you a favor;
Candidates visited your home or workplace;
You worked on a campaign;
[Mark the number:]

1

2

3
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4

5

DK is 9

NA is 10

Table A.1a: Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 1
Group
Gender

Age

Ethnic
Group

Religious
Group

a

Subgroup
Men
Women
20 - 24
25 - 29
30 - 34
35 - 39
40 - 44
45 - 49
50 - 54
55 - 59
60 - 64
65- 69
70-74
75- 79
80- 84
85 plus
Malay
Chinese
Indian
Other
None
Buddhist
Muslim
Trad. Chinese
Christian
Hindu
Sikh
Roman Catholic
Other

Proportion
of Sample
52.2%
47.8%
3.35%
19.3%
20.6%
14.8%
14.5%
9.5%
7.9%
5.4%
3.0%
0.79%
0.39%
0.39%
0.39%
0.59%
50.0%
41.1%
4.45%
4.45%
4.3%
24.7%
50.7%
1.6%
11.6%
3.4%
2.9%
0.8%

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.001

184

Difference
in Means
0.342
-0.850
-0.294
0.319
0.099
-0.184
0.191
0.390
-0.104
0.530
-0.380
0.193
0.110
-0.420
0.030
0.267
0.024
0.186
0.111
0.111
-0.540
0.562
-

SE
(.09)***
(.08)
(.40)
(.15)**
(.15)
(.17)
(.18)
(.20)*
(.22)
(.30)*
(.38)
(.10)**
(.09)
(.30)
(.36)
(.29)
(.13)
(.09)*
(.42)
(.17)
(.34)
(.43)
-

Table A.1b: Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 2
Group

Education

Occupation

Income

a

Subgroup
None
Primary School
Certificate/Diploma
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
PhD
Business Owner
Professional/Executive
Other White Collar
Skilled Worker
Unskilled Worker
Student
Housewife
Part-time
Unemployed
Less than 2000
2001 to 5000
5001 to 8000
8001 to 12000
12001 to 15000
More than 15000
Not Willing to Disclose

Proportion
of Sample
-10.8%
27.9%
50.2%
9.7%
1.1%
11.9%
48.7%
15.3%
12.9%
0.59%
0.89%
2.0%
5.2%
2.5%
9.2%
32.0%
26.2%
18.3%
6.2%
5.6%
2.5%

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.001
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Difference
in Means
0.607
0.417
-0.151
0.080
0.625
0.374
0.052
0.038
0.236
0.333
0.226
0.266
-0.549
0.438
-0.044
-0.120
0.169
0.244
0.032

SE
(.24)***
(.13)**
(.08)*
(.18)
(.53)
(.21)*
(.09)
(.16)
(.20
(.64)
(.29)
(.50)
(.25)
(.13)***
(.11)
(.13)
(.26)
(.25)
(.40)

Table A.1c: Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 3
Proportion
of Sample
None
54.2%
UMNO
16.9%
MCA
3.5%
MIC
0.85%
Party
DAP
7.6%
Affiliation
PKR
4.4%
PAS
7.2%
PPBM
1.9%
PAN
0.85%
OTHER
2.6%
National Front
40.9%
Coalition
People’s Pact
42.7%
Support
Indp. Candidate
10.8%
Other Party
5.5%
Yes
34.2%
Fair
No
44.5%
Elections
Don’t Know
17.3%
No Answer
4.0%
Very Important
0.079%
Honest
Rather Important
2.4%
Elections
Not Very Important
20.3%
Not At All Important
76.5%
Group

a

Subgroup

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.001
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Difference
in Means
0.185
0.149
-0.021
-0.037
0.151
0.129
0.637
0.356
0.107
0.143
0.104
0.321
0.135
0.171
0.052
0.200
0.102
0.137

SE
(.08)*
(.17)
(.44)
(.16)
(.27)
(.24)
(.59)
(.39)
(.11)
(.08)
(.21)
(.29)
(.12)
(.09)*
(.16)
(.57)
(.15)
(.07)*

Table A.1d: Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 4
Group

Subgroup

Under 2,000
2,000 to 5,000
5,001 to 10,000
Urban
10,001 to 20,000
Rural
20,001 to 50,000
Divide
50,001 to 100,000
100,001 to 500,000
500,000 or more
0
1
2
Number
3
of Cars
4
5
6 or more
60,000RM and below
Car
60,001RM to 100,000RM
Value
101,000 to 150,000RM
151,000RM or more
Johor
Kedah
Kelantan
Malacca
Negeri Sembilan
Pahang
Palau
State
Perak
Perlis
Selangor
Terengganu
Sabah
Sarawak
Kuala Lumpur
a

Proportion
of Sample
0.79%
0.49%
1.9%
3.5%
8.2%
6.5%
53.1%
25.1%
2.6%
35.9%
40.9%
13.3%
4.9%
1.9%
0.49%
43.4%
36.7%
14.1%
5.8%
12.0%
6.0%
5.0%
3.0%
3.0%
5.0%
6.0%
8.0%
1.0%
21.0%
3.0%
11.0%
9.0%
6.0%

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.001
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Difference
in Means
1.400
0.518
0.207
0.272
0.083
0.135
0.062
-0.92
0.259
0.145
-0.160
-0.092
0.257
0.173
0.158
-0.178
0.226
0.112
0.093
-0.286
-0.044
0.202
-0.692
0.182
0.504
0.095
0.250
0.611
0.423
0.055

SE
(.57)***
(.56)
(.34)
(.27)
(.28)
(.09)
(.12)
(.38)
(.11)**
(.10)
(.16)
(.28)
(.54)
(.10)*
(.11)
(.15)
(.30)
(.20)
(.36)
(.47)
(.40)
(.36)
(.56)
(.21)
(.29)
(.13)
(.70)
(.23)
(.19)
(.13)

Appendix B
Material for Chapter 5
Table B.1: Change in Number of Seats in the 2013 Election
State

B. Nasional

P. Rakyat

Independent

Johor
Kedah
Kelantan
Malacca
Negeri Sembilan
Pahang
Penang
Perak
Perlis
Sabah
Sarawak
Selangor
Terengganu
Kuala Lumpur
Putra Jaya
Labuan

-4
-1
+3
-1
X
-2
+1
-1
X
+2
-4
-1
-2
+1
X
X

+4
+1
-2
+1
X
+2
+1
+2
X
X
+4
+1
+2
X
X
X

X
-2
-1
X
X
X
-2
-1
X
-2
X
X
X
-1
X
X

a

No change is the number of seats in denoted by X
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Table B.2: Change in Number of Seats in the 2018 Election
State
B. Nasional
Johor
-13
Kedah
-8
Kelantan
X
Malacca
-2
Negeri Sembilan
-2
Pahang
-1
Penang
-1
Perak
-1
Perlis
-1
Sabah
-12
Selangor
-6
Terengganu
-3
Sarawak
-2
Kuala Lumpur
-2
Labuan
X
Putra Jaya
X

P. Harapan
+13
+6
X
+2
+2
+2
+1
+5
+1
+11
+4
+7
-1
+2
X
X

G. Sejahtera
X
+2
X
X
X
-1
X
-4
X
X
X
-4
+3
X
X
X

a

No change is the number of seats in denoted by X
Independents won 1 seat in Sabah and 2 seats in Selangor, not noted in
the table
b

Table B.3: Urbanization and Malay Population by State
State
Johor
Kedah
Kelantan
Malacca
Negeri Sembilan
Pahang
Perak
Perlis
Penang
Sabah
Sarawak
Selangor
Terengganu
Kuala Lumpur
Putra Jaya
Labuan

% of
% of Malays
Urbanization by Population
71.9
54.6
42.4
86.5
66.5
50.5
69.7
51.4
90.8
54
53.5
91.4
59.1
100
100
82.3

45.9
68.8
68.1
57.0
50.3
62.3
28.4
76.5
35.2
5.7
20.0
42.7
79.4
36.0
70.3
29.0
189

Table B.4: Bayesian Model Averaging Output
Variables
2013 Vote Share
2018 Vote Share
2012 BR1M Handouts
2017 BR1M Handouts
Gender
Ethnicity
Mahathir
Urbanization

PIP
1.00
0.92
0.64
0.42
0.41
0.31
0.21
0.20
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Post Mean Post SD
0.94
0.09
0.47
0.22
-0.34
0.36
0.15
0.33
-0.04
0.25
-0.07
0.18
0.01
0.09
0.01
0.08

Figure B.1: Pooled Model Posterior Distribution
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Table B.5: Frequentist Linear Regression Model for the 2013 Election
Dependent variable:
Party Competition
2012 BR1M Handouts

−0.434∗
(0.222)

Urbanization

−0.078
(0.223)

Malay

0.463
(0.313)

Gender

−1.070∗∗
(0.363)

Mahathir

−0.111
(0.228)

Constant

−0.000
(0.165)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

16
0.708
0.562
0.662 (df = 10)
4.847∗∗ (df = 5; 10)
∗

p<0.1;
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∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table B.6: Frequentist Linear Regression Model for the 2018 Election
Dependent variable:
Party Competition
−0.636∗∗
(0.256)

2017 BR1M Handouts

Urbanization

−0.247
(0.253)

Malay

0.458
(0.379)

Gender

−0.628
(0.434)

Mahathir

−0.355
(0.268)

Constant

0.000
(0.197)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

16
0.586
0.378
0.788 (df re= 10)
2.826∗ (df = 5; 10)
∗

p<0.1;
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∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Figure B.2: Convergence Diagnostics for the 2013 Model
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Figure B.3: Convergence Diagnostics for the 2018 Model
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Figure B.4: Predicted Probabilities for the 13th General Election with 90% Confidence Intervals
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Figure B.5: Predicted Probabilities for the 14th General Election with 90% Confidence Intervals
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